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Abstract
The Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 identifies important
new responsibilities for Metropolitan Planning Organizations (MPOs) in the transportation
planning process, including the development of financial plans to accompany long-range
transportation plans (LRPs) and Transportation Improvement Programs (TIPs). Joint
FHWA and FTA planning regulations governing the requirement of financial constraint
were promulgated in October, 1993. In addition, EPA Conformity Regulations
documenting the relationship of the financial constraint requirement to Conformity
requirements were handed down in November, 1993. At this, the half-way point of the
ISTEA legislation, this thesis analyzes the financial planning requirements as contained in
ISTEA, from their historical antecedents to the status of present-day implementation
activities across MPOs.
Following a review of the mandate for the financial constraint requirement, a history of
public budgeting and financial requirements in U.S. transportation planning is documented
in Chapter 2. Several salient issues are identified, a central one being the concern that the
requirement may actually do more harm than good, by focusing attention on the limited
investment capacity of urban areas. As a remedy to this, Chapter 1 suggests that ISTEA
may have been remiss in not adopting the teletic view of financial planning by requiring
both constrained and unconstrained (vision) plans to be developed by MPOs. These plans
could inform national transportation policy by documenting the cost-to-complete the re-
capitalization, management and expansion of the nation's urban transportation systems.
Chapter 3 conceives a framework for viewing the impact of the financial constraint
requirement based upon four stages of transportation planning: System Planning, Program
Development, Project Development and Implementation. The roles and responsibilities of
various stakeholders in implementing financial planning requirements are identified,
including those of MPOs, States, US DOT, the US Congress and transit operators.
Techniques for performing analysis and strengthening institutional capacity are suggested.
Chapter 4 examines the experience of three MPOs in their first attempts at
implementing the financial constraint requirement. The Philadelphia, Salt Lake City and
Seattle regions exhibit varying approaches to and capacities for conducting financial
planning. Their experiences provide valuable lessons on best practices and common
pitfalls in implementation.
Chapter 5 presents findings for consideration of the financial constraint requirement as
we approach re-authorization of ISTEA in 1997.
Thesis Advisor: Mr. Fred Salvucci
Title: Senior Lecturer, Civil and Environmental Engineering
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Chapter 1.0 Introduction
1.1 Research Statement
How should transportation projects, from the most nondescript to the most high-profile
get evaluated, planned and ultimately delivered? In drafting the Intermodal Surface
Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991, Congress first and foremost believed that planners
should plan within their budgets, to the extent that these can be estimated over a 20 year
horizon. Prior to ISTEA, some plans were fantastically unconstrained, with everything
thrown in but the proverbial kitchen sink. This type of planning was not very useful in
guiding choices when the gap between the 20-year long-range plan and the three- to five-
year Transportation Improvement Program needed to be bridged. Project evaluation and
prioritization was not a strongpoint of many Metropolitan Planning Organizations, the
entities charged with long- and short- range transportation planning in urban areas, where
political considerations often obscured technical factors in decision-making.
Furthermore, in some states, state (or highway) interests maintained heavy control over
the project selection process as a result of the fact that metropolitan plans and programs
must be incorporated into state documents and approved by governors before federal
funds may be disbursed.
While this approval process remains under ISTEA, the regulations now give primary
responsibility of developing plans and programs to metropolitan regions who must work in
consultation or in cooperation with states, depending on the pot of money to be
programmed. Congress granted MPOs new powers, but required MPOs to perform
major new financial planning activities in exchange. The Intermodal Surface
Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 identifies important new responsibilities for
Metropolitan Planning Organizations (MPOs) in the transportation planning process. A
major requirement in ISTEA states that metropolitan Long Range Plans and
Transportation Improvement Programs, the long and short range priority plans in a given
region, must be financially constrained. Generally speaking, this means that planned
expenditures of a region over a set period of time must not exceed revenues which can be
reasonably expected to be available to that region over the same period of time. The
financial constraint provisions of ISTEA are not entirely new. However, administered in
concert with Environmental Protection Agency regulations regarding the Conformity of
transportation plans and programs to air quality plans, the financial constraint requirement
imposes significant new challenges and present historic new opportunities to reform
transportation planning.
At this, the halfway point of the legislative period covered by ISTEA, and one and half
years since the regulations governing financial constraint were first promulgated, it is
appropriate to assess the normative and positive impacts of the financial constraint
requirement on the transportation planning process. This thesis analyzes the financial
constraint requirement in transportation planning. How is the regulation being
implemented? What is the effect of financial constraint on transportation planning
processes and products? What is the value added of the requirement? What are the costs
of the requirement? These issues are of interest to the transportation planning community
at-large, including practitioners, policy-makers and the public. In particular, they will be
of interest to the Department of Transportation and US Congress, as these bodies begin to
contemplate the re-authorization of ISTEA, which expires in FY 1997.
1.2 Scope
The scope of this thesis is largely determined by the scope of the regulations governing
financial constraint. This thesis considers the history and philosophical merits of financial
constraint, as well as the legislative background and intent of the requirement, as
documented in the October 1993 Metropolitan and Statewide Planning Regulations and
the accompanying November 1993 EPA Conformity Regulations. In the interest of
brevity, analysis of compliance with the regulations will focus on the requirement as
practiced at the metropolitan level by MPOs, and not the States. The reason for this is to
control the scope of the thesis topic and because the activities at the MPO level are a
microcosm of inter-governmental relations which - by examining MPO plans and
processes - can be a proxy for/indicative of the general health of the planning process in
the state as a whole.
Pursuant to this distinction, the scope of this thesis can be stratified in two ways. The first
is by stakeholder group, e.g. Federal (Congressional and regulatory), Practitioner (State
DOTs, MPOs, transit operators and other project sponsors), and the Public. For these
groups, this thesis investigates the appropriate roles, responsibilities and levels of effort by
each of the stake-holders in meeting the requirements of financial constraint. A review of
available and suggested transportation and financial planning techniques is also included.
The second stratification is of the metropolitan planning process itself. Two "snapshot"
stages of planning are the Systems Planning stage and Programming stage, represented by
the Long-Range Plan and Transportation Improvement Program, respectively. An
examination of the products of the planning process further suggests two additional stages
of the planning process which should be considered. These are the pre-planning stage,
which refers to the genesis of projects, and the implementation stage of transportation
planning in which projects and programs are actually delivered.
In addition, as they are important and germane to the discussion of financial constraint,
this thesis also considers the topics of state-level planning requirements, metropolitan
planning requirements other than financial constraint, and/or other financial provisions of
ISTEA, such as flexible funding, as they relate to the financial planning requirements of
ISTEA.
1.3 Methodology
As the history of the primary legislation, the ISTEA of 1991 is recent, the literature on the
topic of financial constraint is sparse. This thesis therefore relies heavily on case studies of
MPOs. The sources of the case studies are the author's own work experience at the
Metropolitan Transportation Commission and one year of research with the Volpe
National Transportation Systems Center, in which Enhanced Planning Reviews were
carried out in several urban areas. MPO products, such as the Long Range Plan and the
TIP, provide the primary data for analysis. These documents are supplemented with
literature, interviews and Congressional testimony as appropriate.
1.4 Review of Chapters
This thesis discusses the impact of fiscal constraint in transportation planning in four
chapters. Chapter two presents the legislative history and intent of the requirement, as
well as an historical account of financial planning in federal programs and transportation
planning in particular. Upon establishing a context for the requirement, chapter three
presents the actual requirements and considers the impact of the requirement - in terms of
the objectives, techniques and major challenges of the requirement - using the four stages
of transportation planning as a framework. After flushing out the relationship of financial
constraint with each step of the transportation planning process, chapter four presents a
snapshot of three MPOs and their approaches to implementing the financial constraint
requirement in each of the major transportation planning areas. Finally, chapter five
presents summary findings and recommendations for improving the implementation of
financial planning requirements.
Chapter 2.0 Background and Context
The purpose of this chapter is to provide background and context for viewing the financial
constraint requirements in transportation planning. The chapter begins with a review of
the primary pieces of legislation mandating financial constraint, the Intermodal Surface
Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 and the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990. Next,
the chapter presents an historical survey of public budgeting. This account sheds light on
the evolution of financial planning in transportation planning and the potential for financial
constraint to succeed as envisioned in ISTEA. Together, these perspectives set the stage
for the presentation of the actual requirements of the regulations governing financial
constraint, and consideration of a framework to identify the impact of the requirement on
various stages of the transportation planning process in Chapter 3.
2.1 The Mandate for Financial Constraint
The mandate for financial constraint derives from at least three sources: the Intermodal
Surface Transportation Efficiency Act (1991), the Clean Air Act Amendments (1990) and
other policy directives from the Executive branch. We begin with a look at ISTEA.
2.1.1 Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991. The primary
legislative mandate to financially constrain transportation plans and programs appears in
two parts within the section on Metropolitan Planning in ISTEA. The first component of
financial constraint is the requirement of financial plans for both the Long-Range Plan
(LRP) and the Transportation Improvement Program (TIP). The second component of
financial constraint is the requirement that priority consideration be given to system
priority needs in the development of these newly required financial plans.
Financial Plans. Identical paragraphs under provisions for the Long-Range Plan and
Transportation Improvement Program state that each document must, at a minimum:
Include a financial plan that demonstrates how the [LRP/TIP] can be
implemented, indicates resources from public and private sources that are
reasonably expected to be made available to carry out the plan, and
recommends any innovative financing techniques to finance needed projects
and programs, including value capture, tolls and congestion pricing.'
Primary Purpose: Reform. The main purpose of requiring financial plans to accompany
LRPs and TIPs is to target and reform the transportation planning process. An excerpt
from the metropolitan and statewide planning regulations governing financial constraint
lends insight into the legislative intent of the requirement:
It is very clear from the [conference] report language that the Congress
included the requirements for financial plans for both transportation plans
and the TIPs because of concerns with pre-ISTEA "wish list"
transportation plans and TIPs. 2
Transportation "wish lists" refer to the consistent and gross over-programming of LRPs
and TIPs. As products of the transportation planning process, these documents indicate
the lack of a substantive planning process in transportation planning and are considered
harmful for three reasons. First, the absence of increasing plan refinement at successive
stages of the transportation planning process reflects poor project selection processes,
undermining the purpose of planning exercises. In addition, deficiencies in project
definition, including those in financial planning, cause costly delays at the time of project
implementation. Finally, public trust and confidence in the planning process is eroded as a
result of these effects. As Murray notes:
With unrealistic [or non-existent] financial assumptions, the overall
community vision used to develop the TIP is breached. ... Rather than a
program of projects, the TIP [or Plan] is a pool of projects from which to
choose; not a self-contained investment program sufficient to implement
certain regional goals.3
At a minimum, these twin problems - poor project selection processes and project delays -
were considered evidence of inefficiencies in the planning process. In the worst case, their
'ISTEA, Sec. 134, Subparts (g)(2)(B) and (h)(2)(B), 105 Stat. 1958-1959.
2 FHWA/FTA, 23 CFR Part 450 Statewide Planning; Metropolitan Planning, Rule, Federal Register, Vol.
58, No 207, October 28, 1993, p. 58059.
3David Murray, "Financial Constraint of the Transportation Improvement Program", in STPP, ISTEA
Planner's Workbook, ed. Margaret Franko, Washington, D.C., October, 1994, p. 62.
effects compromise public trust. ISTEA targets these undesirable outcomes of "wish list"
planning by strengthening project development and implementation activities.
Plan Development. Financial plans allow regions to take an objective and detailed look
at available resources and expected costs when designing that bundle of strategies which
best meets community needs and desires. This examination reveals the extent to which
currently available resources will be adequate or inadequate to cover the necessary or
desired level of investment. Financial plans identify and quantify resource scarcity.
Assuming scarcity is found, the resulting opportunity cost of resources then serves as the
mechanism by which plan refinement occurs. By forcing decisionmakers to consider
financial realities as tehy evaluate alternatives, develop priorities and makeinvestment
decisions in the transportation planning process, ISTEA financial plans attempt to
strengthen, or "give teeth" to the plan development process.
Implementation. In addition to improving plan development, ISTEA also intends for
financial plans to improve the implementation of those projects as articulated in LRPs and
TIPs. In the latter stages of planning, financial plans are expected to act as management
tools to minimize delays and contribute to the overall deliverability of the region's priority
investments. In these ways, ISTEA financial planning requirements seek to strengthen and
reinforce the transportation planning process from the earliest stages of system planning
on through to the actual delivery or implementation of projects.
Secondary Purpose: System Preservation. The second component of financial
constraint is the identification of system preservation needs as a priority consideration in
financial plans. ISTEA states that transportation plans must:
Assess capital investment and other measures necessary to ensure the
preservation of the existing metropolitan transportation system, including
requirements for operational improvements, resurfacing, restoration and
rehabilitation of existing and future major roadways, as well as operations,
maintenance, modernization, and rehabilitation of existing and future transit
facilities. 4
4ISTEA, p. 105 Stat. 1958.
The purpose of assigning priority to system preservation needs in financial plans is
twofold: to further emphasize good planning practice through resource management, and
to promote the idea of system management, a function which will be increasingly
necessary in the post-Interstate era.
Resource/Asset Management. In conjunction with the mandate for Management
Systems, ISTEA's financial constraint requirements emphasize the need for greater
efficiency in the transportation planning process. Whereas financial plans discipline the
planning process from a theoretical basis, the requirement of system preservation fortifies
the notion of efficiency in a more tangible way: by focusing attention on responsible
management of the existing asset base. This component of financial planning embraces the
view that the use of sound investment principles should not end with the construction of
facilities and the purchase of plant and equipment. Efficient operation, maintenance and
preservation of assets are all necessary in order to maximize total system benefits.
System Management. Finally, the emphasis on system management brings the purpose
behind financial constraint - to strengthen the planning process - full circle by closing the
loop in the planning cycle. Financial constraint contributes to ISTEA's overall emphasis
on system efficiency by acknowledging the increasingly important role of system
management in future planning activities. Viewed in this way, financial constraint fights
two transportation policy "wars". The first is a war left over from pre-ISTEA times: the
promotion of good planning practice. The second war heralds the dawn of a new era in
transportation planning. ISTEA financial constraint exhorts decision-makers to think
critically and creatively about the next generation of transportation projects and programs.
ISTEA challenges regions to recognize that they can no longer build their way out of
congestion problems, and must look instead for ways to better "manage what they've
got".
Through the requirement of financial plans and the priority consideration of system
preservation, ISTEA attempts to establish comprehensive financial planning as a core
activity within the practice of transportation planning. In conjunction with other ISTEA
planning requirements including Public Involvement, Management Systems, and Major
Investment Studies these new financial planning requirements are intended to strengthen
the planning process, ensure more timely delivery of plans and programs, focus resources
upon system preservation, and re-direct attention to new system management challenges.
2.1.2 Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990. EPA regulations governing the Conformity
requirements of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 strengthen the primary legal
mandate for financial constraint as articulated by ISTEA. Transportation Conformity
refers to the consistency of transportation plans and programs to air quality plans as
presented in State Implementation Plans or SIPs. The SIP is an air quality management
plan which contains rules and regulations for air pollution sources under State control and
a demonstration that the State will attain the national ambient air quality standards
(NAAQS) by the dates set forth in the Clean Air Act.
As a pollution control strategy, Transportation Conformity is based on statutory language
in the CAAA 1990, which has antecedents in the CAAA of 1977. Section 176:
Limitations on Federal Assistance states that:
"no department, agency, or instrumentality of the Federal Government shall
engage in, support in any way or provide financial assistance for, license or
permit, or approve, any activity which does not conform to a(n) (state)
implementation plan after it has been approved or promulgated under
Section 110. The assurance of conformity to such an implementation plan
shall be an affirmative responsibility of the head of such department,
agency, or instrumentality." 5
In particular, a finding of Conformity means that transportation activity in a region will not
e cause any new violations of the National Ambient Air Quality
5Sarah Siewick,"Conformity", in STPP, ISTEA Planner's Workbook, ed. Margaret Franko, Washington,
D.C., October, 1994, p. 80.
e cause any worsening of existing violations, by demonstrating that the "build" scenario
provides more emissions reduction than the "no-build" scenario.
e delay the region's effort to attain NAAQS in a timely manner. (Transportation plans
and programs must provide priority funding for transportation Control measures
identified in the SIP in a timely manner.)
These underlying concepts of Conformity have been in place for over two decades. Over
time, however, it became apparent that projects were being implemented at an uneven
rate; highway projects were being completed faster than transit projects. The reasons
behind this phenomenon range from the lack of a dedicated revenue source for transit to
the presence of institutional factors which were more favorable to highway projects. A
major purpose of linking transportation plans and air quality plans through financial
constraint therefore, was to address the general implementation bias against transit
projects. Financial planning requirements for plans and TIPs were sought to demonstrate
sufficient resources to deliver all projects for which environmental benefits were being
claimed. 6
Final EPA Conformity regulations were promulgated in November 1993. With respect to
financial constraint, the regulations state that:
EPA believes these ISTEA requirements will adequately ensure that the
transportation activities analyzed for conformity can realistically be built,
and therefore is proposing that plans and TIPs comply with the ISTEA
requirements.
In this way, the CAAA strengthened the implementation purposes of the financial planning
requirements in ISTEA. Conversely, financial constraint requirement lends a tangible
measure of enforcement to the air quality planning process such that TCMs and other
projects that may be beneficial to air quality are not continually postponed due to lack of
funding or funding commitment. Acknoweldging these perspectives in an article on air
quality Conformity, Siewick writes that "[financial constraint] is potentially a powerful
6Ed Weiner, Office of the Secretary, U.S. DOT, personal conversation, 4/24.
7EPA, 40 CFR Part 51 "Criteria and Procedures for Determining Conformity to State or Federal
Implementation Plans of Transportation Plans, Programs, and Projects Funded or Approved Under Title
23 U.S.C. or the Federal Transit Act", Federal Register, Vol. 58, No.6, January 11, Section VI Part C.
tool in reinforcing the linkages between air quality attainment plans and transportation
plans and will require a high degree of discipline and willingness to make investment trade-
offs on the part of local, regional, and state transportation professionals and policy-
makers." 8
Theoretically, this suggests that Conformity determinations for plans and TIPs depend
upon affirmative findings of financial constraint. It remains to be seen whether financial
constraint will be enforced to this standard, and if so, by which regulatory agency, DOT or
EPA. In addition, it remains to be seen how regulations in either the CAAA or ISTEA
will fare in the new Republican Congress. In any case, it is important to recognize that the
legislative mandate for financial constraint derives primarily from ISTEA; the CAAA only
further strengthens one component of the ISTEA directive: the emphasis on plan and
program implementation.
2.1.3 Other Policy Directives. In addition to the legislative mandate to perform financial
planning as contained in ISTEA and the CAAA, additional policy directive emanates from
the executive branch through Executive Orders and U.S. DOT policies. Executive Order
12893, "Principles for Federal Infrastructure Investments" instructs executive departments
with infrastructure responsibilities to observe the following principles: 9
e systematic analysis of expected benefits and costs;
e efficient management of infrastructure, including the promotion of
market-based mechanisms for managing infrastructure;
e private sector participation in infrastructures investment; and
e encouragement of more effective state and local programs (emphasis
added).
In addition, pre-ISTEA DOT financial planning policies provide an historical mandate for
financial planning. These resided primarily in the Federal Transit Administration. They
are presented later in this chapter.
'Siewick, p. 85.
9National Transit Institute, Financial Planning and Programming for MPOs, U.S. DOT/Rutgers
University, August, 1994, p. 1-4.
As intended by ISTEA, the CAAA and other policies, the requirement of financial
constraint has several purposes. Through financial planning, the goal of financial
constraint is to strengthen the transportation planning process by 1) promoting more
responsible and efficient system planning and resource management, 2) to ensure the
deliverability of projects forwarded in transportation and air quality plans, and 3) to
encourage broader thinking on ways to manage the existing system and consider future
initiatives.
A note on terminology. We digress momentarily to note that it is at once interesting and
unfortunate that the financial planning requirements in ISTEA have come to be known
collectively as "financial constraint". Unfortunate because, in our attempt to evaluate the
merits of this requirement, the pejorative connotations of the word "constraint" may bias
the perception of these requirements prematurely. Accounting for this potential bias is
made all the more important at the start of our evaluation because the overriding debate
surrounding the financial constraint requirement focuses on the potential for financial
constraint to infact constrain itself. We introduce the reader to this central debate by
way of an example which also serves to provide context for viewing the requirement.
A major concern regarding financial constraint in the transportation community is that the
requirement itself is misdirected. Arguably, transportation and other urban needs generally
far exceed the level of resources currently available to them. By drawing attention inward
to scrutinize these investments, rather than focusing outward on the larger debate at the
national level, the fear is that financial constraint may further constrain or harm the
position of transportation interests relative to other interests. Indeed the financial stakes
of these issues dwarf those of financial constraint by orders-of-magnitude. Any crippling
effect that the requirement has on transportation interests in this arena would be a perverse
and unintended outcome of the requirement. This paper strongly takes the position that
transportation and other urban needs are critical to our national interest and deserve
continued national attention and support. However, the evaluation of financial
constraint's influence on this area of advocacy should not be confused with the greater
issue of inadequate financial resources for transportation and other urban uses in general.
Indeed, the topics are intimately related and their relationship is complex; we analyze these
presently. However, it is important here to account for any tendency toward bias at this
early stage of our analysis.
As in any policy evaluation, this thesis investigates the possibility that the financial
constraint requirement could do more harm than good to transportation interests. The
preceding presentation of the financial planning requirements of ISTEA demonstrates that
there would be no loss of accuracy to discuss the requirements of "financial planning" and
"financial constraint" synonymously. In order to address the potential for bias, therefore,
these terms will be used interchangeably for the remainder of this paper to the extent that
their use facilitates the impartial evaluation of the requirement.
Whither Financial Constraint? ISTEA and other sources provided the purposes of
financial constraint, while the metropolitan planning regulations interpreting and
implementing them were promulgated in October, 1993. At this time, regions all across
the country are in various stages of delivering the first planning products to be developed
under the new planning regulations. One purpose to this thesis is to evaluate the first
ginger steps which have been taken in the area of financial planning, from regulatory,
practitioners' and general public perspectives. We begin our analysis by establishing the
objective function of transportation planning from the perspective of the public interest.
Let us optimize the continuous delivery of the "best" mix of transportation projects for a
given region, where "best" is a little black box, self-defined by the region in question.
Questions which help to focus our analysis are: How is the continuous delivery of the
"best" mix of projects helped or hindered by linking planning and budgeting through
financial planning requirements? Does financial constraint effectively turn plans into
budgets? What is a plan? a financial plan? a budget? Can distinctions be made regarding
each of these products, their methodologies and/or processes to better understand the
potential for financial constraint? Tackling these questions is critical to the demonstration
or rejection of the key arguments for financial constraint, and to the identification of
measures needed to support its intended purposes. To begin these tasks, we review the
history of public budgeting in government in general and the history of financial planning
in transportation in particular. In this way, we gain an appreciation for the ways in which
financial constraint is consistent and descendent from that history.
2.2 Plans, Financial Plans and Budgets
What is the difference between the financial plans mandated by ISTEA and public agency
budgets as we known them? Larry Dahms, Executive Director of the Metropolitan
Transportation Commission, often refers to the agency's long-range plan, the Regional
Transportation Plan, as a "20-year transportation budget". Others are not so comfortable
viewing the plan as a budget and in fact find the two ideas radically different from one
another. In what ways and to what extent should plans be budgets and vice versa? On
this question, the extensive history and literature on public budgeting prove instructive.
We begin with a discussion about the generic features of budgets.
2.2.1 The Idea of Budgets.
Budgets are not merely affairs of arithmetic, but in a thousand ways go to the root of
prosperity for individuals, the relation of classes and the strength of kingdoms.
- Gladstone0
For these and many other reasons, budgeting has always been one of, if not the most
important and complex functions of government. Difficulties lay both in the technical and
political aspects of budget preparation. To begin to understand the purposes and
problems in budgeting it is useful to adopt a working definition of budgets.
Definition. Lynch provides an excellent working definition of a budget:
'
0Albert C. Hyde, Government Budgeting: Theory, Process, and Politics, Brooks/Cole Publishing
Company, Pacific Grove, CA, 1992,p. 1.
[A] "budget" is a plan for the accomplishment of programs related to
objectives and goals within a definite time period, including an estimate of
resources required, together with an estimate of the resources available,
usually compared with one or more past periods and showing future
requirements."
This definition is preferred over others because it links budgets with goals and objectives,
where others do not.12 Arguably, this distinction may be the difference between budgets
and financial plans, as we shall see later. All decision-making environments can be
inherently characterized by normative considerations. Microeconomics recognizes this
reality about the decision-making environment through the assumptions of 1) scarcity, 2)
discrete choices, and 3) ordinal preferences. As a decision-making process, budgeting is
a highly value-laden process, and for that reason, it is always a political process. A
working definition should reflect this reality.
Purpose. Budgets serve a variety of purposes. Duncombe offers a relatively
comprehensive and pragmatic view of the main purposes of budgeting:
...the budget system [is] a means of balancing revenues and expenditures.
...the budget process [is] a semi-judicial process....
The main purpose of the budget system is accountability.
The most important single reason for a budget system is control.
The executive budget document should be an instrument of ... policy.
Budgeting is public relations.
A budget is an instrument of good management.
A budget is really a work plan with a dollar sign attached.
The budget is an instrument of planning.
Budgeting is the art of cutting the most fat from an agency request with the
least squawking.13
"Thomas D. Lynch, Public Budgeting in America, Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey,
1979,p.5.
12Interestingly, Congressional appropriations activities in the House of Representatives take place in the
Ways and Means Committee. Ostensibly, this committee's name refers to the ways and means to achieve
policy goals.
'
3Sydney Duncombe in Lynch, p. 3.
While these ideas illustrate the range of purposes budgets serve, they can be narrowed
down to four commonly accepted general approaches to budgeting. Budgeting may be
viewed 1) as a political instrument, 2) as a tool to exercise control and accountability, 3) in
light of its management function and 4) as a means of planning. As a "top-down" political
instrument, the budget reflects implementation of policy through the allocation of scarce
resources. Alternatively, budgets may be used as "bottom-up" political instruments to
reflect actual needs and to serve as advocacy documents. Control refers to society's
implicit contract with budget-makers, which trades the political power of budgets for the
assignment of accountability in the administration of public funds. The management
function stresses use of the budget or budget process as a means to evaluate and monitor
performance and therefore act as a tool for extracting increased operational efficiency.
Finally, the planning orientation of budgets suggests that budget processes can be used to
systematically evaluate alternative means to achieve stated goals, and through the use of
decision-making tools and processes, iteratively re-set means and ends in a continuous
manner. Shick provides a table of the control, management and planning orientations of
budgets and stratifies these by their many characteristics (see Table 2.1).
Table 2.1 Basic Differences Between Budget Orientations 4
Characteristic Control Management Planning
Personnel Skill Accounting Administration Economics
Information Focus Objects Activities Purposes
Key Budget Stage (central) Execution Preparation Pre-Preparation
Breadth of Measurement Discrete Discrete/Activities Comprehensive
Role of Budget Agency Fiduciary Efficiency Policy
Decision-Flow Upward- Upward- Downward-
Aggregative Aggregative Disaggregative
Type of Choice Incremental Incremental Teletic
Control Responsibility Central Operating Operating
Management Responsibility Dispersed Central Supervisory
Planning Responsibility Dispersed Dispersed Central
Appropriations Link Direct Direct Crosswalk
14Allen Schick, "The Road to PPB: The Stages of Budget Reform", in Hyde, p. 47.
As Schick shows, the purposes of and characteristics of budgeting are myriad and
complex. For this reason, many more factors are likely to frustrate the budget process
than help it. For example, political gridlock can result at many points in the budget
process for any reason from parochialism to lack of good technical information. Taken to
the extreme, the control function can result in net losses in efficiency, through excessive
oversight and/or orientation to detail. The management function commonly breaks down
in that evaluation and monitoring are either not performed or are not carried out
meaningfully. Finally, the planning function requires a fair amount centralization,
resources and skills, in order to be carried out effectively.
The planning function of budgets is our main area of interest, and so we look to the
history of this orientation of budgeting. In particular, four of Schick's budget
characteristics may be viewed as prisms through which we can perform analysis during our
investigation. Breadth (and Depth) of Measurement refers to trade-offs between
comprehensiveness and ease of use of processes and methods, and serves as a good
measure of the burden of calculation or transaction costs. Role of Budget Agency refers
to the institutional orientation of agencies, and will aid us by capturing the varying
stakeholder perspectives in planning and budgeting. Decision-Flow refers to the many
dimensions of decision processes in budgeting (i.e. bottom-up vs top-down flows, open
vs. closed, centralized vs. decentralized). And finally Type of Choice presents an
opportunity to discuss the appropriateness of those decision tools and models that are
available for use in decision-making process.
2.2.2 Planning-Programming-Budgeting. Our interest in the planning function of
budgets leads us to identify the rise of the planning function in government budgeting,
which occurred during the Johnson administration in the mid- 1960's.15 Led by Robert
McNamara and the Department of Defense, the movement to institutionalize planning
tools and processes in the budget process resulted in the Planning-Programming-
Budgeting (PPB) system for federal budgeting. PPB utilized analysis, data and statistics in
i5For a more thorough discussion, see Chapter two of Lynch, pp. 19-43.
the budgeting process as a means to link long-term plans and policies with near term
budget activities. This innovation toward planning activities represents a significant
change in public budgeting in America.16 While the control and orientation roles of
budgeting still existed in PPB, "PPB is predicated on the primacy of the planning
function.... [and would] delegate primary managerial and control responsibilities to the
supervisory and operating levels respectively."
David Novick, generally credited as the originator of the concepts in PPB, presents a ten-
point description of the major features of program budgeting (see Figure 2.1).
Figure 2.1 What Program Budgeting IS"7
1. Definition of objectives in as specific terms as possible.
2. Determination of programs and alternatives to achieve objectives.
3. Identification of issues to be resolved in development of programs.
4. Annual cycle with subdivisions for planning, programming and budgeting,
with sufficient time for analysis and decision-making.
5. Continuous re-examination of results in relation to costs and expectations.
6. Recognition of issues which require more time than was anticipated so that
they can be set apart from the current period and addressed subsequently.
7. Analysis of programs in terms of probable outcomes and their direct and
indirect costs.
8. Development of analytical tools for measuring costs and benefits.
9. Development each year of a multi-year program and financial plan.
10. Adaptation of existing accounting and statistical reporting systems to
provide inputs into planning and programming as well as continuing
information on resources used in and actions taken to implement programs.
The primary purpose of program budgeting was to provide federal government officials
with a formal, systematic method to improve decisions concerning the allocation of
resources at
16The planning movement was preceded by two other budget reform movements: Control and
Management. Control was the focus in during the Depression era, while the management-orientation
reached its zenith during the New Deal years. Following PPB, modern budgeting continued to experiment
with reforms such as Management-by-Objective (MBO) in the mid-70's and Zero-Base Budgeting (ZBO)
in the late 70's. See Schick, "The Road to PPB: Stages of Budget Reform" in Hyde for a more complete
discussion of these movements.
17David Novick , "What Program Budgeting Is and Is Not", in Hyde, p. 342-343. List is slightly edited for
length.
the federal level of government. Program budgeting differed from traditional budgeting in
at least three ways: structure, use of analysis and for its recursive features.
Structure. Structurally, program budgeting rejected traditional budgets formats in which
costs were assembled by type of input, or line item, by administrative or organizational
unit.
Figure 2.2: Traditional Line Item Budget vs. Program Budget1 8
Traditional Budget Program Budget
Program Program Program Program Program
I II III IV V
ENVIRONMENT
Water Department Program Element - Water 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974
Salaries and wages (not in traditional budget)
Maintenance and Operations 1. Water supply
New Equipment Personnel
Equipment
Health Department
Salaries and wages 2. Water sanitation
Maintenance and Operations Personnel
Equipment Equipment
Highway Department 3. Storm Drainage
Salaries N Personnel
Maintenance and Operations Equipment
Equipment
Program Element - Land
Program Element - Air
Instead, once goals, plans and programs were chosen, PPB organized costs or budgeted,
by programs. This allowed an orientation to output rather than input, and a consistent
assessment of the effectiveness of investments within and among programs (see Figure
2.2). This information was then used to provide information for the subsequent budget
cycle.
Analysis. Emphasis on analysis was the second defining feature of the system. In part,
the rise of PPB can be attributed to developments in the rational model of decision-
making. Conversely, the power of analysis embodied by the tools of the rational model
made it eminently superior to other methods of decision-making as a means to support
'Novick, "What Program Budgeting Is and Is Not", in Hyde, p. 343.
planning activities in budgeting. The rational model promotes the development of a
complete set of goals, alternatives, and analyses in support of choosing the alternative(s)
with the highest net benefit. These tools were developed by welfare economists in the
1930's and operations researchers and systems analysts in the 1950's.19 Welfare
economics developed micro-economics concepts of utility and choice, and notions of
overall measures of welfare and efficiency. Operations researchers likewise sought and
developed tools of optimization. And finally, systems analysts tackled the more global
class of problems for which the objectives are either not known, interconnected, or are
subject to change. 2 0 These disciplines developed analysis tools such as marginal utility
analysis, cost-benefit studies, cost-effectiveness analyses, sensitivity analysis, pay-off
matrix, present values and other techniques which were later applied to the evaluation of
alternatives and the goals they were meant to serve.2 It is important to note the argument
that the quest to measure social utility and apply these tools to resource allocation, is
inherently impeded by the presence of intangibles not easily accounted for by available
methods. 22 This view concludes that welfare economics fails to contribute directly to the
budget process. Others however, note that welfare economics contributes to the budget
rule that "expenditure proposals should be considered in the light of the objectives they are
intended to further, and in general final expenditure decisions should not be made until all
claims on the budget can be considered."2 In addition, where sufficient data were lacking
or quantitative analyses was inappropriate, program budgeting called for analytic
approaches or qualitative measures to capture these effects where possible.24
19For a complete account of these developments see Schick, pp. 55-60.
20Aaron Wildavsky, Budgeting: A Comparative Theory of Budgetary Processes, Little, Brown and
Company, Boston, Massachusetts, 1975, p. 320-321. Note: the process of choosing and modifying both
means and ends hearkens the evolution of the exalted concept of total efficiency to a new concept of
mixed-efficiency. This notion acknowledges that total optimization is an ephemeral concept and instead
emphasizes the dynamic optimization of continuous processes.
21As we will note later, these disciplines also spawned predictive analytic methodologies which were also
adopted by transportation planning.
22V.O. Key in "The Lack of a Budgetary Theory", Hyde pp. 22-26.
2 3Arthur Smithies, The Budgetary Process in the United States (New York: 1955) p. 16.
24Clearly however, the adoption of the rational model represents a choice over other models of decision-
making. We explore these comparative models of decision-making and decision-processes presently.
Recursion. The third feature of the program budget was the recognition of the future
budget implications of present decisions. This feature was instituted by calling for multi-
year programs and financial plans, in addition to developing the current year budget. In
addition, the program budget structured information and reporting systems so that
outputs, or statistics, of these systems could be re-used in the planning or programming
steps of the process. These innovations cannot be underestimated. By bridging the
functions of planning, programming and budgeting temporally, and developing the
recursive features of planning, program budgeting provided a comprehensive, continuing
and coordinated framework for decision-making within an organization. An early
description of the Transportation Improvement Program demonstrates this feature of the
program budget:
[the] T[ransportation] I[mprovement P[rogram] provides continuity
between the transportation planning process, the transportation plan and
the projects included in the annual ... element. As such, the TIP provides a
framework in which to place, in perspective, those projects which are
proposed for implementation with the policies and strategies of the area
described in the transportation plan (not necessarily discrete projects).2 5
Together, the program budget concepts of program structure, analysis and recursion
reached far beyond the scope of traditional budgeting.
The Convergence of Planning and Budgeting in PPB. We comment upon the role that
micro-economic and other decision-making tools played in the rise of planning-oriented
budgeting. Yet the explanation of the convergence of these two dissimilar activities would
be incomplete without a discussion of the impact that Keynesian macro-economic
principles had on the use of fiscal policy to advance social goals and objectives. Intuitively,
it is not surprising why planning and budgeting might not have been linked in this way
before, and even since, the Keynesian revolution. Mosher notes that "budgeting and
planning are apposite, if not opposite. In extreme form, the one means saving; the other,
25Department of Transportation, FHWA/UMTA, "Urban Transportation Planning; Final Rule", Federal
Register, Vol. 48, No. 127, June 30, 1983
spending." 26 In addition, there were philosophical barriers to the use of planning in public
budgeting activities. As Schick writes, "The national government [had] been reluctant to
embrace central planning of any sort because of identification with socialist management
of the economy."27
With origins in the underemployment era of the Great Depression, however, Keynesian
economics uncovered the macro-economic potential of government expenditures on the
general economy, and with this, the interest in federal budget processes as a means of
carrying out policy. 28 At a time when the marginal cost of labor is arguably low to nil, and
in search of a mechanism to deliver large-scale, employment generating public works
projects into the economy, government officials eventually looked to planning approaches
and their aforementioned tools. There are several reasons why the planning function was
attractive to budgeters as this interest took hold. We have already identified the
availability of rational model tools to perform alternatives analyses and statistics to
measure outputs. In addition, as Schick points out, planning is future-oriented, strives for
comprehensiveness and is means-oriented. 2 9 For these reasons, the planning-orientation of
budgeting was considered a useful approach to employ in the comparison of the large,
discrete and expensive types of projects that were the first to be advanced during the New
Deal and after World War II. These public works projects included water projects,
defense projects, and, through the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956, the National System
of Interstate and Defense Highways.30 As we shall show presently, this common
characteristic - lumpiness - of transportation projects and defense projects allows for
interesting comparisons between the evolution and relative successes of financial planning
requirements in DOD and at DOT. For now we conclude our presentation of what
constitutes PPB and begin to evaluate its historical experience in various areas of public
budgeting.
2 6Frederick C. Mosher, Program Budgeting: Theory and Practice, (Chicago: 1954), p. 48.
27Schick, "The Road to PPB: The Stages of Budget Reform", in Hyde p. 57.
21Ibid, p. 55.
29Ibid, p. 57.
3Ed Weiner, Urban Transportation Planning in the United States: An Historical Overview, USDOT,
Revised Edition, November 1992, p. 34.
The Fate of PPB. Though adopted widely throughout government and by the planning
profession, the rational model and the PPB movement generally were not considered
successful in the 1970's. In fact, detractors scorned the system as being idealistic, overly
intellectual and fraught with burdensome exercises. Operationally, PPB had a tendency to
centralize government and had a reputation for being impossible to implement as
conceived, that is, objectively. Using examples from case histories of the use of PPB in
Congress and at the Department of Agriculture, Wildavsky identifies three main obstacles
to PPB: the difficulty of creating the new program categories, the political challenge of
internal as well as external buy-in to these, and the problem of overlapping or indiscreet
costs associated with different programs or alternatives.31 (As we shall see later in our
analysis of the transportation experience, the design of program structure, presence (or
absence) of institutional factors and the multiple objectives of transportation policy all
have had major effects on the administration and implementation of financial planning and
budgeting requirements.)
Unsurprisingly, the one area in which PPB was considered a modest success was at the
Department of Defense, where PPB enjoyed its genesis. Though budgeting at DOD still
relied heavily on incrementalism, (the approach ostensibly supplanted by the rational
model), there PPB did result in the use of analytic methods and statistics to inform
decisionmaking.3 2 Wildavsky identifies the confluence of five factors to explain this
apparent success: 1) highly talented RAND Corporation analysts were employed in the
early years of PPB at DOD, 2) the benefit of a common terminology and use of analytical
approaches, 3) leadership (i.e. Secretary McNamara) committed to and aggressive about
PPB, 4) the pre-existence of planning functions within the department, and 5) the
predisposition of the types of choices to be made (i.e. alternative weapons systems, the
siting of military bases) to PPB methods of analysis. Despite the demonstration of modest
success at DOD, however, critics generally agreed that PPB had limited influence on the
31see Wildavsky Chapter 15 and pp. 344-345.
3 2Ibid, p. 345, p. 355.
major resource allocation decisions in domestic agencies of the federal government. The
inadequacy of the rational model to account for political externalities and its analytic
intractability were the most popular reasons for this assessment.
Inadequacies of the Rational Model. Here we consider the issues of political
considerations and intractability. These were considered significant enough to doom PPB
as a movement, but are they insurmountable? The success of PPB at DOD already
suggests they are not, though other problems specific to PPB such as program structure,
institutional factors and the multiplicity of objectives may be. At this time, we devote our
attention to investigating the more global problems of the rational model.
Political Externalities. It is not surprising that political considerations often dominated
technical considerations where PPB was attempted. After all PPB was instituted in federal
agencies responsible for major public programs. In addition, Diesing argues that "political
rationality is the fundamental kind of reason," and that "the political problem is always
basic and prior to the others." 3 Indeed, program budgeting and the rational model do not
explicitly account for the political cost and benefit of a given alternative - a major
deficiency in light of the political purposes of budgets. Programs which administer major
projects with large macro-economic effects such as defense or transportation projects are
especially susceptible to this type of political intervention. In fact, these investments
involve so close a mixture of political and economic considerations that it is often not
possible to disentangle them.34
As an example, development of the federal Interstate Highway program was rife with
political considerations, i.e. the economic development of certain "backward" regions,
facilitating the movement of defense supplies, and meeting the needs of key public
"Paul Diesing in Wildavsky, pp. 330 and 333.
34Indeed, based in the rational model, financial constraint, is just the latest from a long line of tools whose
utility is questioned on the basis of this argument. Consider the cost-effectiveness index in transit
planning. There, the political process is the forum in which non-technical issues are considered and often
win out over technical ones. Decision-making under financial constraint is susceptible to the same types
of developments.
officials. Though cost-benefit analysis might have shed light on certain areas of decision-
making, Meyer concludes that "given the complexity of the political and economic
decisions involved, and the emphasis on designing a geographically consistent system, it
probably would be difficult to improve on the congressional process as a means of
developing such a program in an orderly and systematic way." 35
It is important to note, however, that even in the administration of the Federal Interstate
Program, sophisticated mechanisms of financial planning were employed to manage
federal disbursements in an efficient and effective way. As a means of estimating total
costs for the system, and in order to determine the best way to apportion funds for this
large, 20-year plus program to states with dissimilar stakes in the system equitably,
Congress asked each state to estimate the total costs required to build its portion of the
system. In this way, apportionments could be based upon each state's "Cost-to-Complete"
its portion of the total system. States were responsible for spending down their
apportionments with an incentive redistribution program in place to direct funds to the
states which could utilize them fastest. In this way, the national interest or "vision" (the
Interstate Program) was served (delivered) by an effective and efficient means to allocate
and manage program funds. Some features of transportation financing mechanisms
changed as the Program neared completion, whereas others were retained. For example,
the federal obligation ceilings and redistribution programs continue to play a role in
managing federal disbursements. However, as state interests become more in line with
federal interests with respect to use of the Interstate System, this generated interest in
revisiting states' donor/recipient statuses relative to their contribution to the Highway
Trust Fund. As a result, ISTEA supplemented states' Minimum Allocation with three new
provisions which increase to 90% of contributions the guaranteed amount that states
receive back from the Highway Trust Fund.
There are important lessons to be learned from the history of the federal Interstate
Program. Arguably, the national interest remains the same: the economic health, safety
35J. R. Meyer "Transportation in the Program Budget" in Wildavsky, p.327/
and quality of life of our urban areas is of paramount importance. However, the emphasis
of this interest has evolved from a more centralized single-purpose program to a much
more complex decentralized goal of intermodal system management. In the absence of a
clear objective such as the building of the Interstate, Congress must rely upon regions to
decide for themselves how best to maintain the maturing systems, and to usher in the next
era of transportation investments. In this way, financial constraint may be viewed as the
post-Interstate attempt at a "Cost-to-Complete" exercise, aimed this time at MPOs instead
of States. In contrast to the top-down orientation of the Interstate Program, the national
vision is instead comprised of the collection of bottom-up local, state, regional and
national needs and visions as expressed in constrained and unconstrained transportation
plans and programs. Viewed in this way, financial planning serves a potentially major
federal purpose - to facilitate the collective development of the national "vision" or post-
Interstate "national interest". As this view relies upon financial planning to support
unconstrained as well as constrained plans in order to develop a complete assessment of
needs, this is one purpose which ISTEA may not have fully recognized or anticipated.
The legislation does not require "vision plans" to accompany financially constrained plans
and programs. We return to this subject later in this chapter.
Clearly political externalities will continue to manifest themselves in decision-making at all
levels of government. The Congressional model - an extreme example of politics in
decision-making - is an appropriate system for delivering major national programs; yet
even decision-making at this level benefits from financial planning, especially in the
implementation stages of program delivery. At best, political considerations ensure
geographic equity and possibly, social equity through the re-distributive effects of
qualifying projects. This is a net benefit where there exists a great enough need for
projects such that it is safe to assume most satisfy threshold criteria, though not all
projects are equally deserving of funding based on their merits. Moreover, though
important, it is not clear that merit should be the only criterion by which to judge projects.
For example, if the FTA cost-effectiveness criterion were the only criterion applied to
transit projects across the board, arguably the majority of projects would be funded in the
Northeast, where systems are old and extensive, and needs are greatest. Clearly, however,
the disadvantage of a system decision-making based purely on political considerations is
the obfuscation of policy signals to observers of the process. Without being balanced by
financial considerations this can result in skewed decision-making at lower levels of
government. We return to this topic and an example in transit planning later in this
chapter.
Intractability. More troubling than the argument of politics as a reason to reject PPB-
like exercises is the contention that no one knows how to do program budgeting, and in
fact, that it is impossible to do (and still achieve net benefits from the exercise). One critic
noted facetiously that program budgeting is "like the simultaneous equation of
governmental intervention in society." 36 If one can solve that equation, one has solved the
problems of the world! Surely, a more sagacious view can be taken. We look to a
generalized model of decision-making to see if this is indeed the case.
2.2.3 Toward a Generalized Theory of Decision-Making. A generalized theory of
decision-making helps us to evaluate the general strong-points and deficiencies of the
rational model. Here we introduce a comparative analysis of various decision-models and
processes which sheds light on our evaluation of the rational model.
Alternative Models. Recall that the rational model of decision-making was adopted by
PPB because its tools could be applied to the Type(s) of Choice(s) that were prominent at
that time. Other decision-making models were likewise and continue to be useful in
planning and budgeting decision-making. These often are used to complement or
supplement rational model tools in resource allocation decisions and include the
incremental model, satisficing model and problem-solving model." In the incremental
model, public policy evolves through iterations of incremental appeals to improve a base
condition. Appeals are met with either accommodation or rejection. This model is
"
6Wildavsky, p. 364.
3 7Lynch, p. 22-23.
inherently reactive and conservative, and can be found at higher, more political levels of
decision-making, i.e. in Congress. The satisficing model is based on developing criteria to
meet goals and objectives and searching for the first available alternative to satisfy them.
In this case, the necessary equals the sufficient. The primary features of this model are its
screening characteristics and avoidance of opportunity costs of more lengthy or exhaustive
searches. Finally, the problem-solving model is notable because it begins not with goals
and objectives, but rather with the perception that a problem exists. This type of needs-
based decision-making typifies "bottom-up" planning. The utility of each of these models
or some combination of them depends upon the Type of Choice which needs to be made
and the "stakeholder" who is making the choice. This consideration hints at the
importance of Federalism in public planning and budgeting processes which we consider in
more detail later.
Alternative Processes. Like the models they employ, decision-making processes differ in
important ways as well. Two important dimensions by which decision-making processes
may be characterized are their level of centralization and their transparency to other
decision-makers or the general public. Loosely, we consider these as proxy measures of
transaction costs and politics, respectively. For the sake of brevity, we choose to compare
and contrast the extreme combinations of these for illustrative purposes. These are the
highly centralized, relatively closed and the group-oriented, more open processes of
decision-making. In general, the advantages of the closed and centralized decision-making
process are a greater chance of consensus and lower transaction costs, and the opportunity
to abandon partisan views and reach compromise faster where differences of opinion do
exist. The main disadvantage to this process is the heavy reliance upon well-intentioned
and even-handed participants, or conversely, the potential for the abuse of power. The
more open and group-oriented process is most attractive for the high level of vigilance it
affords. However, it suffers for its intractability both in terms of transaction costs and the
potential for hold-outs. In addition, where there exists a weak or unassuming public, as in
the Machiavellian case of the closed/centralized process, the open/group-oriented process
is likewise susceptible to a "tyranny of the majority". It is important to contrast these
decision-making processes as we consider the implications of a single set of policies or
regulations which must be applied to a diverse set of decision-making environments.
Decision-making environments are diverse for any number of historical or cultural reasons.
Recognizing this, we make no a priori judgments regarding either decision-making
process. It is simply sufficient to note that regardless of the decision-making process
which exists, defensible analysis will not hurt and can generally only improve the decision-
making process, raising the level of debate and resulting in more informed and therefore
"better" decisions.
Defensible Analysis. It is true that the questions in budgeting and financial planning are
demanding. They are not impossible to solve, but they may be impossible to solve without
analysis. Analysis is a necessary and powerful in tool planning and budgeting. As Quade
points out: "The use of analysis can provide some of the knowledge needed, ... serve as a
substitute for experience, and most importantly, ... can work to sharpen intuition." 38 As
we shall see in Chapter 3, the fruits of intuition pay off when "expert judgment" can be
used in forecasting and other planning exercises. However, we would be remiss to sing
the praises of analysis without considering the "costs" of good analysis. Most would
agree upon the value of analysis, the question is at what point does the burden of analysis
outweigh the benefits? To address this question, we consider the concept of "defensible"
analysis. "Defensible" analysis refers to maintaining the quality of analysis independent of
the resources which were devoted to it. Any level of effort, from the back-of-the-
envelope calculations to the most sophisticated model output, should involve defensible
and informed assumptions and methodology. In this way, the marginal burden of
calculation is always balanced against the marginal benefit of performing the analysis. The
amount and accuracy standards for the analysis should not be pre-determined, but
marginally justified. In the closed, centralized model of decision-making, technicians with
expertise in analysis should make the determination of assumptions and methodologies.
Where buy-off of more parties is needed, this is facilitated to the extent that ultimate
3
"Quade, "Analysis for Military Decisions, ed., p.12., in Wildavsky, p. 324.
decision-makers take part in the earliest determinations of 'reasonable' assumptions and
methods for analysis. In this way, only analysis which will be useful is performed.
Our evaluation of the major problems of the rational model shows that there is no reason
why defensible analysis cannot be used to inform decisionmaking, regardless of the
institutional characteristics of the decision-making body. Defensible analyses add value to
the decision-making process, regardless of the political nature of the decisions in question,
and should be employed in public policy decisions. It is incumbent upon planners to
continuously develop and improve the methods and processes of planning so that all
stakeholders have access to information upon which to base important resource allocation
decisions.
We have seen how planning and budgeting came to be linked in PPB and where it enjoyed
successes and failure. Our analysis of the experience at the DOD and elsewhere suggests
that the PPB system can yield important lessons as we evaluate the financial planning
requirements of ISTEA. We look to the history of planning and budgeting at DOT for
traces of this important link.
2.2.4 PPB and the Rational Model in Transportation. Despite their grim fate in other
areas of government, vestiges of the PPB movement and the rational model persist in
various forms today, including in the administration of transportation programs. It is not
surprising that elements of PPB survived in transportation, and in fact it may be
considered somewhat natural that they did. One major reason for this is that, like defense
projects, transportation projects lend themselves to analysis and evaluation.
Transportation engineering has its disciplinary roots in civil engineering, and
transportation planning has evolved as the most quantitative of the urban planning
disciplines. Analysis permeates myriad aspects of the practice. In fact, the current
transportation planning process owes a large debt both to the tools of the rational model,
and the framework created by the PPB system. The traditional four-step demand
modeling process - trip generation, distribution, mode-choice and trip assignment - gains
its predictive capability from the rigor and robustness with which economic (utility,
equilibrium), statistical (probabilistic discrete choice and continuous choice models) and
operations research (shortest path) methods are applied. These models, continuously
improved and calibrated to simulate existing conditions and the trip-making effects of new
projects, can be useful in the evaluation and comparison of alternative transportation
investments. It is important to note, however, that these models have their limitations,
most notably a deficiency in accounting for the accessibility benefits of transportation
investments. Today, planners continue to research transportation /land use relationships
and attempt to incorporate these into the next generation of transportation planning
models. In addition, as relationships between travel behavior and emissions are identified,
air quality modeling has also come into use. While also challenged for its accuracy, air
quality modeling has been validated by the courts in some judicial tests.3 9
Though never formally declared in the DOT, the influence of PPB-like processes in the
administration of the federal transportation program is readily apparent. Program
structure had evolved since the inception of the Federal-Aid highway system in 1921.40
Continuous analysis is promoted through the 3-C process for transportation planning and
requirements for systems analysis, alternatives analysis and project selection phases of
program and project development, (though only recently on both the highway and transit
sides). Transit also has been aggressive in the area of financial planning requirements and
evaluation measures such as cost-effectiveness indices. Finally, in the area of reporting
statistics and multi-year planning, long-range transportation plans and multi-year TIPs to
implement them have been federal requirements since 1962 and 1974 respectively.4 1
Recursive planning has also been re-enforced recently with the requirement of the six state
Management Systems under ISTEA.
39 see Sierra Club vs. MTC, 1986.
*OWeiner, p. 10. Evolution of program structure continues to this day.
41Weiner, p. 41. Federal Highway Administration and Urban Mass Transportation Administration:
"Transportation Improvement Program", Federal Register, vol. 39, no. 21, November 8, 1974.
Within this PPB-like planning environment, financial planning was considered important,
but was instituted unevenly. For example, while TIPs were long required to include
"realistic estimates of total costs and revenues for the program period," long-range plans
were not held to the same standard until recently under financial constraint.42 In addition,
a proposed joint planning rule in 1981 first introduced some of the financial constraint
concepts found in ISTEA, but the subsequent 1983 rule stripped most of this language
away.43 Finally, with respect to the modal programs, then-UMTA was markedly more
aggressive in pursuing financial planning requirements than FHWA." In 1984, UMTA's
Major Capital Investment Policy emphasized financial analysis as an integral part of the
project development process. In order to obtain federal funds for new starts, be they fixed
guideway extensions, bus service expansions or large-scale rail modernization projects,
operators were required to demonstrate adequate financial capacity to maintain and
operate existing services while implementing the proposed project.45 Section 3 New Start
Criteria also include quantitative criterion such as the cost-effectiveness index and
46qualitative measures such as an approximation of land-development potential. Projects
which failed to meet the $6 cost-per-new-rider had to secure greater local commitment to
remain competitive. In contrast, the highway program did not impose additional federal
requirements beyond the EIS; and states made their own decisions regarding the use of
federal highway funds.4 7
Though applied only at the project development stage previously, these FTA financial
planning and policy concepts are at the core of the new ISTEA requirement of financial
42FHWA/UMTA, 1974.
4 3Rich Steinmann, Office of Budget and Policy, Federal Transit Administration, conversation, April 24,
1995.
"Arguably, this is because the level of funds for highway projects far exceeded that of transit projects.
45Later, in 1987, these concepts were codified in FTA's Financial Capacity Circular (FTA C 7008.1)
which outlined the elements of financial capacity analysis: an assessment of financial condition and
together with an assessment of financial capability. Financial capacity was to be demonstrated through
the ability to pay for the cost of acquiring the transit equipment or facility, the cost of operating the
equipment over its useful life, and the cost of re-capitalizing the assets as needed.
46FTA Office of Policy, draft "Revised Measures for Assessing Major Investments", 1994.
47U.S. GAO, Transportation Infrastructure: Urban Transportation Planning Can Better Address Modal
Trade-Offs, Washington, D.C. p. 23.
constraint for transportation plans and programs. For the first time, the long-range
transportation plan must now act as a multi-modal budget as well as a vision document.
TIPs are also to be constrained, by year, over the entire program horizon. These new
planning requirements are significant and are presented in greater detail later in Chapter 3.
At this point, we look back to the examples provided by PPB and the experience at DOD
to shed light on why the transportation experience differed from the defense experience as
it did. Understanding where similarities and differences exist helps us to analyze the
potential for financial planning to succeed as envisioned by ISTEA.
DOD, DOT and PPB. As we have seen, features of PPB were attempted but unevenly
instituted at DOT. In order to better understand the challenge of linking planning and
budgeting functions in transportation then and today, we return to our discussion of the
main problems Wildavsky identified in the administration of PPB throughout government.
Recall that these main problems were program structure, internal and external buy-in to
program structure, and the multiplicity of objectives assigned to any one policy. Recall
also why PPB succeeded at the Department of Defense. First, program structure at DOD
was simplified - one-level, compared to other multi-level agencies. Next, strong leadership
at the top helped to combat any dissent at DOD. Third, the divide between political and
policy decisions was the smallest to reconcile at DOD. As we have seen, transportation
share some characteristics with defense projects, most notably, in their 'lumpiness'.
However, unlike defense projects, transportation projects serve a multiplicity of social
objectives, including safety, congestion management, socio-economic considerations and
most recently environmental. We have already shown how the Clean Air Act Amendment
influenced the requirement for financial planning in ISTEA. While this difference is
significant to note, it is not the most important reason why financial planning and
programming policies at DOT did not take hold as they did at DOD. The primary reason
for the lengthier evolution of these policies in the administration of transportation
programs is that the program structure in transportation is extensive while it is singular at
the Department of Defense. As we have already seen in our generalized theory of
decision-making, the consideration of different institutional frameworks and stakeholders
is central to the potential for rational models to overcome inherent hurdles and improve
decision-making. We embark on our final area of analysis - federalism in transportation
planning, finance and budgeting - in order to fully understand the partial implementation
of financial planning requirements at DOT and to provide context for our analysis of
ISTEA financial constraint.
2.2.5 Federalism: the Missing Link between the Experience at DOD and DOT. Our
comparison of PPB in DOD and DOT and discussions of decision-making models and the
processes which employ them suggest the importance of federalism to the understanding
of financial constraint. Federalism refers to distinctions in government purposes, roles and
priorities which may be attributed to the respective levels of the national government.
Two aspects of federalism are discussed here. First, we explain the importance of
federalism in the program structure of federal transportation finance. This discussion
illustrates the increased complexity in program structure which is introduced by many
levels of government, and the implications of these for the implementation of financial
constraint. Next we present the concept of federalism in budgeting. This discussion
provides context to consider different stakeholder interests in the implementation of
financial planning requirements in transportation.
Federalism in Program Structure. As in defense, the federal interest in transportation
increased dramatically with the New Deal era public works programs. Unlike defense
projects, interstate commerce notwithstanding, the primary benefits of transportation
projects are not national, but local.48 For this reason, as we noted earlier, there was a need
to distribute the roles and responsibilities for transportation planning among various levels
of government, and especially to involve state governments. In relation to other levels of
government, the federal role was heavily financial for two reasons. First, its redistribution
power dwarfed state and local resources. In addition, with local entities responsible for
the planning of projects, the federal role expanded in order to ensure that the planning of
4 8Arguably, the economic well-being of urban areas is in the national interest.
transportation projects (which involve long lead times) would not be compromised by
typically shorter local political cycles.
Once the federal involvement in transportation finance was established, various options
were available for how programs should be administered and designed. One option was to
begin with no constraints. The block grant concept embodies this view and is popular with
states' rights advocates. Block grants were tried during the Nixon administration, but
generally failed. One reason for the failure of block grants is the tendency of recipients to
view these grants as "free money". With such large disjoints between the government
entity which raises the money and the entity which spends it, there is little incentive for
control and accountability. Program categories were therefore needed. In transportation,
the "free money" problem led to the creation of the programmatic distinction between
capital funds (which provide incentive to pursue long-range planning at the local level),
and operating and local match funds (necessary requirements at the local level to temper
enthusiasm for the "free" capital funds). As we shall see, later, this has important
implications for multi-modal planning and funding, especially for transit.
'Lumpiness' Considered. In addition to the distinction between capital and operating
funds, there was also a need to further divide capital funds into those larger amounts
necessary for start-up costs and smaller amounts for re-capitalization needs. In transit
these programs are the Section 3 New Start capital program and Section 9 capital and
operating programs. Here, we encounter yet another implication of the "lumpiness" of
transportation projects. The preservation of mechanisms to deliver worthy transit and
other large-scale transportation projects, (the new ISTEA era of operational and
management planning orientations notwithstanding), is an important consideration in
evaluating financial constraint. These mechanisms are needed to ensure that financial
planning exercises do not adversely affect the competitiveness of large, chunky
transportation projects (which will need to be phased or otherwise made "programmable")
relative to smaller, more well-defined projects. Oftentimes, these larger regional projects
are already "hard sells", since their benefits extend beyond the immediate range of their
impacts. Financial constraint should not further bias their consideration. Chapters 3 and 4
will survey the ways in which various MPOs can and do deal with this challenging
problem.
A third category which was deemed necessary was the urbanized/non-urbanized program
category. Traditionally major urban areas have tangled with rural areas over their fair
share of state and federal resources. For historical reasons, there existed a perceived need
to guard against the potential for underinvestment in our nation's cities. 4 9 At same time,
rural resources were usually insufficient to provide for maintaining the facilities needed to
provide them with access. The urbanized/non-urbanized categorization of state funds were
meant to addresses these problems and exist still today.
Beyond these categories, other modal and equity categories were set up, and these
multiplied to an intractable number over time. Just as block grants had their
disadvantages, so too does the presence of too many categories make for an unwieldy and
undesirable program structure. ISTEA was an attempt to reach compromise on program
structure. It reformed the program structure to be more simple, and promoted flexibility
as a compromise between the two extremes of block grants and several smaller programs.
Some argue that ISTEA's programs represent little new in content or flexibility.50 Indeed,
flexibility existed in the highway programs previous to passage of ISTEA. However,
ISTEA did increase the total flexibility of federal funding for use between modes. This
potentially alleviates some of the pressures associated with decision-making under
financial constraint. This potential will depend to a large extent upon the strength of state-
MPO relationships.
To show why this is so, we return to provide background for the state/urbanized program
category. The amount of ISTEA funds which is distributed to MPOs and States
49For example, agricultural interests dominated urban interests in many states, resulting in several state
capitals being located outside the major urbanized areas.
50see Neal Denno, "ISTEA's Innovative Funding: Something Old, New and Borrowed", Transportation
Quarterly, Eno Foundation, Landsdowne, VA, Vol. 48, No.3, Summer, 1994, p. 275.
respectively has implications for the implementation of financial planning requirements in
ISTEA. Figure 2.3 compares the proportion of ISTEA Title I funds which pass through
states with the proportion over which MPOs have project selection control.
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As Figure 2.3 shows, while MPOs bear the primary responsibility to plan and program
under financial constraint, states control the allocation of almost 80% of the funding under
ISTEA. State transportation plans are not required to be financially constrained, and may
be policy plans instead. State TIPs must be financially constrained, but must incorporate
regional TIPs in full. As we showed above, for both policy and logistical reasons, the
MPO is the appropriate governmental entity to carry out the bulk of the financial planning
requirements of ISTEA. Nonetheless, for largely historical reasons (which may be due for
review), most of the funds available through ISTEA is controlled by State DOTs.
Although states may choose to spend these funds in MPO jurisdictions, MPOs have no
direct authority over the expenditure of Interstate Maintenance, National Highway System
Bridge, Safety, most Surface Transportation Program funds, Emergency Relief funds and
demonstration projects.52 In order for MPOs to carry out their financial planning
responsibilities, therefore, states must provide estimates of revenues and expenditures over
the next 20 years. This relationship does not necessarily imply that MPOs are impeded in
carrying out their important planning functions. However, as we shall show in Chapter 3
and 4, for provisions in ISTEA which were meant to help ease the difficulties of financial
51Surface Transportation Planning Project, ISTEA: Year Three, January, 1994, p. 5.
52ibid.
constraint (i.e. increased funding levels and flexibility) to work, MPOs will need the full
cooperation and support of their state partners, a tall order in many places still.
Federalism in Budgeting. Federalism in budgeting refers to the functions, roles and
priorities of agencies in different levels of government with respect to the budget process.
In order to understand budgeting at the metropolitan or regional level, it is important to
understand the functions and priorities of agencies at different levels of government, i.e.
Federal, state and local.
At the Federal departmental level, emphasis is generally placed more highly on the
expenditure rather than revenue aspects of budgeting. At least two reasons account for
this phenomenon. First, as we have seen, the federal government uses fiscal policy to
achieve macro-economic effects on the economy. Congress and the Executive Branch
look to the federal departments to carry out this economic stimulus function. In addition,
federal departments are responsible for carrying out national policies and for ensuring the
proper use of program funds. In transportation for example, expenditures which support
policy objectives such as improving safety, air quality or congestion levels concern the
transportation official far more than how revenues should be raised. This is so in part
because, at the federal level, transportation already enjoys a dedicated revenue source in
the Highway Trust Fund. There are important reasons behind the establishment of the
Highway Trust Fund as the primary funding mechanism for federal expenditures in
transportation, as we shall explore in Chapter 3. In addition, tax policy generally
originates from outside of the federal departmental agency, in Congress or in other
divisions of the Executive Branch.s3
Unlike federal government, state and local governments are more concerned with both
sides of the equation: revenues and expenditures. There are two reasons for this. First,
although states and locals engage in capital financing (bonding) - in theory no different
53While this is so, it is worthy to note that nothing explicitly prevents the federal department from
engaging in tax policy research.
than deficit financing - they do not enjoy the luxury of printing money. That is, the effects
of federal fiscal policy may be tempered through monetary policy, whereas those of state
and local policy may not. Distinctions regarding the financing options available to agencies
at various levels of governments are important to point out again due to the 'lumpiness' of
traditional transportation projects, causing them to require large, up-front commitments of
capital.
Another important explanation for the difference in attention to revenues and costs as
government approaches the local level is the fact that local governments and entities, i.e.
transit agencies, are closest to the actual provision of services. In fact, in contrast to
federal budgeting, local government budget processes can be characterized as being
revenue driven for this very reason. This results from localities' reliance on revenue
sources which are either a) relatively inelastic, i.e. state/federal formulas, b) politically
sensitive (property, business taxes), or c) economically constrained, as in the case of sales
taxes which are difficult to raise beyond the rate of inflation. The effect of this is that
"rather than using the budget process for purposes of steering, ... budgeting becomes
largely a maintenance activity."54 The local transit agency provides a good example of this
effect. As we saw in the preceding discussion of federal program categories, operating
funds primarily are a local responsibility. As a result, transit operators grapple with cost
and revenue issues on a continuing basis. In addition, it is generally more difficult for
transit to take advantage of capital funds as well, since local matching funds are often
restricted for use in highway projects only.
While the transit example is the most extreme, many other transportation agencies at the
state, regional and local levels of government are also experiencing declining tax bases and
increases in competing needs. New transportation revenue sources and the potential to
link these more directly with the user will be the major challenge to all levels of
government in the coming era. In this regard, it will be important for the transportation
community on an individual agency basis, and as a whole to demonstrate financially
"Ibid.
responsible practices within their existing taxing or spending authority. In this way, all
levels of government can better position themselves to argue for new revenue instruments
at the local levels and/or potential to shifts of resources to transportation and other urban
uses at the national level.
The distinctions in budgeting among the various levels of government are an important
final step in establishing a context for our discussion of financial constraint. They illustrate
why and how federal transportation finance "pinches" the lowest levels of government
more so than the highest levels, and in so doing, demonstrate the challenge to regional
governments - themselves diverse in their make-up - in carrying out financial planning
requirements with their many different partners. Though awesome, the responsibilities
assigned to MPOs are appropriately placed at the regional level. MPOs are the proper
policy forum to address "spill-over problems" such as congestion and air quality. At the
same time, however, they must reconcile lofty, ivory-tower, top-down planning objectives
and methods with practical, bottom-up needs and realities. This challenge is significant, for
inferior or superior decision-making at any one level of government can greatly frustrate
or enhance the entire planning process, and the timely delivery of projects and programs.
Knowledge about the history, tools, processes and characteristics of transportation
funding and institutions can aid MPOs in their task. Having presented these at length, we
now return to the controversial issues we presented at the start of this section.
2.3 Plans, Financial Plans and Budgets Re-Considered
Clearly, financial constraint is a complex and important area of transportation policy in
ISTEA. While TIP financial planning requirements have met with some resistance, the
requirement to financially constrain long-range plans has been far more controversial.
This is because, as a near term programming document, the TIP is far closer in concept to
a budget than the 20-year plan. Recall that the cemtral complaint among transportation
planners and officials regarding the financial constraint requirement: the perception that
the "budgetization" of the long-range plan limits the ability of planners to think creatively
and pro-actively about the future, adversely affecting the "vision-setting" process. An
added concern is that transit project planning, already modally disadvantaged historically,
will be further harmed disproportionately as planning is scaled back in the new
"constrained" environment. This concern is the dual to the argument presented at the start
of this paper, in which advocates of transportation interests are fearful that transportation
will be handicapped relative to other federal interests as a result of financial planning
requirements. This concern boils down to the belief that the management and control
functions of budgets undermine their political and vision-planning purposes; this concern is
by no means new or unique to the transportation planning process.
"A budget is a plan, but not all plans are budgets" writes Kenneth Howard, in a seminal
discussion of state planning and budgeting. * Indeed, despite the convergence of planning
and budgeting during PPB, the apposite nature of plans and budgets remains. To begin to
evaluate the concerns regarding the linking of planning and budgeting, we consider the
scenario of unconstrained visioning in the planning process. Vision-setting in planning is
only useful if the end result is a narrower set of options to consider at the next stage of
planning than existed at the start of the exercise. After all, a plan which begins with a
wide range of options and does nothing to refine them has not achieved its stated
objective. We have already remarked upon the ill-effects of "wish-list" planning.
In addition, if we review the requirements of ISTEA we see that ISTEA calls for the
development of a financial plan to support the long-range plan of policies and investments,
not to precede it. Used in this way, the financial plan is not likely to dominate the
planning process, but rather can act as an effective instrument to facilitate trade-off
analysis and prioritization where needed and to identify new means of funding after all
calls on available funding are in. Financial planning may be defined as:
...the determination and balancing of all relevant sources of anticipated
revenue and expenses over a set period of time with provisions for use of
55Howard, "Planning and Budgeting: Who's on First", in Hyde, p. 349.
debt to finance certain expenses and for assignment of revenue to service
such debt.56
Note that this definition makes no reference to goals and objectives as the definition of
budgets did. This is because financial planning is a value-neutral exercise. It is the very
objectivity of the financial plan, as a statement of the financial condition and capacity of
the region, which makes it an attractive tool to both identify resource scarcity and to
identify alternative strategies to fund regional needs and desires. In this way, the financial
planning exercise supports both the constrained and the unconstrained parts of the
planning process. This is the teletic view of financial constraint, and is the key to the
dilemma of the plans vs. budgets controversy.
2.3.1 Teletic View. In the teletic approach, planners ask "Where do we want to go", and
then employ financial planning techniques to answer "What do we do to get there?" as
opposed to the incremental view which simply states "This is where we are" and then asks
"where do we go from here?", 7 The assurance that financial constraint does not do more
harm than good turns on the ability of stakeholders to view and implement the
requirement in this way. Chapter 3 discusses ways to perform financial planning teletically
through the cost estimation and programming processes.
2.3.2 ISTEA (Re-)Considered. Clearly the financial constraint requirements are a key
component of the ambitious re-orientation of national policy which is envisioned in
ISTEA. ISTEA's financial planning requirements put new pressures upon MPOs and their
partners as they endeavor to make plans and TIPs more realistic and to focus their
attention upon system management. Ostensibly, Congress and the planning regulations
provided comprehensive package of "aid" to MPOs in anticipation of the difficulties which
they and their partners would face in achieving the goals of ISTEA financial constraint
including: increased planning and program funds, flexibility in funding and decision-
making, and planning requirements in Public Involvement, Management Systems and
56National Transit Institute, Unit 1-2.
5 Schick, p. 58.
Major Investment Studies. Materially, each of these provisions contributes to the view of
financial constraint as a constructive element of long-range planning. Yet, the over-riding
fear among transportation (and transit) advocates remains: the potential for opponents of
change to take the destructive view of financial constraint, either by ignoring the
regulation and maintaining the status quo, or worse, by using the present reality of scarce
resources to stem nascent intermodal planning efforts. In short, although nothing specific
to financial plans or ISTEA dictates it, financial planning requirements bring with them the
potential to constrain vision-setting as a means of planning and advocacy.
As a part of our analysis of the ISTEA mandate for financial constraint, it is worthwhile to
consider this argument seriously. Indeed, while nothing in ISTEA prohibits the teletic
approach to financial planning, neither is there anything within the legislation to support
this view of financial planning. ISTEA emphasizes the formulation of financially
constrained long-range plans yet it is silent on the subject of financially realistic but
unconstrained long-range plans. ISTEA and the planning regulations may have been
remiss by not being more pro-active about vision-setting in long-range planning. In
particular, the legislation does not require unconstrained (vision) components of long-
range transportation plans. Though sorely needed, the view of financial constraint solely as
a mechanism for plan refinement and delivery is an incomplete and potentially damaging
one without explicit support for the vision component of long-range planning.
Congress itself acknowledged the need for financial planning exercises to support planning
exercises which begin with a full review of transportation needs and desires. In fact,
describing the strategic planning that is intended to lead transportation planning in the
1990's, the House Public Works and Transportation Committee report on ISTEA
encourages strategic vision-planning and demonstrates how financial planning can support
this exercise:
The planning begins with a clear understanding of infrastructure needs and
the options available to respond to them. Needed is an improved
understanding of what must be done, what can be done within the limits of
available resources, and a prioritization of needed infrastructure projects.
Levels of revenue available should also be identified, along with the
consideration of contingencies in the event of revenue short falls. The
result will be improved public and private sector investment choices and
wise utilization of tax dollars.58
Clearly, what Congress articulates here is the need to begin with a visioning exercise.
From that exercise, the questions "Where do we want to go?" and "How do we get
there?" may then be asked. Again, this is the teletic view of planning. Recall that this
view begins with a visioning exercise and then looks to see what is the financial capacity
of the region to achieve the regional vision in addition to what can be done to enhance or
augment that capacity. While ISTEA clearly addresses the documentation of the
financially constrained long-range plan, the link of financial plans to the remainder of the
long-range plan should be strengthened.
There are at least two reasons to encourage regions to initiate long-range transportation
planning activities with unconstrained needs identification and vision-setting. First, as we
noted above, the national policy focus on system management represents a new era in
terms of the "national interest" in transportation. Arguably, the new roles which federal,
state, MPO and local transportation entities assume in this era will dramatically influence
the success or failure of the transition. In the same way that states were enlisted to
demonstrate the "Cost-to-Complete" the Interstate System, so have MPOs and their
partners be called upon to document the needs which must be met in order to meet the
new federal mandate. The modem exercise far exceeds the traditional one in complexity
and difficulty, if only because the goal of system management is so much less tangible than
a map of interstate highways. In this regard, not only does the focus shift to MPOs and
their partners to document costs and manage the delivery of projects, so does the
orientation of the national interest evolve from a pre-defined top-down directive to a
relatively undefined bottom-up initiative. Through financial planning, Congress remands
major transportation planning responsibilities to MPOs and exhorts them to engage in
honest and realistic transportation planning in return. At the same time, however,
58Committee on Public Works and Transportation, U.S. House of Representatives, ISTEA 1991, Rept.
102-171, Part I, p. 13.
Congress should acknowledge the help it needs in defining the post-Interstate "national
interest" and should give MPOs the opportunity - in concert with their partners and the
public - to inform the national "vision-setting" process through the development of
constrained and unconstrained transportation plans and programs, as long as these plans
reflect valid needs. In this way, together, these plans constitute the "Cost-to-Complete"
the national vision in the post-Interstate era. They also provide an indication of regions'
abilities to meet those needs through currently available revenues.
In addition to serving this federal purpose, vision-planning engages stakeholders and
community members into the transportation planning process and is the archetypal
example of strategies to promote buy-in. Ultimately, this end is as important, if not more
so, than impressing Congress. The public is the ultimate judge of whether needs
assessment, program delivery and transportation finance has been carried out responsibly.
It is incumbent upon transportation planners to carry out financially realistic long- and
short-range transportation planning with the input of the communities they serve. This
strategy enhances the effectiveness of using the plan and plan development process as an
educational and advocacy vehicle. With the support of their communities, transportation
officials can more effectively lobby for increased financial support at the local, state and
federal levels of government, in addition to seeking the involvement of private interests.
The San Diego Association of Governments (SANDAG) presents an example of the
education and advocacy potential of conducting financial planning in conjunction with
long-range transportation planning. 59 Even before passage of ISTEA, (see 1984, 1986
and 1990 Regional Transportation Plans), SANDAG used the long-range planning process
as the mechanism for identifying funding shortfalls and recommending actions to obtain
the revenues needed to implement the projects and programs recommended in the plan.
As a result of this strategy, SANDAG was successful in establishing a one-half percent
59Craig H. Scott, "Multimodal Financial Planning from a Regional Perspective: A Guide for Decision-
Making," in Transportation Research Record No. 1305, TRB/National Research Council, Washington,
D.C. pp. 42-49.
local transportation sales tax program and continues to seek other new revenues sources
as well. The major factors planners cite in evaluating their success are 1) broad
involvement of the public and local elected officials, and 2) the establishment of a high
degree of credibility in the forecasts and analyses which SANDAG performs. Clearly, the
San Diego experience indicates that the long-range financial plan can be used as an
effective strategy to establish new revenue sources for needs identified in the long-range
plan.
2.4 The Proof is in the Pudding
The passage of a regional sales tax measure offers some evidence of the benefits of
financial planning. How else can we measure the effectiveness of financial innovations and
requirements? Historically, the impact of strategies such as PPB on "bottom line"
decision-making has been difficult to gauge. Apart from the Department of Defense, PPB
was not found to have much of an impact on decision-making. However, it is clear that
transportation planning has opted to retain elements of the movement in the administration
of federal transportation programs. Still, it is difficult to assess the transportation
example, due to the modal bias in the application of financial planning requirements at
DOT. Moreover, where it was instituted, it remains unclear whether UMTA's financial
policies affected decision-making at the metropolitan or local level.6o Both of these
considerations are further exacerbated by the practice of Congressional earmarking of
transportation legislation.
In the case of highways, one GAO study reports that ISTEA included 539 demonstration
projects with an accompanying authorization of $6.2 billion. 6' This amount is over five
times higher than the $1.3 billion included for 152 highway demo projects in the 1987 re-
authorization act. Demonstration projects have been criticized on several fronts. First, for
"Steinman, April 24, 1995.
6 1U.S. GAO, "Surface Transportation: Funding Limitations and Barriers to Cross-Modal Decision-
Making", Testimony before the Subcommittee on Transportation, Committee on Appropriations, United
States Senate, GAO: T.RCED-93-25, March, 1993, pp. 5-7.
a variety of reasons, they are often authorized at lower levels than are needed to complete
the projects. A 1991 GAO study of 66 projects in 8 states found that the cost to complete
projects frequently exceeds authorized levels.62 For example, across all projects reviewed,
Federal funding and the state match comprised only 37% of total anticipated project costs,
with States scrambling for other federal, state and local funds to meet the shortfall. In
addition, a majority of the projects reviewed did not appear on state or regional
transportation plans before they were authorized. As a result, projects are not well
developed and have slow rates of obligation. The GAO found in 1991 that only 36% of
funding authorized for demonstration projects four years earlier had been obligated, and in
fact that 22 of the 66 projects reviewed had not obligated any of their $92 million in
authorized funding. Unlike other federal-aid program funds, if not obligated, the budget
authority for demonstration projects is lost forever, and is not redistributed. This is
especially undesirable since the exemption of demonstration projects from obligation
limitations lowers the annual obligation ceiling for all other federal-aid highway programs.
In the case of transit, as explained previously, the FTA Section 3 Discretionary "New
Start" program, like the Interstate Program for highway building, was designed to combat
potential for unfriendly local political cycles to harm long-term vision and planning. In
addition, by creating a mechanism (category) for large projects to be funded, this ensures
that large projects do not artificially hurt smaller ones and vice versa where they are
equally desirable or deserving of federal funding. This purpose is undermined, however,
when lawmakers circumvent FTA recommendations (based on policy criteria including
cost-effectiveness) by earmarking legislation. Arguably, there is a much greater backlog of
transit projects than highway, given the historical orientation of the federal-aid highway
programs. This increases the likelihood that earmarked transit projects meet planning
criteria and are worthy of funding. However, there have been severe consequences as a
result of ignoring financial planning principles. The most disturbing of these is the
incidence of existing local transit service cutbacks, (usually at the expense of inner-city bus
62ibid, p. 6 from U.S. GAO, Highway Demonstration Projects: Improved Selection and Funding Controls
Are Needed, (GAO/RCED-91-146) May, 1991.
service), in order to operate urban rail systems which primarily serve suburban commuter
constituencies. Not only is the practice of earmarking harmful for the "perverse
incentives" it introduces into local decision-making process, it additionally tends to divide
an already weak and underfunded transit industry first by pitting operators' political talents
against one another and secondly by compromising true system planning by polarizing bus
and rail transit interests. Finally, it is worth noting that while highway and other projects
are also susceptible to Congressional earmarking, those projects have historically enjoyed
much higher levels of federal funding, and therefore less direct competition with one
another and fewer of the negative effects of earmarking.
Today, bottom line improvements in decision-making - project mixes and their operation,
maintenance and preservation - continues to be a challenge to measure as practitioners
struggle to re-invent planning process around the 15 factors, MISs, public involvement,
ISTEA management systems, and financial constraint in a meaningful way. Chapter 3
attempts to contribute to the implementation of financial planning by developing a
framework to view the influence of financial planning on decision-making at each stage in
the transportation planning process. In addition, Chapter 3 will show how it is possible to
institute processes and methods to address the challenges facing MPOs in carrying out
their new financial planning responsibilities.
2.5 Summary
In order to examine the major issues in financial constraint, this chapter began with an
historical overview of public budgeting and financial planning in transportation planning.
Program budgeting was identified as a useful model against which the linking of
transportation planning and budgeting activities in ISTEA could be compared. Major
successes and obstacles to program budgeting were explored and analyzed in a generalized
theory of decision-making and Federalism in transportation planning and budgeting. Our
analysis uncovered several challenges to implementing financial constraint as envisioned by
ISTEA. These include the presence of political influences in decision-making, analytic
intractability of planning and financial planning exercises, the importance of State/MPO
relationships, the special case of transit, the problem of transportation 'lumpiness' and the
feared subordination of vision-setting to management and control purposes of
transportation plans and programs. While the challenges are many and great, there are
indications, that they are not insurmountable. In particular, strong leadership, mutual
respect and processes to account for diverse institutional structures, i.e. the joint design
and use of defensible analyses, and teletic view of plans and budgets, in conjunction with a
strong public involvement process may together overcome the challenges facing MPOs
and their partners. If achieved, the transportation community could then harness the
potential energy of financial constraint by demonstrating efficiency in the use of existing
resources and advocating for increased funding for transportation needs at the local and/or
national levels through the use of teletically developed, long-range financial planning.
In the past, implementation of financial planning policies at the DOT was limited and
uneven. With the promulgation of the 1992 joint metropolitan and statewide planning
regulations requiring financial constraint, management systems and Major Investment
Studies, however, systems and financial analyses are now more comprehensively
instituted in transportation planning than ever before. The grand experiment has begun,
though it took twenty-some years of prior art and a kick-start by environmental and air
quality groups to fully commence.
As implementation takes place, an important question to ask now is how best to evaluate
the impact and effectiveness of the regulation? While it is impossible to control for the
simultaneous effect of the many other planning requirements introduced in ISTEA,
Chapter 3 presents the actual requirements of financial constraint, suggests methods and
processes to facilitate their implementation, considers the influence of financial constraint
on decision-making at various stages of the transportation planning process, and suggests
ways to measure its impact.
Chapter 3.0 A Framework to Consider Financial Constraint
Chapter 2 provided the purposes, background and context for financial constraint. This
chapter presents the actual requirements of the regulations governing this ISTEA
requirement and offers a framework for viewing the influence of financial constraint on the
processes and products of transportation planning. Based on four general stages of
transportation planning - System Planning, Program Development, Project Development
and Implementation - the framework facilitates a discussion of costs, benefits,
methodologies and measures of effectiveness associated with the financial constraint
requirement. We begin with a look at the actual requirements of financial constraint.
3.1 Overview of Financial Constraint in Planning and Programming
A few million here, a few million there, and after a while you're talking about some real
money.
- Senator Everett Dirksen6 3
As discussed in the previous section, in the past, transportation planning did not generally
observe the conventions of financial planning beyond (transit) project planning. Before
passage of ISTEA, at the MPO level, with the exception of the Annual Element of the TIP
(the first year of the multi-year program), projects were included in metropolitan plans and
TIPs without consideration of revenue availability. Plans and TIPs were "wish lists"
rather than products of a planning process that includes financial analysis and decision-
making concerning alternative visions or investment trade-offs.
Before ISTEA, no outside discipline existed to moderate projections of
available resources. Projections were sometimes more political than
prudent. Then, as now, pressures existed to include as many projects as
possible in the [Plan and] TIP, regardless of cost. Without the discipline of
a Financial Constraint regulation it was difficult to resist including any
project that had some chance, however slight, of being funded. In the end,
63 Murray, "Financial Constraint of the Transportation Improvement Program", STPP ISTEA Planner's
Workbook, p.61.
[this method of planning] compromises the integrity of the entire [Plan or]
program.
Referring to Transportation Improvement Programs, Murray's comments are equally
relevant as applied to the development of the Transportation Plan. In the past, planning
left financial considerations to the latter parts of the project development and planning
process. As a result, projects typically experienced costly delays in implementation,
resulting in missed opportunities to spend available federal transportation dollars. As
Senator Dirksen's comment suggests, cumulatively, these delays were not insignificant.
At a minimum, they signaled the presence of major inefficiencies in the transportation
planning process. Furthermore, delays do nothing to advance the justification for new
revenues with respect to public sentiment. The new planning requirements such as the
Major Investment Studies, Management Systems and Financial Constraint in ISTEA and
the CAAA target greater efficiency in planning and implementation. Through financial
planning, the requirement of financial constraint provides further opportunities for MPOs
and their partners to improve the planning process. This is achieved by developing
realistic plans and programs, focusing on their delivery, re-orienting attention toward
operating, maintaining and preserving these investments, and finally, identifying new
means to achieve needed and desired levels of investment.
3.1.1 The Requirements. The October 28, 1993 metropolitan planning regulations
implement the ISTEA requirement of financial constraint. 23 CFR 450.322 Metropolitan
transportation planning process: Transportation plan, Subpart b(1 1) states that the
transportation plan must:
Include a financial plan that demonstrates the consistency of proposed
transportation investments with already available and projected sources of
revenue. The financial plan shall compare the estimated revenue from
existing and proposed funding sources that can reasonably be expected to
be available for transportation uses, and the estimated costs of
constructing, maintaining and operating the total (existing plus planned)
65transportation system over the period of the plan.
"ibid, pg. 62.
65 FHWA and FTA, Metropolitan Planning Rule, Federal Register, p. 58075.
Furthermore, the regulations state that:
1. the estimated revenue by existing revenue source available for transportation shall
be determined and any shortfalls identified. Proposed new revenues and/or
revenue sources to cover shortfalls must also be identified, along with strategies
ensuring their availability;
2. existing and proposed revenues shall cover all forecasted capital, operating and
maintenance costs over at least a 20 year horizon;
3. all cost and revenue projections shall be based on the data reflecting the existing
situation and historical trends;
4. the plan must be updated every three years in non-attainment areas and every five
years in attainment areas; and
5. plans in nonattainment and maintenance areas must demonstrate financial strategies
required to implement projects necessary to attain air quality compliance.
With regard to TIP financial planning requirements, 23 CFR 450.324 subpart e states that
The TIP shall be financially constrained by year and include a financial plan
that demonstrates which projects can be implemented using current
revenue sources and which projects are to be implemented using proposed
revenue sources (while the existing transportation system is being
adequately operated and maintained).
In addition:
1. the TIP financial plan shall be developed by the MPO in cooperation with the State
and transit operator, who must provide MPOs with estimates of available Federal
and State funds;
2. the TIP must be updated every two years, with the development cycle compatible
with the STIP cycle;"
3. only projects for which construction and operating funds can reasonably be
expected to be available may be included. In the case of new funding sources,
strategies for ensuring their availability shall be identified.
4. the TIPs must cover three years, with funds being available or committed for the
first two years for projects in a non-attainment or maintenance area.
These are the financial planning requirements for metropolitan plans and programs. It has
been just a year and a half since the regulations were promulgated, and the first plans and
programs which reflect them are just becoming available for review. Comments received
during rule-making and initial indications suggest that the following issues are worthy of
more detailed discussion. These issues are salient either for the controversy which
6 6Note: STIPs are also required to be financially constrained by year, per the regulation.
surrounds them or for the central role they play in implementation of the financial
constraint requirement:
Priority. As we noted in our review of ISTEA in Chapter 2, the regulations are clear
about the priority consideration of existing system operating, maintenance and
recapitalization costs:
Priority should be given to the maintenance and operation of the existing
system including capital replacement. A credible cost estimate and
replacement schedule must support this assessment.67
Furthermore, consistent with direction of the Clean Air Act Amendments, in
nonattainment areas, priority is also assigned to the implementation of TCM's. Beyond
these priorities, the MPO, in cooperation with the State and transit operator, is left to
develop the regional vision and the programs to implement this vision, with due
consideration given to the 15 planning factors identified by ISTEA.
Comprehensiveness. The regulations are also explicit regarding the need to document all
system costs, including those necessary to build, operate, maintain and re-capitalize the
existing and planned transportation system. Where new sources are proposed, strategies
necessary to ensure the availability of funds must be clearly stated.
Accuracy. Revenues and costs are to be estimated with the aid of those closest to the
source of information, i.e. States and transit and other operators. This suggests the
importance of MPOs' relationships with their partners. Forecasting should be based upon
historical and presently identifiable trends. The interpretation of this aspect of the
regulations is important to the teletic view of the financial planning requirements in that
historical funding trends may not accurately reflect actual needs. We expand upon this
topic later in the discussion of cost-estimation methods. This distinction notwithstanding,
the regulations acknowledge that it is "difficult to concretely forecast [20-year revenues]
6 7FHWA/FTA, p. 58060. Note: State asset-based management systems should assist in providing these
cost and replacement schedule estimates.
in detail" and state that technical assistance on forecasting funds and utilizing alternative
revenue sources will be provided.6 s At this writing, formal D.O.T. technical guidance on
financial constraint is not yet available although information is available through the
National Transit Institute course, "Financial Planning and Programming for MPOs".
Timeliness. The STIP and TIP development cycles should be coordinated. The MPO
should coordinate planning cycles with its partners so that all information is made available
to the MPO in a timely manner.
Flexibility. The regulations adopt an approach of flexibility over proscription. In general,
the regulations consider the "inherent diversity of metropolitan areas" by allowing regions
to develop their own processes and methods for meeting the financial planning
requirements.69 In particular, as one Congressional report notes,
The process is designed to achieve the goals and objectives of the Federal
surface transportation program and other important Federal programs,
recognizes the central role that the states play in administering the Federal
program, recognizes the special needs and expertise of urbanized areas, and
is designed to be flexible enough to accommodate the different needs and
circumstances that exist among the states.
As we showed in Chapter 2, flexibility is an essential feature of any regulation which
would impose requirements on institutions as diverse as MPOs and their partner agencies.
ISTEA affords regions and their partners increased flexibility as they consider issues of
plan priorities and criteria, project selection, phasing and scheduling, and the use of
flexible funds.7 In return, regions must give priority to system preservation and
management, include the public in decision-making and are expressly prohibited from
suballocating STP and FTA Section 9 funds, unless such activity is absolutely necessary.
"FHWA/FrA, Section 450.322 Metropolitan Planning Process: Transportation Plan, p. 58058.
69FHWA/FTA, Metropolitan Planning Rule, Section 450.316, p. 58054.
70U.S. House of Representatives, Report of the Committee on Public Works and Transportation, To
accompany H.R. 2950, ISTEA 1991, Report 102-171, Part I, p. 25.
7 FHWA/FTA, Section 450.222 Project Selection, p. 58049.
Procedures which predetermine by percentages or formulas funding to individual
jurisdictions or modes
are inconsistent with the legislative provisions that require MPOs in
cooperation with the State and transit operators to develop a prioritized
and financially constrained TIP and shall not be used unless they can be
clearly shown to be based on considerations required to be addressed as
part of the planning process.
Although the spirit of this provision is consistent with promoting true intermodal
transportation planning, it will be difficult to enforce. As we have seen, even in the federal
transportation program, it was necessary to create "categories" to address equity and
other concerns. As regions carry out their new financial planning responsibilities, it is not
clear why they should not employ similar conventions as necessary. In fact, it may be
shown that "ISTEA-ization" of transportation finance at the state level better equips some
MPOs and their partners to meet the challenges of ISTEA. We explore this issue further
in the discussion of programming techniques below.
Cooperation. Again, as we saw in Chapter 2, cooperation among operators, the state and
the MPO is critical to the success of planning and programming under the financial
constraint requirement. In addition, ISTEA challenges MPOs to broaden access to
decision-making by inviting private, environmental and socio-economic interests to the
table. In many areas, the introduction of these new players will alter the traditional or
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existing balance of power.
Recognizing past and existing friction between MPOs and states in the development of
plans and programs in particular, the DOT revised the joint planning regulations to more
clearly indicate that metropolitan TIPs must be included in the STIP without modification,
either directly or by reference. Project selection responsibilities for different Federal
72FHWA/FTA, Section 450.324, TIP: General, p. 58077.
73As we shall see, the California state legislature has passed a measure which reconciled state and ISTEA
funding rules to facilitate integrated multimodal transportation planning.
74U.S. GAO, "Transportation Infrastructure: Major Program Revisions Present Challenges", Testimony
before the Interim Committees on Transportation, Oregon State Legislature, September 1992, p. 8.
75FHWA/FTA, Section 450.216: STIP, p. 58047.
funds sources are also outlined. These provisions, along with extra planning funds, were
intended to give greater authority to the MPO in determining regional priorities.
However, there are indications that events at earlier stages can undermine the intent of
these provisions. In particular, concerns were raised during rulemaking regarding the
development of the fund estimate. Commentors raised the potential for States to alter
estimates of funds to an area, as a result of disagreement over projects included in the TIP.
FHWA and FTA, responding to this concern could do no more than to denounce this
practice:
Through the cooperative TIP development process and the joint approval
requirement, disagreements over which projects to include in the TIP and
their priority should be resolved. While we would hope that through
negotiations a mutually acceptable decision ...would be reached, it is
recognized that this may not always be the case. Where agreement cannot
be reached ... the statutory provisions do not prohibit a State from using
the Federal funds [other than STP urbanized] in some other part of the
State."
This suggests the possible need for formal agreements to solidify estimates in advance of
program development or the direct pass-through to MPOs of a greater percentage of
federal funds.
"Reasonably Available". Predictably, planners quickly honed in on the interpretation of
this phrase during rulemaking. According to the Senate report on ISTEA, reasonably
anticipated sources of funding include "historical" funding levels, "existing" bonding
authority, and "existing" state and local tax revenues which would be available within the
timeframe of the plan or TIP.77 In response to concerns about such a strict interpretation
of the regulation, the final rule concedes that "some flexibility beyond available funding is
necessary for effective planning." This view acknowledges 1) the need to allow States
flexibility to manage obligation authority, 2) the legislative directive to encourage use of
innovative funding sources, 3) the need to allow other project implementors to manage
their own revenue sources cost-effectively, 4) the Congressional directive to permit
7 6FHWA/FTA, Section 450.324, p. 58061.
7 7 Senate Report 102-71, P. 30 in STPP Guidelines, p.28.
utilization of Federal authorization levels as a basis for forecasting available revenues, and
5) some natural project "slippage"." At the same time, however, the regulations note
that "Congress indicated a need for a more constrained approach to programming than has
historically existed and that plans should have a financing strategy associated with them."79
The final word was a compromise allowing the assumption of proposed new or increased
revenues, where these revenues are accompanied by strategies for ensuring their
availability. A plan for securing the new funds should provide information on how support
of the public, elected officials, business community or other interests will be obtained. The
regulations include examples of acceptable and unacceptable assumptions regarding the
availability of new revenues. 0 The final interpretation of "reasonably available revenues"
will consist of the enforcement and compliance activities as they take place.
3.1.2 Framework to Consider Financial Constraint. In order to consider the full
impact of financial constraint on the planning process - including where value is added or
costs are imposed on the process - it is useful to examine the influence of the requirement
on the various stages of planning. As defined in this thesis, these are: System Planning,
Project Development, Programming and Implementation. The System Planning and
Programming stages refer to the processes and activities surrounding Long Range Plan
and TIP (products at the MPO level) development respectively.
In addition to these two main stages, two additional stages of transportation planning
which are worthy of our attention are the Project Development and Implementation stages
of transportation planning. States or operators generally take the lead in these stages of
planning. Though not directly in the purview of the MPO, Project Development and
Implementation are important to the discussion of financial constraint since they affect or
are affected by the way in which the requirement is implemented at the regional level.
78FHWA/FTA, Question 2: Reasonably Available Funding Sources, p. 58043 and ibid.
79
80FHWA/FTA, p.58060.
Figure 3.1 illustrates the relationship between the framework as conceived, and the
traditional FTA project development process, after which the joint planning regulations
were patterned. In addition to preliminary feasability studies usually undertaken with local
planning funds (not shown in FTA process), Project Development includes steps
Figure 3.1: Framework for Viewing Financial Constraint as Compared to FTA
Project Development Process for Major Transit Investments"
2, 3 and 4 in the diagram. As shown in the diagram, System Planning and Project
Development are closely linked. System Planning considers the broad objectives for
system development and generates potential projects for development. At the same time,
System Planning also utilizes that pool of projects generated from other planning
8 1US.DOT/FTA, Brochure, "Project Development Process for Major Transit Investments".
exercises. In this way, system planning is conducted dynamically with project
development. The programming stage generally follows System Planning and occurs
somewhere in the project development stage, depending upon the programming criteria
used. Most programming criteria dictate that a fair amount of Project Development be
completed, including environmental analyses and permitting before projects may be
considered for inclusion in the TIP. Finally, Implementation may not occur until a project
has been included in the TIP and funds have been obligated for construction.
Previous to ISTEA, the highway and transit project development processes differed
substantially, not the least of which in their financial planning requirements.
Figure 3.2: Pre-ISTEA Planning Processs2
HIGHWAY PROCESS
Long Range System Planning
* Regional plans
Preliminary Engineering
* Location/Alignment
* Draft EIS
* Design Features
* Final EIS
Implementation
TRANSIT PROCESS
Long Range System Planning
* Regional Plans
Altematives Analysis
* Mode and Alignment
* Draft EIS
* Financial Plan
Preliminary Engineering
* Design Features
* Final EIS
Implementation
As noted in Chapter 2, transit projects were subject to much more rigorous financial
analyses as a part of project justification and funding procedures. Figures 3.2 and 3.3
demonstrate the separate transit and highway processes before ISTEA and the combined
8 2APTA Summary Outline of FHWA/FTA Rule on Metropolitan and State Transportation Planning and
Programming.
process as a result of ISTEA, respectively.Previous to ISTEA, except for some
compatability at the Plan and TIP stages and flexibility in the Interstate Substitution
program, highway projects and transit projects had separate planning and funding
processes. Notwithstanding funding constraints which remain, 83 ISTEA expanded
funding flexibility across modes, and instituted a common multimodal planning process
which includes financial planning and corridor studies. With the introduction of flexible
funding and the MIS requirement, ISTEA begins to address modal bias in the planning
Figure 3.3: Post-ISTEA Planning Process
process identified earlier in Chapter 2. In addition to contributing to greater parity in
multi-modal transportation planning, the influence of financial constraint is apparant at
each stage in the transportation planning process. We begin with a look at Systems
Planning.
83The degree to which federal funds can be leveraged for transit continues to be constrained by the
availability of operating and matching capital funds at the state and local levels, as we see later in Chapter
3.
MULTIMODAL PROCESS
Long Range Planning
* Regional Planning
* Corridor Planning
* Considerations: demand,
cost, environment, finance, etc.
Preliminary Engineering
* Draft EIS
* Major Design Features
* Final EIS
Implementation
3.2 Long Range System Planning
Several of the benefits, costs and issues associated with financial constraint at the System
Planning stage are present at the Programming stage of transportation planning as well.
This section will therefore focus on these shared issues in addition to issues specific to
System Planning. The section on Programming will present the impacts of financial
constraint that are unique to that stage of the planning process.
Long range system planning can be characterized in terms of the process of vision
planning and the product of this exercise: the Transportation Plan. The Transportation
Plan is a product of the continuous, cooperative, and comprehensive transportation
planning process required of all urban areas with a population of over 50,000. The
Transportation Plan, also known as the Long-Range Plan (LRP) is a 20-year, intermodal
plan, which describes the policies, strategies and facilities that the region will want or need
to make more efficient use of the existing transportation system and to meet future travel
demands. As a planning document, the plan should begin with goals and objectives,
proceed with an assessment of needs, and then identify, evaluate and prioritize alternatives
to best meet regional goals and objectives. In conjunction with their partners and the
public, MPOs must also consider the 15 factors identified in ISTEA, the integration of
Management Systems, Major Investment Studies, and strategies to improve regional air
quality.
As discussed in Chapter 2 and earlier in this chapter, the purpose of financial constraint at
this stage of the planning process is to strengthen the planning process in general and to
enhance the efficiency of the planning process in particular. Another potential purpose of
financial planning, not articulated by ISTEA, is the use of regional long-range plans at the
federal level to inform the Congress of the "cost-to-complete" the vision of ISTEA. We
begin an examination of the major issues related to system planning in detail here, starting
with a look at the primary benefits of the financial planning exercise.
3.2.1 Benefits
Choices. A primary benefit intended of the financial constraint requirement is its role in
promoting the development of alternatives and the examination of trade-offs among
regional priorities once vision planning has been performed. Theoretically, this is the
essence of planning and should take place regardless of financial constraint. However, the
introduction of scarcity increases the opportunity cost of each investment choice, making
all choices increasingly deserving of scrutiny.
With all stakeholders at the table and participating fully in the decision-making process,
the result of conducting long range transportation planning with financial planning can be
a more refined statement of regional objectives and priorities than ever before. Where a
balance of interests does not exist, however, there is increased potential for financial
constriant to be used destructively. As mentioned above, therefore, a major pre-requisite
for financial constraint to work as intended is the fashioning of a cooperative institutional
structure for decision-making which enjoys the consensus of the public, the MPO and its
partners. As noted in Chapter 2, this structure should be designed to involve decision-
makers or their representatives in the earliest stages of the financial planning and long-
range planning processes, in order to avoid controversy over analyses once they are
performed. Through the use of consensus-oriented approaches, mutually agreed-upon
defensible analyses can play an important role in decision-making, despite the presence of
seemingly overwhelming political and technical obstacles.
Efficiency. The efficiency of the planning process is enhanced through financial constraint
and financial planning in several ways: First, as a result of the consideration of alternatives
and prioritization of needs, the financial planning process concentrates resources on the
actual implementation of the identified priorities, instead of squandering them upon a
"wish list" of projects, which, without priority ordering, serves no discernible purpose in
guiding future transportation investments. As products, the Plan and TIP represent
successive steps in the planning process and must articulate with increasing clarity
regional policies and priorities.
The second way in which financial planning promotes efficiency is to ensure that ongoing
existing system operating, maintenance and re-capitalization needs will be met before
other investments are considered (see Figure 3.4).
Figure 3.4: Financial Planning Process for Long Range Plan14
84 NTI/DOT, Financial Planning and Programming for MPOs, p. 1-12.
committed projects from the current TIP. Only after these costs are considered and met,
should system expansion plans be considered. When all "available", "committed" and
"reasonably available" revenues have been identified and "spent", the result is a fiscally
constrained Long-Range Plan.
Highlighting New Strategies. Another way in which financial planning promotes
efficiency in transportation planning is by highlighting the most cost-effective strategies for
addressing regional transportation problems such as congestion, air pollution and safety.
These may include regulatory, market-based or capacity-enhancing strategies ranging from
a review of performance/planning criteria for capacity-enhancing projects to operations-
oriented demand and supply management strategies. In conjunction with the Management
System, MIS and public involvement planning requirements, financial planning encourages
a more critical look at options to more cost-effectively manage the existing transportation
system.
Teletic Approach. Figure 3.4 also illustrates an important process in the teletic approach
to long-range planning. Recall from Chapter 2 that the teletic approach to system
planning begins with the question "Where are we going?" and then asks "How do we get
there from here?" with respect to regional transportation investments. Adopted en masse,
this approach would yield transportation plans which amount to a national set of regional
"visions". These would include cost estimates to achieve the needed investments and
documentation of regions' abilities to cover their costs. On the revenue forecasting side,
an important part of the teletic approach to financial constraint is a feedback loop for
identifying additional available revenues where system expansion or other costs exceed the
revenues estimated in the original fund estimate (see Figure 3.4). This loop acknowledges
the possibility that initial fund estimates overlooked project-specific revenue options such
as fees, debt-financing or privatization. Similarly, teletic cost estimation should be based
upon needed rather than historical costs. We expand upon these topics later in this section.
Linking Regional Planning. Finally, financial planning affords regions the opportunity
to link regional planning activities through financial planning. Developing regional
consensus on the assumptions and methods used in the financial plans for the LRP and the
TIP is no small feat. Yet once achieved, this result confers significant benefits on the MPO
and its partners. Figure 3.5 illustrates this through a more detailed picture of the financial
planning process.
At the heart of the process are the activities of regional financial policy and program
planning. This process is characterized by the confluence of several agencies' policies,
products and interests, requiring strong institutional relationships in order to carry out the
financial planning process. Once policies and assumptions have been set, revenue
forecasts, cost estimations and sensitivity analyses can be performed. These tasks are
difficult; negotiations on methods and assumptions are often fraught with policy and
technical hardspots. Once consensus is achieved however, participants are rewarded with
significant planning economies of scale. Agreement regarding expectable capital and
operating costs, fare policies, grant receipts, growth and inflation greatly strengthens the
links between and within planning entities. For example, a Public Transit Management
System which represents regional agreement on such things as the life cycle of a bus, will
be useful for comparisons at the regional level (where several operators may vye for
system preservation funds) as well as for capital and maintenance planning at the operating
agency itself.
A further example of linking regional planning is when financial planning at the MPO has
positive "trickle down" effects on the long-range planning efforts of its constituent
agencies. This effect is taking place in the San Francisco Bay Area where the long-range
planning efforts at the Alameda County Congestion Management Agency and Santa Clara
County Transportation Agency include financial planning components and assumptions
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which are consistent with those contained in the MPOs Regional Transportation Plan.
85This effect is taking place currently at Santa Clara County Transportation Agency, per interview with
Chris Wornum, Cambridge Systematics, January, 1995.
Figure 3.5
Financial Planning Process in Metropolitan Transportation Planning8 6
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86 ibidp 1-8.
Education and Advocacy. Financial constraint further strengthens long-range planning
by creating educational and advocacy opportunities throughout the plan development
process. Financial planning has been said to lend a "sense of proportion and purpose" to
the planning process.87 Used in this way financial constraint is a vehicle to educate
decision-makers, the public and the MPOs public agency partners about the financial
condition and capacity of the region. In addition, presented together with an unconstrained
plan showing needs and investment proposals beyond the region's current financial
capacity, the financially constrained long-range plan can act as an advocacy document on
behalf of the region, such as was achieved in San Diego, CA. In this way, as both an
educational and advocacy document, the financial plan can be used to a) demonstrate
where costs are not (and should be) fully allocated, b) identify revenue shortfalls in the
attainment of needed or desired investment levels and c) serve as a springboard for
legislative or other actions to remedy a) and b).
In summary, in conjunction with Management Systems, Public Involvment, and MIS
planning requirements, the major objective of financial constraint in long-range planning is
to strengthen the planning process through 1) the identification of trade-offs and priorities,
giving teeth to the Plan development process, 2) increased efficiencies in planning as
resources are dedicated to implementing plans and programs, 3) the emphasis on system
management (including taking care of existing system needs first), 4) planning economies
of scale afforded to the MPO and its partners and 5) the educational and advocacy benefits
of the constrained (and unconstrained) Long-Range Plans.
3.2.2 The Costs and their Remedies. Financial constraint cannot be determined to add
value to the planning process without addressing the costs associated with its
implementation. Many of the major issues associated with financial planning at the System
Planning stage were identified in Chapter 2. To re-cap these, the major objections to
financial constraint are: 1) that it inhibits the vision process, to the potential detriment of
transit projects in particular, 2) is technically burdensome, and 3) ignores political realities.
87Murray, p. 62.
In addition, an issue from the regulatory perspective important to the assessment of the
regulation in light of these issues is the determination of what constitutes a "good faith
effort". In other words, how should the requirement of financial constraint be enforced?
Which components of the requirement deserve priority consideration in enforcement?
When do total enforcement costs outweigh other benefits? We examine each of these
issues in turn.
The Anti-Visioning Argument. Recall from Chapter 2 that a major objection to the
financial constraint requirement is the assertion that financial constraint inhibits the
"visioning" process. Some planners additionally fear that transit projects, already
historically disadvantaged relative to highway projects, will not fare well under the new
"constrained" planning environment. We examine the concerns related to transit later in
our discussion of the Project Development stage of planning. Chapter 2 considered the
anti-visioning argument and found that indeed ISTEA may have been remiss in calling for
financially unconstrained vision-planning, thereby failing to encourage the teletic approach
to transportation planning. If true, as evidenced by the first few rounds of long-range
plans across MPOs, this oversight would be a major missed opportunity for the long-range
vision plans to cummulatively inform the development of a national vision for
transportation policy and funding needs at the federal level.
Ideally, MPOs operationalize the teletic approach to long-range transportation planning by
developing the financial plan in two parts, constrained and unconstrained. Moreover, in
developing these, planners need not adopt the incremental status-quo approach. Instead,
the teletic approach to financial planning employs pro-active analysis techniques on both
the revenue and the cost sides of the constrained plan. The unconstrained plans list the
remaining projects that are needed or desired, and may also be prioritized to show which
plans would go forward as certain resources become available. In this way, the plans
themselves are at once realistic and forward-looking documents of advocacy. They can be
used educate and lobby decisionmakers and the public regarding future actions that will be
necessary to achieve the regional vision.
As we identified in Chapter 2 and will see again in Chapter 4, for reasons ranging from the
technical to the institutional, MPOs are experiencing varying degrees of success in
implementing the requirement as envisioned by ISTEA. Given the diversity among
regions, in terms of their transportation problems and institutional capacity, it is not
unreasonable to expect that MPOs will need time to adjust to the new planning rules.
Thus far, we presented the intended benefits of financial constraint and showed how the
teletic view of the requirement, in conjunction with mutually-developed defensible
analyses, can combat the technical and political pitfalls associated with financial constraint.
3.2.3 Features of ISTEA to Support Planning Activities. In fashioning the financial
constraint requirement, Congress too anticipated how difficult implementation of the
requirement would likely be. In order to ease the technical and political burdens, it
included three provisons in ISTEA to facilitate the implementation of the financial
constraint requirement. The first remedy was increased fungibility of federal funds. The
second was a promise of more program and planning funds to carry out the newly
mandated planning responsibilities of MPOs. And third, technical assistance was to be
made available through FHWA and FTA guidance and training. As we shall see, several
issues - some of which erode the effectiveness of these remedies - signify that, like MPOs
with their partners, Congress may need to exercise patience with MPOs as they endeavor
to implement the financial planning requirements of ISTEA.
Flexible Funds. The Government Accounting Office estimates that over half of the $155
billion in ISTEA is available for flexible use." The flexible funding provisions in ISTEA
associated with STP, NHS and certain other fund categories were patterned after previous
flexibility within the federal Interstate Substitution Program and California's Propositions
108 and 111, which established Flexible Congestion Relief (FCR) funds and county-level
Congestion Management Programs. 9 With fewer barriers limiting the availability of
"8 STPP, ISTEA Year Three, p. 6.
89Alameda County Congestion Management Agency, Congestion Management Program, Executive
Summary, June 27, 1991, p. i.
funding for certain modes, i.e. transit, many argue that states and regions are now better
able to fund the mix of projects which best meets regional needs. While the amount of
federal funds flexed to transit is increasing, (approximately $600 million in FY 1994, as
compared with $469 million in FY 1993 and $301.5 million in FY 1992), the trend toward
funding more intermodal project mixes is generally a slow one. 90 The STPP study on
state expenditures of federal funds found that states are favoring traditional programs and
that few states have taken advantage of the flexible funding provisions of ISTEA. In FY
1992, however, only three states - Maine, Vermont and Massachusetts transferred NHS
funds to the STP; in FY 1993 these three entities were Vermont, New Hampshire and the
Virgin Islands. Table 3.1 shows the nationwide obligation rates for the NHS, STP and
CMAQ programs in Fys 1992, 1993 and 1994.
Table 3.1: Nationwide ISTEA Program Obligation Rates, FYs 1992-19949'
ISTEA Program FY 1992 FY 1993 FY 1994
NHS 94% 88% 81%
STP 70% 61% 63%
CMAQ 42% 42% 48%
It is important to note that just examining obligation rates by program and the number of
states transferring funds between programs may not yield an accurate assessment of
implementation activities. These rates may mask the use of highway funds for non-
traditional programs within programs such as the NHS. Research has not shown this to be
true however. STPP found that no NHS funds were used for transit purposes in NHS
corridors. The CMAQ program represented 62% of all highway program transfers to
transit in the first two years of ISTEA, with transfers of funds in FY 1993 increasing 69%
over those transferred to transit in FY 1992. STP funds have also been increasingly used
9 Statement of Jane F. Garvey, before the House Public Works and Transportation Committee,
Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight, Hearing on ISTEA Flexibility and Planning Provisions,
October 6, 1994., p.2. See Appendix A for draft FTA figures on Flexible funding Transfers to FTA and
ObIgiations.
91STPP, State Expenditures of Federal Surface Transportation Funds: Do They Reflect the New
Directions?, December 8, 1993, Introduction. FY1994 figures are draft figures, per Felicia Young, STPP.
to fund transit, with STP funds accounting for 8% and 31% of all transfers to transit in
FYs 1992 and 1993 respectively. 9 2 Indeed, expectations for flexible funding to relieve the
decision-making challenges of ISTEA and for better decision-making to be reflected in
actual project mixes should be tempered by the following caveats to this important
provision.
As we saw in Chapter 2, flexibility is not a new concept in transportation funding and
should not be expected to necessarily change decision-making patterns and project mixes
right away, if at all, in some states. 93 The reasons for this are several. First, many states'
transportation laws still are not complementary to the flexible funding provisions in
ISTEA. Problems with inflexible local matching dollars and the (in)availability of local
operating funds persist in the post-ISTEA environment. These account for some part of
the uneven use of flexible funding provisions across states. As one FHWA points out,
most legislatures are on a biennial schedule and are just now assessing these issues for the
first time since passage of ISTEA.94
Additionally, regions and states who do elect to take advantage of flexible funds must first
wait for existing pipeline of pre-ISTEA projects to be delivered. Meanwhile, it is
important to create a similar backlog of multi-modal projects at both the state and local
levels. In order to do this, however, regions must develop the institutional and technical
capacity for administering the new programs and for performing multi-modal trade-off
analyses. 95 For example, Michigan DOT, while supportive of fiscal constraint for both
TIPs and Long-range plans, believes there is a need to supplement current policy-based
decisions with suitable technical mechanisms to make trade-off decisions between different
92Ibid.
93 Denno, p. 275.
9*Garvey, p. 14.
95GAO, "Transportation Infrastructure: Urban Transportation Planning Can Better Address Modal
Trade-Offs".
types of projects.9 6 Similarly, the GAO has called on DOT to develop criteria and related
measures for comparing highway and mass transit projects.97
Finally, with new mixes of projects in plans and programs, states should, but may not,
respond to changes in local decision-making over time as represented by obligation rates
of different federal fund categories. A major reason for this is the sizable backlog of
unfunded highway needs which exists in many states.98 FHWA estimates the current cost
to retire the existing backlog of highway pavement deficiencies and feasible capacity
deficiencies to be approximately $212 billion. In addition, over 100,000 bridges are
deemed structurally deficient requiring $78 billion for these projects alone.99 This
situation causes many states to balk at flexing their highway dollars toward non-traditional
projects. Missouri DOT, for example, refused to obligate Enhancement funds unless
Congress provides 100% obligation authority for all of ISTEA.'00 We turn to the
important issue of federal funding presently.
States Considered. Several of the factors mentioned above suggest that the potential for
ISTEA flexible funding provisions to alleviate pressures associated with decision-making
under financial constraint still rests very much with the states. ISTEA changes the state-
MPO relationship, mandating more direct project selection and enhanced overall planning
roles for MPOs. The abilities of states to adapt to these changes will influence how post-
ISTEA decision-making translates into actual delivered projects.
As we saw in Chapter 2, and in the comments received during rulemaking, the State-MPO
relationship is key to the smooth and equitable administration of federal funds. States
"Louis Lambert, Deputy Director of the Bureau of Transportation Planning, Michigan DOT, Testimony
before the U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Public Works and Transportation, Subcommittee
on Investigations and Oversight, October 6, 1994, p. 7-8.
97 GAO, Transportation Infrastrucutre: Urban Transportation Planning Can Better Address Modal Trade-
Offs, p. 13.
98STPP, State Expenditures of Federal Surface Transportation Funds: Do they reflect the new directions?,
p. .
"Garvey, p. 4-5.
ioSTPP, State Expenditures,Introduction.
control over 80% of federal funds, including flexible funds, and are also responsible for
approving and incorporating regional TIPs into STIPs. Therefore, although ISTEA
intends to grant MPOs greater authority in decision-making, states continue to have major
programming responsibilities as well as potentially significant roles in metropolitan
resource allocation decisions. If state roles are not well defined and incorporated early in
the regional plan development process, state/MPO conflicts regarding the fund estimate
and project selection can easily frustrate the plan or program development process.
Ideally, ISTEA envisions a more parallel and collaborative state and regional planning
process than existed previously. It requires states to work cooperatively with MPOs at
the regional level, and for controversial issues to be resolved before regional TIPs are
included in STIPs.
Initial indications suggest that state-MPO relationships vary considerably. In hearings on
ISTEA planning and flexible funding provisions in 1993, the Committee on Public Works
and Transportation noted that:
While some states were accepting the changes and developing the planning
processes necessary to implement them, others were resisting the new provisions
of ISTEA and were trying to continue spending federal money on highways the
same way they always had.101
There are any number of reasons for the uneven implementation of ISTEA provisions.
Diversity of history, institutions and system characteristics account for many of these. In
surveying the experiences of localities in utilizing flexible funding provisions of ISTEA,
the Surface Transportation Policy Project found that, in some cases, the differences
manifested themselves attitudinally. STPP notes that "the clearest winners under ISTEA
have been those willing to make new alliances and actively participate in transportation
planning."'" In addition, some states, such as California, New York, Massachusetts, and
Washington, D.C. gained experience in multi-modal planning through use of multimodal
Federal-Aid Urban System Funds and transfer provisions of the Interstate substitution
'"'Committee on Public Works and Transportation, Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight,
"Hearing on ISTEA Planning and Flexible Funding Provisions," October 6, 1994, p.1.
'"STPP, ISTEA: Year Three, p. 2.
program (see Appendix B for Obligation Levels for Highway and Mass Transit Projects,
FYs 1976-1991).103
Indeed, a culture of institutional cooperation and determination - in short leadership - will
be key to the successful implementation of ISTEA. State officials and representatives also
share this view. A 1993 survey of Secretaries of DOTs (Suvey I response rate: 43 states
or 86%) and regional directors at state DOTs (Survey II response rate: 48 states or 96%)
informs our understanding of a critical aspect of ISTEA's challenge to states, their
decision-making and implementation processes":
Table 3.2: Questions Posed to DOT Secretaries and Regional Directors
Regarding State Decision-Making Practices
1. With respect to source (budget) allocation, is the process of decision-making in your state DOT centralized, decentralized,
combination and/or other?
2. In your opinion, is the process of decision-making in your SDOT smooth and logical?
3. Is them any room for improvement in the decision-making process?
4. Does the organizational structure of your state DOT support/complement the department's decision-making process?
5. Please indicate the number of upper management positions in SDOT that are political appointees.
6. How does the change in the top-level DOT administrators (political appointees) affect the decision process?
7. How does the change of top-level DOT administrators affect the implementation of decisions?
8. How can the decision process and implementation be improved under the changing management environment.
In evaluations of the responses to questions 1 through 4, 6 and 7, researchers found
statistically significant degrees of consistency between the views of secretaries of DOTs
and regional directors. Table 3.3 presents the results of the surveys. Respondents in both
categories surveyed generally believed decision-making in their organizations to be
smooth and logical; yet they also believed that there was room for improvement in terms
of process and institutional structure.
103GAO, Urban Transportation Planning Can Better Address Modal Trade-Offs, Appendix II.1 and 11.2.
'
04Hulsey, eLal. "On the Response Consistency of Questionnaire Surveys of State Department of
Transportation Management," Transportation Research Record, No. 1395, TRB/National Research
Council, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C., 1993, pp. 163-167.
Table 3.3: Responses and Results of Tests of Significance for
DOT Survey Questions 05
Question No. Category Significance'"
1: yes/very much 2. to some extent 3. no
Q1: Survey I 17 26 0 Ho: reject
Survey I 28 16 3
Q2: Survey I 22 21 0 Ho: accept
Survey I 28 18 2
Q3: Survey I 23 19 1 Ho: accept
Survey I 27 19 1
Q4: Survey I 28 14 1 Ho: accept
Survey I 37 10 1
Q6: Survey I 10 27 6 Ho: accept
Survey II 6 32 6
Q7: Survey I 4 27 10 Ho: accept
Survey I 3 33 8
In addition, changes in top-level administrators are perceived to have some effect on
decision-making and implementation activities. The consistency of responses extended to
the responses to question 8: "How can the decision process and implementation be
improved under the changing management environment". These are indicated below:
Table 3.4: Recommendations for
Improved Decision-Making and Implementation at the State Level
* Top-level positions should be civil service or under executive contract.
* Mutliyear project commitments should be exempt from changes except for some predefined reasons.
* There should be well-documented information systems that would not have to be resold to each new
administration.
* Transition would be smoother if only transportation officials were appointed.
* There needs to be good communication of objectives to all involved employees. There should be no
hidden agendas.
* The basis for decisions should be documented and should be based on clearly stated objectives.
* The establishment of a long-term plan, supported by detail and a "need justification," may be the best
hedge against impulse or political expedients.
* An unified management information system should be established.
i05Combination of two tables in original study.
''Significance is determined using Chi-square tests of correlation. Ho= depending on the hierarchical
level of the management decision maker responding to a questionnaire survey, no significant degree of
variation in responses may be expected.
Recall the argument forwarded in the generalized theory of decisionmaking presented in
Chapter 2. We stated that rational processes and defensible analysis aids decision-making
regardless of the institutional make-up of the decision-making body. From their responses
to question 8, it is clear that officials and staff directors in most DOTs believed this to be
true as well. They call for greater rationality in resource allocation decision-making
processes and better analytical and management tools to support state decision-making
and implementation processes, independent of the level of centralization of decision-
making in the state in question.
Looking closer at the recommended actions, it is possible to differentiate among them.
While developing meaningful and functional management systems is challenging in itself, a
more fundamental and important issue for states is the re-evaluation and orientation of
their mission, which ISTEA urges. Intermodal system management, a much more difficult
and complex objective than designing and building the Interstate Highway System, is the
new charge of the day. Like MPOs and their other partners, state DOTs will need time
and assistance as they redefine their missions and re-organizing activities and resources to
support resource-allocation decison-making in this new environment. As Deputy FHWA
Administrator Jane Garvey noted, these changes will require "substantial changes in
culture, policy, and programmatic actions, as well as administrative and legislative action
by State DOTs, governors and legislatures."10 7
Increased Funding. As discussed above, the multi-modal decision-making and financial
planning required under ISTEA inspired its flexible fund provisions. Flexible funding was
intended to help ease tensions within and among institutions. In order for flexible funding
to work as intended, however, increased funding to support the new planning activities
and non-traditional programs must accompany the new flexibility This is especially true of
regions whose technical and insitutional multi-modal decision-making capacity is
immature. Newly flexible dollars with less or the same amount of funds can result in
'
07Garvey, p. 13-14.
gridlock rather than eased tensions. With a bigger funding pie, however, there is greater
assurance that everyone will get a slice.
In ISTEA, Congress increased authorizations for both transportation planning activities
and actual programs. In anticipation of the charge of "unfunded mandate" from MPOs
and other planning agencies which would have to carry out substantially increased
transportation and air quality planning responsibilities as a result of ISTEA, Congress
more than doubled the planning set-aside for MPOs and increased the large planning and
research set-aside available to the states.10 A second area of increased federal funding
was in program funding, both in existing programs and with the creation of new ones. An
example of this is the CMAQ program, an entirely new Federal program administered by
the states which helps non-attainment regions achieve national standards of air quality as
mandated by the CAAA. Increased program funds both support mandates contained in
ISTEA and the CAAA and aid regions as they implement ISTEA by tempering conflicts
that can result from competing interests for newly flexible funds.
ISTEA authorizes an unprecendented $155 billion over 6 years for transportation
investments. Annually, the authorization for transportation spending grows from $23
billion in FY 1992 to about $26 billion in FYs 1993 through 1996, and jumps to $28
billion in FY 1997. Authorized levels of funding translate into on-the-street projects as a
result of the federal appropriations and obligations process. The major criticisms of
federal funding falls in these areas, as obligation ceilings - the amount up to which funds
may be committed - generally fall short of authorized levels. Actual federal authorizations,
obligation authority, and outlays for the major highway trust fund programs, many of them
flexible, appear in Tables 3.5 and 3.6.
In the federal process, several actions may erode the funding contained within an
authorizing piece of legislation. This process is complex and confusing. We elaborate on
this process in the section on Program/Project Implementation. Here it is important to
108STPP, ISTEA: Year Three, p. 6.
note that although the Highway Trust Fund operates under contract authority - which
permits obligations of funds directly from the authorizing act - Congress controls the rate
of obligation through the Appropriations Act.
Table 3.5: ISTEA Authorizations (all figures in billions)'09
Account Federal Fiscal Year
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Highway Trust Fund
Highway Account 17.8 20.9 20.9 20.8 20.8 20.8
Transit Account 1.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.8 4.8
Trust Fund (subtotal) 19.7 23.8 23.9 23.7 23.6 25.6
General Fund 3.1 2.5 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5
Total Authorizations* 17.9** 22.8 26.2 26.2 26 26 28.1
* Figures may not add up due to rounding.
**source: Highway Users Federation and the Automotive Safety Foundation.
Table 3.6: Highway Trust Fund Budget Authority, Obligation Limitations and
Outlays (all figures in billions)"o
Congressional Federal Fiscal Year
Action 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
FHWA Budget Authority 15.2 14.6 18.3 21.2 22.3 21.5
(HTF:
Contract Authority)
Obligation Limitation, 13.9 16.3 17.8 17.4 20.7 19.7
Bonus, and Exempt***
(Appropriations Bill)
Outlays
Highway Account 14.4 14.7 15.5 16.6 19
Transit Account 0.9 1.1 1.3 1.9 3.4
Total Outlays 15.3 15.8 16.8 18.5 22.4
*Source: Highway Users Federation and the Automotive Safety Foundation, The Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of
1991: A Summary, insert.
**Substitutes Primary System funding for NHS, Secondary and Urban System funding for STP, for comparison purposes.
***Sum of Obligation Limitation, Bonus Limitation, and Exempt Obligations.
Obligation authority may exceed budget authority where unused obligation authrority is
carried forward from past years. Outlays are also not temporally consistent with
obligations since they reflect obligation activities of past years.
1 FHWA, Financing Federal-Aid Highways, Appendix B. (See Appendix B for full Table.)
"0 U.S. DOT, FHWA, "Limitations, Obligations and Trust Fund Balances", fax transmittal from Bruce
Swinford, FHWA.
The numbers in Figure 3.6 show that the critics have a case; the decreasing levels of
budget authority, obligation ceiling and outlays do lag authorized levels, sometimes by
several billion dollars."' Yet, it is also true that there has been a notable upward trend in
the amount of money available to transportation projects during the ISTEA period.
Indeed, federal obligation authority increased 42% in real dollars from 1990-1994.112 This
raises an issue which is important to financial planning. Where the federal funding process
is known to all familiar with transportation finance, what is the effect of allowing regions
to assume authorized levels of funding in their 20-year revenue forecasts, when actual
figures almost certainly warrant downward adjustments of these levels? While many
believe the assumption is harmless and perhaps even beneficial to the delivery of projects,
some reject the practice as inefficient and potentially damaging to the timely delivery of
projects. We expand upon this point later in our discussion of overprogramming.
Clearly, a major responsibility in implementing ISTEA rests with the Congress. As one
GAO official noted: "One of ISTEA's key challenges will be to find the budgetary
resources to support the act's $155 billion authorization through fiscal year 1997." At the
same time, regions must continue demonstrate the need which exists for federal funding of
transportation and show that the new funding which is available is being expended
efficiently and effectively. These tasks can be most effectively communicated through the
long-range transportation plan and accompanying financial plan. Although it is less than
accurate, unfortunately, the uncertainty regarding annual funding levels makes it difficult
to assume anything less than authorized levels of funding and extrapolations of these - the
current policy under the planning regulations.
"'The difference between obligation limitations and authorized levels is the more important of these,
since outlays generally reflect past obligation activities and will increase in future years to reflect ISTEA-
funded projects.
1 2 STPP, State Expenditures of Federal Surface Transportation Funds: Do They Reflect the New
Directions?, Introduction.
Technical Assistance. Ever the pragmatist, MIT lecturer Fred Salvucci is fond of noting
that "the enemy of the possible is the perfect". However, he also acknowledges that one
"can't make better what one cannot measure." Somewhere in between those two
positions lays just the right level of analysis for conducting financial planning so that it
informs the development of TIPs and Plans without imposing a prohibitive analytical
burden on the process. Generally, the right level of analysis to employ for each region
should be determined by consensus.
Far from being impossible to carry out, the technical responsibilities of financial constraint
are themselves not as difficult as the actual decisionmaking which follows. A fair amount
of assistance is available to MPOs in performing these new duties. Consistent with its
traditional role of providing technical assistance to its constituents, FHWA and FTA have
sponsored financial planning workshops' 1 3 which are available at low to no cost to
planners around the country. In addition to providing concise lessons on financial
planning with useful examples and exercises, the NTI workshop on "Financial Planning
and Programming for MPOs" also offers a listing of software, contacts, publications,
courses and other resources that can aid in the learning process. In addition, at this
writing, federal guidance on financial constraint was under development at FTA and
FHWA. Finally, an excellent non-federal source of information is available to planners
through other resources such as STPP's ISTEA Planner's Workbook. The following
section offers a brief discussion of the major steps of financial planning in which the MPO
should engage toward the development of financially constrained plans and programs.
The core activities of financial planning are: Revenue Forecasting, Cost Estimation, Risk
Assessment, Capacity Assessment, Plan Preparation and Plan Implementation." 4 While
each of these planning duties may be performed at varying levels of sophistication it is
113see GFOA/APTA/FTA Project Number DC-26-6019, "Flexible and Innovative Funding: Making
ISTEA Work for You" and NTI/DOT course "Financial Planning and Programming for Metropolitan
Planning Organizations".
"
4Much of the discussion in this section is paraphrased from NTI, "Financial Planning and Programming
for MPOs".
important for the analyst to possess a rudimentary to good understanding of the related
concepts of interest rates, inflation, the time value of money (present value of money) and
cash flow analysis. These are especially useful if debt will be used to finance needed
improvements over the planning horizon.
Revenue Forecasts. Revenue forecasting begins with development of the fund estimate.
The following categories of revenues are often included in revenue forecasts. Category
descriptions and the common method of forecasting each fund source are noted in
parentheses:
e Grants (federal, state, and local government funds, trend analysis+inflation)
* Transit fares (function of policy, elasticities and ridership, demand modeling)
* Dedicated taxes and user fees such as motor fuel taxes, registration fees, sales
taxes and tolls (function of VMT, fuel efficiency, vehicle ownership, tax rates and
toll structures)
e Other revenues such as lease of transit properties, benefit sharing, concessions or
advertising revenues (function of contract/agreement, expert judgment on real
estate)
Figure 3.6 presents one possible classification of these funds for inclusion in TIP and Long
Range Plan financial plans. Recall that years 1 and 2 of the TIP in nonattainment and
maintenace areas, regions must use "available" and "committed" fund sources. For
periods beyond these years, and for the long-range plan, funding must be "reasonably
available". This means that new funding sources are permitted where it can be
demonstrated how these funds would likely be obtained. As we noted above the revenue
"loop" element of the revenue estimation process is critical to the teletic view of planning.
Issues of coordination and timing are critical to developing the fund estimate. MPOs must
rely on their partners to provide information about fund sources and their likely growth
rates. The state/MPO relationship is especially important to the development of the fund
estimate. Where fund sources expire before the plan horizon or contributions to the
region are discretionary (i.e. State) additional coordination and negotiation between the
MPO and its partners may be necessary. Ideally, MPOs, states and other agencies adopt
complementary planning cycles, facilitating a more efficient fund estimate process.
Figure 3.6: Classification of Funding Sources for TIP and Long Range Plan"..
Forecasting, especially revenue forecasting, is a major activity which takes place at the
MPO level. There are four types of forecasting techniques: expert judgment, trend
analysis (functional form dependent upon time only), component forecasts (desegregates
variables, i.e. input-output analysis), and statistical methods (regression analysis). Each
technique has pros and cons and the best one to choose depends upon a) the availability of
resources, including time, funds, and data, and b) the characteristics of the variable being
forecast. Appendix C provides a table of available methods and an assessment of their
pros and cons. The extent of specification, measurement and calibration error depends on
the 'goodness of fit' between the variable and the method chosen to forecast it. As in any
1 5NTI, Unit 3-14.
kind of estimation, evaluative checks to see how past forecasts predicted actual trends are
recommended. Additionally, it is important that the forecast process is overseen by a
review committee consisting of representatives of the MPO and its partners, including
State and Federal officials. To the extent that policymakers and decisionmakers are
involved in the initial consensus on assumptions and methodology, there will be less
pressure to "bend" the analyses in one direction or another once the results are posted.
The review committee should then subject the forecast to a "reasonableness check" once
the forecast has been completed. At that point, it is appropriate to also present any
sensitivity analysis which has been performed, including analyses of non-quantitative
variables such as political susceptibility.
Cost Estimation. There are two types of cost estimation which are relevant in financial
planning at the MPO level. The first type of cost estimation - which the MPO employs in
developing long range plans - is system-level cost estimation. The second type of cost
estimation - which generally becomes more relevant as implementation nears, is project-
level cost estimation. Project-level cost estimation is usually performed by the
implementing agency or project sponsor, i.e. transit operator or DOT. Generically, these
can be broken down into initial costs (i.e. planning studies, preliminary design), capital
costs (i.e. row, construction, equipment, facilities), and operations and maintenance costs.
Here, we focus on system-level cost estimation, since it is the activity more closely
associated with the MPO.
In system-level cost estimation, the basic units of cost estimation are more coarse, such as
miles of roadway or track constructed or maintained and number of vehicles purchased,
instead of finer units such as cubic feet of fill or tons of asphalt required. In some areas,
capital system-level costs are estimated at the county or operator level in Capital
Improvement Programs. In others, the MPO performs this function itself. Existing and
incremental operating and maintenance cost estimates are usually based on units of
existing capital and the amount of new capital being purchased. Usually, these estimates
are provided by city departments of transportation and transit operators.
Fundamental to the preceding exercise is the determination of whether future costs will be
estimated based on historical trends or actual needs. If historical trends indeed reflect
needs, the choice of a cost estimation approach is simple: the trend approach suffices. If,
as often is the case with O&M costs, historical trends represent incremental increases and
underinvestment, the estimator may choose to project costs based on the necessary
expenditures to achieve established or desired service levels. In this approach, the cost
estimate acts much like an advocacy budget. Recall the central debate regarding the
potential for financial constraint to do more harm than good regarding transportation's
financial interests. For budgets to be teletic instead of incremental, they must ask "Where
do we want to go?" and "How do we get there from here?" instead of simply saying "This
is where we are" and "Where do we go from here?" This distinction is the major factor
in viewing financial constraint as promoting transportation interests instead of as a
requirement which undermines it. In taking the teletic view, it is important to base cost
estimates on needed or desired levels of investment, either before or after, but always
independent of revenue estimates.
Since O&M cost estimation can be more sophisticated than capital cost estimation,
additional approaches may also be useful to supplement the trend and advocacy budget
approach. These include the cost allocation approach, where all O&M costs are assigned
to one of three factors (vehicle hours, miles and peak vehicles) and the Temporal
Variation approach, where costs are assigned according to time of use, i.e. by peak or
base periods.
A Word on Management Systems and Life-Cycle Costs. Along with the requirement
of financial constraint, ISTEA mandated six Management Systems to be administered by
States and MPOs. These include three asset-based systems and three performance-based
systems. Although the asset-base systems, i.e. PTMS, BMS and PMS lend themselves to
cost estimation exercises more directly, the CMS, IMS and SMS can be used to categorize
program expenditures, and therefore act as inputs into the cost-estimation process. To the
extent possible, all cost-estimation methodologies, should approximate as closely as
possible true life-cycle costs. Life cycle costing is the "economic assessment of all
significant costs of ownership of an asset over its economic life, expressed in equivalent
dollars."116 This approach to costing requires information on the purchase price and useful
life of the asset, the annual O&M costs of the asset, and an interest rate to calculate the
equivalent uniform annual cost (EUAC) of the asset.
Risk Assessment. A quick note on risk assessment is important to our discussion of
financial planning and the financial constraint requirement, since an original objective of
the requirement was to combat the risks, i.e. costly delays, found in the implementation of
projects. Risk is defined as the potential for monetary loss resulting from uncertainty
about costs, revenues and schedules for implementation associated with a project.
Uncertainty is generally attributable to 1) errors in forecasting, 2) insufficient information
about the future or 3) failure to consider all factors. The management of risk involves
three steps a) risk identification, b) risk measurement and c) risk allocation.117 As we shall
see later, the risks associated with project delays may be analyzed in this way and remedies
applied at the Program Development Stage of the planning process.
Financial Capacity Assessment. The analysis of financial capacity determines whether
the existing revenue base is sufficient to meet existing system operating and preservation
needs. For transit operators in particular, financial capacity to meet local match
requirements is a major determinant of the extent to which transit can take advantage of
ISTEA's flexible funding provisions. Figure 3.7 provides some examples of the range of
financial capacity which exists at various transit agencies.
Regardless of the agency in question, where shortfalls exist, alternative financing should be
explored. Three possible approaches are ' pay-as-you-go', borrowing and privatization.
In 'pay-as-you-go' approaches, i.e. sales tax or other user-fee funded programs there is a
116NTI, Unit 6-17.
"
7NTI, Unit 9-2 and 9-11.
significant cost advantage to avoiding debt service and other transaction costs. However,
these revenue sources must be accompanied by documentation demonstrating and
ensuring their availability. Debt financing, or borrowing options include: vendor financing,
vendor leasing, or bonding. Privatization brings the possibilities of benefit-sharing
arrangements (joint development), contracting out, and public/private financing and
ownership arrangements. If none of these options prove satisfactory, the shortfalls must
result in reductions in service and the capital cost requirements associated with decreased
service. In the absence of agreements regarding priorities, generally the "shared pain"
approach among the region's agencies is the best way to mete out the burden of limited
resources.
Figure 3.7: Financial Capacity of Transit Agencies.1 .
CATEGORIES OF FINANCIAL CAPACITY
Substantial Financial Capacity TSome Financial Capacity ILimited (No) Financial Capacity
CHARACTERISTICS OF CATEGORIES
Broad-based local option tax; beginning to Dedicated funding; existing system creates Limited (if any) dedicated funding; rely on
build system; limited debt service debt burden; cash flow bonded appropriations
TRANSIT AGENCY EXAMPLES
Agencies in Texas, Denver, Los Angeles Atlanta, Portland, San Francisco (BART) Detroit, Many small- to medium- sized
operations
The primary instrument of financial capacity analysis is cash flow analysis. Cash flow
analysis may be performed using a simple spreadsheet program. The spreadsheet should
be organized in a manner as to allow direct increment by increment (i.e. every 5 years in a
20-year Plan) or year by year (i.e. for TIPs) comparisons of sources of funds and uses as
shown in Figure 3.8. Note that the sensitivity factors of inflation and discount rate can be
altered to test different scenarios and assumptions. All dollar amounts should be shown in
constant dollars.
'
1 GFAO/FTA, "Making ISTEA Work for You".
Figure 3.8: Sample Spreadsheet for Cash Flow Analysis119
Starting Balance Year 1 Year 2 Year 3
Sources of Funds:
" Federal
* State
e Local
* Private/Other
Uses of Funds:
* PTMS
* PMS
* BMS
* CMS
* IMS
e SMS
Sensitivity Factors:
* Inflation
* Discount Rate
Net Cash Flow:
In a more sophisticated PC-based application, Hillard presents a model for forecasting
transportation program cash flow for Florida DOT.120 Hillard acknowledges the difficulty
of performing financial management, noting that few government agencies practice full
cash flow management. Yet, the benefits of the model, including the production of reports
for tracking and monitoring, and resource planning which can result in one or more years
of a transportation product without an increase in taxes, outweigh the costs and risks
associated with forecasting future cash flows. Examples from the FDOT model are
included in Appendix D.
Plan Development. The development of Plans and TIPs should be performed in parallel
with the financial planning activities described thus far. This element of the process
involves comparing and prioritizing alternatives to include in the final documents. At the
Systems Planning or Long-Range Plan development stage, regional policies should be
reflected in comparisons of alternative levels and types of investments. At the Program
Development Stage this exercise is oftentimes more detailed than at the plan level, (i.e. air
quality benefits are often targeted), three types of criteria, screening (recall the satisficing
119Modified version of example found in NTI, Unit 10-9.
'OW. M. Hillard, "Financial Dynamics: A Model for Forecasting Transportation Program Cash Flow",
Transportation Research Record No. 1305, TRB, National Research Council, Washington, D.C., 1991.
model of decision-making), scoring (the rational model) and programming can be useful in
this process. We discuss program development in the next section. Plan Development is
the topic we tackle here.
Traditionally, long-range plans were organized modally. The ISTEA Management
Systems provide a useful alternative framework for plan development. Management
Systems can help planners to assess the region's financial condition and capacity of the
region; this information is then useful to set the context for vision-setting and the
alternatives to be undertaken with the public. Here is the MPOs best opportunity to
engage in meaningful and innovative public involvement techniques including focus group
and educational activities. Planners should make a special effort to understand and
explain fundamental concepts particular to a region, such as the difference between
manifestation problems - i.e. congestion, safety, poor air quality, transit reliability - and
root problems - i.e. inadequate transportation resources to address needed improvements,
the effects of sprawl on travel behavior, vehicle mix (SOV vs. goods movement) and the
use of non-renewable resources.12 1
Plan development includes integrating the final desired investment package with available
resources. Broadly, this is referred to as transportation "programming". Cash flow
analysis should be performed on expansion expenditures as it was for existing system
needs earlier. Identified resources will either be adequate or inadequate to cover
expenses. Again, where shortfalls exist, planners should investigate alternative financing
options. The availability of certain revenues or financing options potentially constrains the
types of projects which can be pursued. If this is the case, it will cause some conflict in
carrying out the priority of investments determined in the planning process. Wise
programming strategy links projects with fund sources in a way that fully leverages federal
fund flexibility.
12 Dimitriou in Prodyutt Dutt, "ISTEA: Some Perspectives on Whether It Will Necessarily Lead to
BetterTransportation Planning", May 7, 1994.
As we alluded to in Chapter 2, another common programming challenge for regions is the
chronic problem of the 'lumpy' transportation project. Clearly, planning for and
programming large regional projects, which can quickly drain regional resources, can be
more difficult in an environment of financial constraint. Strategies for dealing with this
problem range from phasing projects into smaller segments or minimum operable
segments as recommended by FTA and FHWA 12 2 (i.e. San Francisco Bay Area Long-
Range Plan) to apportioning a set amount of funds for larger vs. smaller projects (Seattle
Long-Range Plan) to simply declaring such projects priority one and planning around them
(i.e. Boston's Central Artery/Tunnel project). These considerations highlight the difficulty
of integrating expenditures with resources, and explain why the preparation of the
financial plan is usually a highly complex, negotiation-oriented and iterative process.
Again, the presence of a well-functioning committee system and regional agreements on
priorities are major advantages in this process. Finally, when all 'reasonably available'
revenue sources have been exhausted, the Financial Plan is complete.
2.2.4 What Constitutes a Good Faith Effort? The slew of technical and institutional
issues associated with assembling a financially constrained long-range plan makes for a
challenging task. The attributes most prized by planners charged with this task are
technical proficiency and political dexterity. Similarly, the assessment of compliance is
challenging to regulators, who must balance their roles as technical advisors on financial
constraint and enforcers of the regulation. The greatest benefit to the process, therefore,
is a commitment by all parties to a style of planning which fosters a team effort among
partners. By giving attention to process, regional partners including the MPO, State,
operators, air quality departments, localities, citizens and federal representatives engage in
debate and forge consensus at each step of the planning process. In this way, a win-win-
win situation can be had for all parties involved. Enforcement costs are kept from being
prohibitively high and strengthened institutional relationships ultimately benefit
professionals and the public through the timely delivery of plans and programs.
122see FTA/FHWA guidance "Obligation Authority and Fund Transfers Between Agencies", May, 1993.
In the event of an imbalance in the planning process, either as a result of structural,
historical or cultural differences, it may be determined that a good faith effort has not been
given in a region. This will become evident over time as first and subsequent planning
efforts are completed across the nation. Analysis of the plans forwarded in the ISTEA
planning period will indicate where and how DOT, EPA and Congress may need to target
their enforcement activities strategically. Here it will be incumbant on federal agencies to
be in close communication with their field representatives - who in turn bear the majority
of the burden of finessing the partner/enforcer role of the federal government. If the
planning processes or product of a region are perceived to be consistently deficient,
ultimately, as servant of the public interest, the federal government has a solid and
defensible responsibility to enforce the tenets of the financial constraint planning
requirements, especially those which target the preservation of the existing transportation
system.
2.2.5 Summary. In this section, we have seen how financial planning occurs in the
System Planning stage of transportation planning. The introduction of financial constraint
confers both benefits and costs on the process, although a net benefit can be achieved if
institutional relationships support the process at key points in decisionmaking. The
State/MPO relationship is an important focus in implementation of financial planning
requirements. Congress must continue to monitor these relationships, and the
effectiveness of aids included in ISTEA which were meant to facilitate implementation of
new planning requirements.
The techniques of financial planning are not overly difficult or complex. The regulations
allow flexibility on the actual methods and processes used by MPOs. Federal authorities
should act as guides and assistants to their MPO partners, and only enforce the regulation
where major deficiences exist. Generally, tests of successful implementation of financial
constriant in the System Planning stage of transportation planning are:
- was a teletic approach adopted for revenue projection? cost estimation?
- was a regional vision articulated?
- alternatives considered?
- choices made which will guide future investment decisions in the TIP?
- is the plan technically constrained?
- does the plan enjoy consensus?
- how does the plan a strategic plan for future decision-making?
- how does the plan guide the next step, programming activities?
The answers to these questions gives an indication as to the extent that the objectives of
financial planning at the systems planning stage of transportation planning have been met.
Ideally, upon completion of systems planning, the investment alternatives available to the
region have been refined to some degree which helps to guide project selection in the
programming stage of transportation planning. The next section discusses the role of
financial constraint in the programming stage.
3.3 Program Development
Nowhere is the strength of institutional relationships more critical to the planning process
than at the Program Development stage of transportation planning, where TIP
development occurs. In this stage, regions to begin with an unconstrained pool of projects
and prioritize them into an expectable three to five year program which is financially
constrained by year. While there are common elements to each method, there are several
ways to perform the prioritization and programming process in satisfaction of the financial
constraint requirement.
3.3.1 Traditional Programming. One approach which is simple and in practice still at
many MPOs, relies upon counties or modal agencies to forward a constrained list of
projects from their capital improvement programs. Screening criteria may be used, but
scoring criteria are not necessarily applied. The MPO then "staples" these together to
make up the TIP. The programming process procedes from there. The political process
and expert judgment of the individual operating agency or local government are
considered sufficient for project selection. MPOs argue that local entities and modal
agencies know best how to prioritize needs, and that equity and technical issues are best
addressed in this way.
The advantage of this type of planning is that it maximizes the benefits of professional
judgment and political conflict is less likely as choices are relegated to the more
homogenous operating agencies. The problem with this type of planning, however, is that
it does not forward the goals of regional multi-modal transportation planning at a time
when urban problems are increasingly regional in nature. Individual agencies cannot be
expected to target regional mobility and air quality problems. Moreover, in the absence
of a strong regional interest in the project selection process, support may be lacking for
larger projects whose benefits are regional and impacts are local.
One factor which explains the difference among regional programming practices is that
MPOs are often artificially constrained in their multi-modal transportation planning and
programming practices. As noted above, in many states, system planning and
programming criteria are limited a priori by state laws or practicies pertaining to the pass
through of federal funds or the flexibility of state and local matching fund sources.
3.3.2 Alternative Programming Method. An alternative process to the stapling exercise
was first conceived by planners at the Metropolitan Transportation Commission in
Oakland, CA. A multi-agency screening, scoring and programming criteria proces is used
to develop the transportation program. This method has been emulated in a number of
major urban regions. We explore the MTC case in this section as a means to introduce the
elements of the programming process; Chapter 4 presents the processes used by several
other regions.
While MTC has long been a leader in regional transportation planning, the MPO has been
especially innovative in the area of fund programming. Several factors combined to
explain the MPOs leadership. First, the state of California had a jump start on multi-modal
planning with passage of proposition 108 and 111 in 1989. This legislation created
county level Congestion Management Agencies and a Flexible Congestion Relief state
transportation gas-tax fund that could be used for highways, local roads and fixed
guideway transportation. As a result, statewide guidelines for fund programming allowed
planners to experiment with multi-modal planning. The legislation also tied transportation
project funding decisions to a wider set of considerations than traditional level-of-service
standards. These included measurable traffic congestion relief, land use decisions and
their impact on local and regional transportation systems, and the implementation of
transportation measures to help meet air quality goals. Finally, legislation known as the
Transportation Blueprint (AB471) included a long-range state transportation plan and
financial plan, provided for continuing planning through CMAs and regional agencies and
identified statewide rail and highway corridor priorities. The CMAs and regional agencies
play important roles in the transportation planning process in California. Any project in
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the State TIP must have originated in a county Congestion Management Plan. At the
regional level, MPOs must consider CMPs in the development of the Regional TIP,
although it is not bound to accept the local priorities.
Another piece of legislation, drafted with MTC input, California Senate Bill 1435 was
passed in the fall of 1992. This legislation reconciled existing state transportation law with
federal apportionment formulas contained in ISTEA for the STP and CMAQ programs. A
compromise between state, regional and local interests, urban and rural interests, and
between transit and highway interests, the bill was considered necessary "[I]n order that
federal highway funds can be apportioned, in a timely manner, to local governments
pursuant to newly enacted federal laws...." 2 3 The legislation enacted the following
provisions14:
1. provided for the preparation of the State Transportation Plan, and accompanying financial
plan. Plans to be based upon regional plans, which are in turn based upon county CMA
plans.
2. provided for the Transportation System Management Program to be coordinated with the
regional STP funds and the CMAQ program funds, thus providing for a local match
opportunity with state funds.
3. provided for the distribution of regional STP funds to MPOs on a population basis, as
provided in ISTEA. Without this exemption, this local program would be subject to
north/south split and county minimum requirements as well as programming in the State
TIP by the California Transportation Commission.
4. provided for a county minimum for each county geographic area by requiring amounts equal
to 90-91 FAU and FAS apportionments to be apportioned to each county geographic area.
Funds are to be apportioned among all transportation providers on a fair and equitable basis.
This is not a guarantee for any jurisdiction or mode, nor does it usurp MPO project selection
authority.
5. provides for re-apportionment of unused obligation authority within the state and for
exchange of FAS replacement funds for state funds. 2 1
12 3Sen. Quentin Kopp, Calfornia Legsilature, SB1435, Chapter 1177, p. 90/500., Approved by Governor
September 29, 1992.
'
24MTC, Memorandum to CALCOG Directors, CMAs and Transit Operator Coordinating Council, dated
April 29, 1992.
25Capacity enhancing projects funded with state funds are still subject to air quality analysis.
6. provides for allocation of CMAQ funds within the state based on the formula included in
ISTEA: weighted non-attainment area population.
AB1435 sought to "ISTEA-ize" state transportation planning and programming practices
in an attempt to take full advantage of the new legislation. Clearly, however, it mimicked
elements of the sub-allocation practice found in ISTEA in a fashion which just avoids
being in violation of the prohibition against sub-allocation formulas by jurisdiction or
mode that is included in the planning regulations. As we noted in Chapter 2, program
structure was clearly necessary and useful in the Federal-Aid Highway program. It is not
clear why program structure which addresses equity issues cannot perform the same
function at the non-Federal level as well. The California legislature has adopted such a
provision. As we shall see in the MTC case, this apportionment system has strengthened
the planning process by giving clear roles and responsibilities to the respective planning
bodies in the state.
In addition to the legislative history, there is also a legal history which helps to explain
MTC's ISTEA implementation focus. In 1986, the MTC was sued under the Federal
Clean Air Act by the Sierra Club and Citizens for Better Environmet. That litigation
lasted three years and significantly affected the planning and conformity practices of the
MPO, bringing air quality issues to the forefront of transportation planning and
programming activites. As part of its implementation activities, in 1992, the MTC helped
itself by creating a coaltion of the region's transportation leadership called the Bay Area
Partnership. In so doing, MTC's purpose was to a) educate the region's leadership and
help them to educate their policy boards and constituencies on ISTEA, and b) establish a
forum and committee system to oversee and discuss regional planning issues. This group
was committed to implementing ISTEA and generating a new set of projects to meet the
region's transportation and air quality needs; "leveling the playing field" through new
institutions, education and new processes were important steps in that endeavor.
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In California, therefore, the voters who passed Propositions 108 and 111, the state
(SB 1435) and the MPO and its partners affirmed the concept of regional planning as a
decision-making process for selection of appropriate transportation projects. Together,
these positive elements allowed transportation planning in the state and the Bay Area to
"assure the greatest possible local control over decisions without without sacrificing
regional coordination". 2 6 In this way, the region was well positioned to implement
ISTEA.
The MTC method for both plan and TIP development begins by retaining the role of
operating agencies and local planning entities through the Congestion Management
Agencies. These agencies forward candidate projects to the CMAs, which ensure that
projects meet screening criteria (i.e. project development criteria and consistency with
LRP). In turn, CMAs forward candidate projects to be considered for funding in some
dollar amount within a bid target whose sum with other CMAs exceeds the final bid
target. In this way equity considerations and expert opinion continue to play a role in the
process without the process terminating at the local level.
Working with the screened pool of projects, planners then apply mutually developed,
mode-neutral, scoring criteria to the candidate projects and "let the chips fall where they
may". MTC's project scoring system was developed by a multi-modal task force which
was assembled soon after passage of ISTEA. Right off, the task force divided into
"equity" and "technical" sub-committees. For the equity committee, a major factor in the
buy-in necessary to achieve full-participation was geographical equity. This was solved by
the up-front designation of "guaranteed" funding and regional "discretionary" funding. In
this system, fifty percent of STP funds and all of CMAQ funds were deemed discretionary,
subject to the evaluation criteria which the task force would develop together. The
remaining fifty percent of STP funds would be passed through directly to the county
Congestion Management Agencies for their programming, with rules against programming
126 Jake Pearce and Lisa Wormser, STPP, Case Study "Bay Area Partnership Pays Off: Financing
Transportation to Reflect Regional Consensus".
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practices based upon modal or jurisdictional breakdown at the local level. Functional
(replacement vs. expansion) and modal equity were addressed directly in the scoring
criteria development process, although they were also indirectly addressed through the
guarnantee/discretionary programming innovation. For example, once the scoring system
- which favored well-rounded projects - was developed, counties could strategically
guarantee their high priority but less competitive projects, such as roadway rehabilitation
or reconstruction projects while advancing more competitive projects for discretionary
funding. Additionally, over time, counties were quick to learn to "bundle" the less
competitive projects with elements that yielded "points" in the scoring system, such as
combining roadway projects with bike lanes and signalization projects. As one Bay Area
official noted, "This was of course, a positive and welcome incentive and effect. These
counties effectively boosted their overall chances of winning discretionary funding,
strategically."127
Clearly, the evaluation process can hinge on the successful development of evaluation
criteria. These criteria and their application methods can be devloped which are simple,
moderate or complex in sophistication. While critieria are difficult to agree upon and will
vary by region both in their design and application, most regions choose to include some
measures of contributions to congestion management, system preservation, expansion, air
quality improvement, land-use connection, cost-effectiveness and safety.
Other important things to keep in mind are to includes a the range of interests in the
develoment process which will be affected by its adoption. To the extent that stakeholders
are involved at the start of the process, the opportunities for objections to results will be
minimized in the end. Finally, it is important for every programming process to include an
appeals process in order to address valid concerns of participants.
The Salt Lake City MPO, the Wasatch Front Regional Council, chooses to use a simple
method based on the minimum required 15 factors and subjective screening of all projects.
27Comments of Brigid Hynes-Cherin, Executive Director for San Francisco County Transportation
Authority, TRB Annual Meeting Session 195, January, 1995.
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The MPO staff apply these criteria and a committee system reviews the product of the
planning process.
An example of a moderately sohpisticated methodology was developed by the North
Central Texas MPO. NCTCOG added six local/regional factors to the 15 ISTEA factors
for a total of 21 initial factors to be considered. Next, technical, policy and community
groups were asked to rate the importance of all factors with the sum of all scores equalling
100. Following this, the factors were reduced in number to 13, and then again to four.
The four detailed factors with point-breakdowns for sub-factors were then used to rank
the region's CMAQ, STP, Sections 9 and 3 and Enhancement projects.
Finally, some regions adopt more complex processes. MPOs which are examples of these
include the San Francisco Bay Area's MTC, Philadelphia's DVRPC and Seattle's Puget
Sound Regional Council. Some, including Falbel, have criticized the "over-quantification"
and logistic complication of scoring models.12 What may be more important, however, is
that processes and criteria be developed jointly by the interests which will be affected by
them. If, as is the case in the Bay Area, transportation planning institutions are varied and
many, the process which results may very well reflect the complexity of the region.
As noted above, the MTC scoring criteria were developed by a subcommittee of a multi-
modal and multi-agency task force. The scoring subcommittee approached its work by
dividing out screening, scoring/prioritization and programming criteria. The screening
criteria were based upon state and federal laws. Planners had much more experience in
designing the screening criteria as a result of implementing other state and federal program
requirements.
The scoring criteria and point assignments were based upon four scoring principles: 1) tie
the solution to the problem, 2) use measures which cut across modes, 3) performance-
121Stephen Falbel, "Allocating Flexible Funds from ISTEA: A Project Selection Process for the Boston
Metropolitan Region", Policy Analysis Exercise, Harvard University, April 13, 1993, p.30.
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based standards in 1) notwithstanding, anticipate data availability from the Management
Systems, and 4) rely upon and strengthen existing plans and programs. 12 9 The scoring
criteria resulted in four broad and weighted categories and sub-categories with
quantitative and qualitative assessments within each sub-category (see MTC scoring
criteria worksheet in Appendix C). The scoring criteria were used to advance regional
policies in interesting ways. For example, the category "Maintain and Sustain the Existing
System" penalized projects if they were beyond the replacement or rehabilitation schedule
that would have been dictated by proper life-cycle management. In addition, as noted
above, more well-rounded projects began to be generated in response to the design of the
scoring criteria.
At the conclusion of the ranking process the priority list of projects is either challenged by
project sponsors through a four step appeals process or is ready for programming. The
programming principles developed by MTC addressed the equity concerns raised by its
Equity Subcommittee, and additionally established programming rules regarding STP and
CMAQ program eligibility guidelines, the value of local contributions, how to allocate
funds to multi-jurisdictional projects and the incorporation of estimates of project cost-
effectiveness." 0
MTC staff and their partners have continued to revise and improve the evaluation process
and criteria. In addition, the MPO has been aggressively educating new players on
implementation processes and monitoring projects on behalf of the region, as we will see
in the next section. The combined leadership of the agency and its state, local and federal
partners is evident in its ability to deliver a mix of projects which satisfies most interests at
the table (1/3 highway, 1/3 transit, 1/3 other)" 1. Over the past two programming cycles,
MTC has scored 344 projects and programmed $442 million (out of approximately twice
129Developed by consultant to the MTC, Professor Elizabeth Deakin.
"3Cost effectiveness was intentionally excluded from the scoring criteria for its volatility. The MPO
continues to struggle with operationalizing this concept in the scoring and programming criteria.
"'Note: "other" includes signalization, bicycle and port projects and projects such as at-grade rail
crossings which were categorized as transit projects).
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that amount in requests) and has obligated 95% of its share of obligation authority. These
statistics are a credit to the regional, local and state planning entities who helped to design
and implement a planning process which takes full advantage of ISTEA program funds
and flexibility.
Ironically, as a result of state budget actions, the state of California experienced a four
billion dollar deficit and handed down a zero dollar transportation fund estimate for the
1995 Fiscal Year. Emergency actions, such as floating short term bonds, were taken in
the latter part of the last legislative session to avert work stoppage on several high profile
highway projects. The true test of the MTC process will be how regional priorities will be
affected in the 1994 Regional Transportation Plan update, in which revenue estimates will
be further curtailed and in the development of the next regional TIP. In addition, as a
result of political pressures, a sizable work load in seismic retrofitting, and a successful
lawsuit by state engineers opposed to contracting activities, the state Department of
Transportation itself has been somewhat an embattled and weakened agency, at a time
when the agency is looking to reform its mission and orientation. The coming planning
cycle will truly test the multi-modal priority setting and decision-making capacity of the
Bay Area transportation planning institutions.
3.3.3 Summary
The pressures caused by the requirement of financial planning can peak at the
programming stage of transportation planning. Priorities must be identified at this stage of
the process and trade-offs must be made. In addition to being fair and tractable, the
alternative programming process conceived by MTC planners can be an effective
instrument of regional policy and project delivery. A major theme in the MTC process is
attention to processes which facilitate buy-in by stake-holders. When stakeholders have
played a role in developing evaluation criteria and processes, and a commitment is made to
strengthen and honor past and present decision-making, opportunities for conflicts or
political intervention can be minimized. In addition, supportive state laws drafted in the
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spirit of ISTEA - such as a flexible state transportation matching fund and allocation
formulas - can empower regions without violating ISTEA's philosophical commitment to
true multi-modal planning. As we shall see in the next chapter, MTC and other MPOs
have been relatively successful in achieving an acceptable mix of projects using this
method of priority-setting.
In addition to enhancing the TIP as a priority-setting and programming document, the
financial constraint requirement also suggests a role for the TIP as a program management
document. The metropolitan planning regulations encourage states and regions to use
STIPs and TIPs as management tools so that project sponsors, operating agencies and
States and MPOs can track project implementation and identify and target recurring
causes of project delivery delay. In this way, financial constraint manifestly alters the
scope of TIPs and TIP processes to act both as a vehicle for program development and a
tool for program management.
Following conformity assessments and approval, TIPs must be incorporated without
modification into State TIPs or STIPs. It is important to note that this provision in the
planning regulations was intended to prevent the State from undermining agreements
reached at the regional level.1 12 In the next section, we discuss these types of
implementation activites, and the concepts of obligation authority and project selection,
two areas over which the MPO most keep close tabs on state actions in order that projects
are implemented in a timely fashion. The next section discusses the Implementation stage
of transportation planning and elaborates upon this idea in detail.
112GFOA/FTA Workbook, "Making the Flexible Funding Provisions in ISTEA Work for You", p. 3.
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3.4 Implementation
The Implementation stage of the transportation planning process refers to the stage of
planning that projects enter once they have been programmed in an approved TIP. In
order to discuss how projects get implemented in this stage of the process, and how the
implementation of financial constraint at the metropolitan level can affect this process, it is
important to discuss two important and closely linked concepts, obligation authority and
project selection. We introduced these topics briefly above in the sections on System
Planning and in Transportation Programming; here a more detailed explanation of these
topics begins with a discussion on the distribution process for federal funds.
3.4.1 Fund Distribution. This section presents a brief explanation about how federal
funds are distributed to projects, from the authorization of expenditures to the payment of
funds from the Highway Trust Fund. 1 33 As an accumulation of federal Acts, the ISTEA
does three things: establishes authority to start or change programs, 2) contains special
requests (i.e. studies), and 3) authorizes funding for categories of federal assistance.
Appendix B presents ISTEA authorizations over fiscal years 1992-1997. Authorized
levels represent the upper limit on program funding. There are two types of authority to
commit funds associated with authorized funding. The first is Budget Authority, under
which programs may only start after an Appropriations Act. Most programs in the
Federal-Aid Highway Program, (including transit programs) operate under Contract
Authority, in which funds are apportioned to the different programs independent of the
Appropriations Act and are made available for obligation on the first day of the federal
Fiscal Year (October 1). Obligations are commitments of spending that will require
payment either immediately or in the future. The rationale behind freeing transportation
funding from the annual appropriations process is that: 1) the source of funds, i.e. the
Highway Trust Fund is a dedicated and therefore relaltively reliable tax and 2) this benefits
long-range planning by reducing the potential for funding anomolies to occur. The
'This discussion relies on information presented in the FHWA publication, "Financing Federal Aid
Highways".
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appropriations act is still necessary to liquidate or pay the obligations, although this action
usually lags the obligations by several periods, since the Federal-Aid Highway program is
a reimbursable program. Figure 3.9 illustrates this fund distribution process.
Figure 3.9: Federal-Aid Highway Fund Distribution Process 1 34
Multi-Year
Authorization Act
(ISTEA)
Annual Distribution
(apportionment or
allocation)
Total Federal-aid Unobligated balances of
available for FY 4prior year distributions
Obligation Limitation Annual
(Federal Government's on 4 Appropriation
Promise to Pay) Obligations Act
Reimbursement Liquidating cash
(Federal Govemnment 4to reimburse States from
pays its share) the Highway Trust Fund
3.4.2 Obligation Authority. In order to control the infusion of dollars into the economy,
Congress places a ceiling on the total obligations that can be incurred in a given year. This
is referred to as Obligation Authority, an Obligation Limitation or an Obligation Ceiling.
Under Obligation Authority, any unobligated balances over and above the ceiling carry
over to the next year and are combined with the next year's apportionment to sum to that
year's Total Apportionments Available. Any unused Obligation Authority is lost and
cannot be carried over into the next fiscal year. As Figure 3.10 shows, although
unobligated balances carry forward, those funds are harder and harder to spend down.
Recall that this is one reason why many transportation officials object to the setting of
obligation ceilings below authorized levels of funding. State control over obligation
authority is important to understand because obligation authority is not applied to each
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134source: ibid.
individual program. Therefore, states can choose to obligate any mix of funds that best fit
their needs, within the obligation ceiling.
Figure 3.10: Apportionments, Obligation Authority and Unobligated Balances135
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....... .Apportionment
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In addition, a fund source which is continually passed up can lapse altogether if not
obligated within a certain time frame, usually 4 years. Furthermore, while unobligated
balances carry over, unused obligation authority does not. In fact, a redistribution occurs
on August 1 of each year to redistribute the obligation authority of states who were unable
to obligate to those who are able to obligate more than their ceiling. There is therefore
great imperative for states to "spend down" their obligation authority in a given year.
In order to "spend down" funds efficiently, therefore, many states and MPOs (who
administer STP-urbanized funds) adopt a criterion of "project readiness" for project
selection.
3.4.3 Project Selection. Project selection refers to the process which determines the
order in which projects come up for obligation. Project selection must occur from an
approved TIP, where regulations allow the TIP to be programmed up to authorized levels
of funding, and the entire first year is designated as an "agreed to list of projects" for
project selection. If authorized levels of funding materialized, project selection would not
theoretically be a problem. However, as we have seen, obligation ceilings fall significantly
below authorized levels on a consistent basis. The project selection criterion which make
i 35 GFOA and FTA workbook: "Flexible and Innovative Funding: Making ISTEA Work for You".
the most sense to invoke at this point is that of project readiness. In order to most
efficiently spend down funds, projects which are ready for construction are obligated on a
first-come, first-served basis. However, TIPs allow all of year 1 to be considered priority
1, resulting in the absence of a detailed priority list which can be referenced. The critical
questions therefore become: a) which program funds will the state chose to "spend down"
first? and b) within those programs, how do we choose among projects which are
simultaneously construction-ready? With respect to the latter, it has been suggested by
some that project selection processes could be improved if programmed projects were
either batched in some way or prioritized beyond the present practice.
The dilemma posed by the former dilemma suggests a need to carefully monitor fund
management by State DOTs. In the early cycles of ISTEA funding, highway projects and
other "pipeline" projects which were "ready to go" dominated the project selection
process.13 6 Over time, however, the project mix in the pipeline may change in response to
regional goals and objectives, and an increase in the obligation rates of the flexible fund
categories, i.e. STP and CMAQ can be expected. Consistently low rates of obligationfor
flexible fund categories and higher ones for highway categories would be a signal of
systematic bias in the project selection process, and could be remedied by requiring
states to obligate some minimum amount of each major fund category.'37 It is therefore
very important for all parties to monitor obligation authority so that 1) all available
authority is used up, and 2) program funds do not lapse, especially fungible ones such as
STP and CMAQ.13 8 Toward this end, some states chose to distribute or "pass through"
obligation authority to regions, and thereby create the same incentive to "spend down
funds" at the regional level.
136STPP, ISTEA: Year Three, p. 3.
'
37It is true that several FHWA programs may provide for transit and other multi-modal projects such as
HOV and park and ride projects and TDM strategies. There is no way to ascertain the project mix of
funds expended except for detailed state-by-state analysis of obligations.
"'Note: obligation rates by fund category are not always an accurate indication of use of flexible funds
since many "highway" funds are themselves flexible.
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MPOs' project implementation responsibilities are also important and can be described as
twofold.13 9 First, in order to maximize project-readiness among TIP projects MPOs
should devise a system to track projects in the TIP. A quick analysis of risk borrowed
from our earlier discussion shows why.
e Risk Identification: projects slated to go forward fail to meet their obligation
dates for whatever reason (i.e. problems with local match, cost-overruns,
securing permits).
* Risk Measurement: The opportunity cost of the slated project is the next best
project to go forward.
* Risk Allocation: Shift risk the risk to the project sponsor by pulling the
eligibility of the project to go forward if not construction-ready by a some date
in advance of the obligation deadline, and substituting a project from year 2 or
3 of the TIP.
As a follow on to risk analysis, the MPO should also look for common problems among
projects so that these can be targeted for special attention. If reviews determine that
delays occurred for reasons beyond the project sponsor's control, (i.e. unforseen cost or
environmental issues) policies can be set which distinguish between acceptable and
unacceptable project delays. An additional role for the MPO is to monitor state project
selection and obligation rates so that projects that are ready for construction in the region
are not subject to unfair delays for any reason. Finally, similar to the state process, MPOs
that succeed in obligating their full share of obligation authority should be rewarded by
being permitted to obligate any remaining unused authority of other regions or the state.
3.4.4 Monitoring. As reported in the section on Programming, the MTC is generally
regarded a model MPO in the area of programming and implementation. The MTC has
succeeded in maintaining an obligation rate of approximately 95% for its projects over the
past two programming cycles. A goal identified early in the process, the MPO and its
partners were committed to maintaining a high obligation rate by aggressively conducting
risk analysis and developing policies aimed at ensuring a high success rate for delivering
13 Some of the MPO tasks described here are modeled after actual program monitoring activities taking
place at MTC.
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the region's projects. First, project screening criteria required county planning agencies to
forward only projects which could be delivered on time. Once programmed, project
sponsors were asked in in spring whether they would be able to obligate funds by the
September 30 deadline. Twenty sponsors expected to miss the deadline and applied for
extensions. A committee then analyzed the various applications and determined which
would be granted extensions. Through this process, implementation ssues surfaced which
the region could address through the planning process. If extensions were not granted to
projects, their funding theoretically passed to the next eligible project based on score.
However, since the previous TIP was inherently overprogrammed (with authorized levels
of funding assumed), funding instead went to first cycle projects still awaiting funding.
Finally, an appeals process was designed and peformed well at the close of the process.
Planners at the MTC are implementing a computer project tracking system to facilitate this
process in future programming cycles.
The TIP provides a perfect vehicle for the MPO to carry out these its implementation
responsibilities. Indeed, the planning regulations stress the importance of treating the TIP
and STIP as an overall program management tool and suggest the inclusion project status
information in addition to information on TIP development processes and criteria in TIP
documents. Through the use of the STIP/TIP in this way,
Programming is no longer just assembling a list of projects that may be able
to proceed; it is now a process for comprehensively managing project
advancement in relation to other transportation and transportation related
activities that impact transportation system performance.14 0
Again, good planning practice dictates that these implementation activites should take
place at the MPO independent of a financial constraint requirement. And again, the
financial constraint requirement often demonstrates a state of resource scarcity,
heightening the importance of following through beyond the Plan and TIP development
stage. Effective monitoring and evaluation can target common and rectifiable
implementation problems and by doing so may yield significant program delivery benefits.
14FHWA/FTA, Metropolitan Planning Rule, STIP, p. 58048.
3.4.5 A Word on Overprogramming. One of the justifications stated in the planning
regulations for allowing MPOs to program TIPs up to authorized levels is to provide for a
natural and expected amount of project "slippage". The rationale is that overprogramming
serves as a hedge against an inadequate pool of projects. However, as Murray argues, the
regulations also allow for projects in years 2 and 3 to be advanced to year 1 without a TIP
amendment if there is consensus in the region to do so. This would effectively eliminate
the need for overprogramming, and the associated artificial "expectations" built into the
obligation process.141
3.4.6 Summary
The federal fund distribution process is a complicated but important process to understand
for all involved in project delivery. It illustrates the importance of the long-standing
dominant criterion favored for project selection: that of project readiness. The obligation
of available funds provides one indication about the efficiency with which transportation
dollars are expended. State obligation activities should be monitored for trends which
would indicate the necessity for proportional obligational authority to ensure the proper
and unbiased implementation of ISTEA. In addition, strange anomolies in the process,
such counting of highway funds flexed to transit against a state's obligation limitation at
the time of transfer 42 , (as opposed to at the time of construction as for highway funds),
should be reconsidered and removed.
MPO's responsibilities in financial planning and management in transportation extend to
the implementation stage of transportation planning. MPOs play important education,
coordination, management, monitoring and roles which can improve the delivery of
regional projects in a timely manner. The TIP is the best vehicle through which the MPO
can educate project sponsors and the public about implementation activites and manage
141Murray, p. 76.
142U.S. DOT, FTA, Draft ISTEA Flexible Funding Opportunities for Transportation Investments FY
1995, "Fund Administration and Obligation Limitation".
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the implementation process. Through an organized, detailed and accessible TIP, the
MPOs can track the status of projects and relate other important State, regional and local
implementation information.
The monitoring and coordination functions are important so that the region's projects are
in the best position to obligate funds as they are available and/or take advantage of new
obligation authority in the event of a redistribution opportunity. This requires pro-active
communication with project sponsors and state officials, and an effective committee
system to determine policies related to implementation activities in a timely manner.
Together, these efforts can yield significant benefits to projects in the current TIP as well
as provide valuable experience which benefit future projects. While these roles are not
spelled out in federal regulations, clearly the public is best served by an MPO which is
informed and pro-active about project and program implementation mechanisms.
Implementation activites described in this section, and especially the criterion of project
readiness, beget questions regarding the development of that pool of projects which
results from system planning and are evaluated and ranked at the programming stage of
transportation planning. The next section, project development, explores the fundamental
question of how projects get the "green light" to begin feasibility analysis, and the impacts
of financial planning requirements on that project generation process.
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3.5 Project Development
As we demonstrated in the discussion of System Planning, Program Development and
Project Implementation, the quality of the program which the MPO ultimately implements
depends upon the pool of projects which is advanced at each preceding stage of the
planning process. This begs the question: How does financial constraint affect the
determination of which projects get planned?
Critics of financial constraint maintain that the grim scenarios uncovered by financial
planning could result in the scaling back of planning activities, and fear that transit projects
will be disproportionately penalized in the process. Noting the positive attributes of the
financial constraint requirement in general, Dutt does point out the potential harm to
transit projects as a consideration which warrants attention. He presents a Boston case
study to illustrate this reasoning:
One of the reasons why Boston was able to achieve a high level of transfer
[of highway funds to transit projects] was because of the existence of large
numbers of transit projects that were already planned under the State-
mandated Program for Mass Transportation (PMT). Such projects were
planned even though the sources of financing them were not at all clear at
that time. If the fiscal constraint results in the number of projects under
planning stage being reduced, this can have adverse effects on the number
of projects in the pre-programming pipeline and thus the effectiveness of
transportation planning.14 3
3.5.1 Transit Considered. These reservations are not completely unfounded. As we have
seen, financial constraint and financial planning do focus attention on the fiscal realities of
a region and of transit's financial capacity in general. Usually, the picture which is painted
is not very rosy. However, a closer look at this argument reveals that it is weak at best. It
is less accurate to fault financial planning requirements for this possibility than to attribute
it to more root (and by now, well-documented) problems such as the lack of local capital
matching funds or declining operating funds for transit, problems which long pre-existed
143 Dutt, "ISTEA: Some Perspectives on Whether It Will Necessarily Lead to Better Transportation
Planning", May 7, 1994. Note the acknowledgment of the financial constraint link between system
planning and project development.
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financial constraint. Though financial planning can bring grim local financial realities to
light, the requirement brought with it an increase, and not a decrease in planning funds.
All else equal, given that financial constraint does not a priori preclude or even discourage
planning for the future, there should not be a deleterious effect on the planning of transit
projects as a result of financial constraint.
The possibility that the financial constraint requirement can be harmful to transit is ironic.
As discussed earlier, partial impetus to include the requirement in the first place derived
from a desire to ensure that transit projects a) are not held to a higher financial planning
standard than highway projects and b) get implemented at the same rate as other projects
in approved Plans and TIPs, as well as a from history of strengthening financial planning in
transit as a means achieve benefits such as reducing lending costs and avoiding
overcapacity. It is early yet to evaluate the harmful effects of the requirement on transit
planning; no evidence has surfaced that transit projects are harmed disproportionately to
highway projects when planning efforts take financial constraint into consideration. In
fact, as noted above, some transit agencies and planning bodies have opted to incorporate
financial planning into their long-range planning. In any case, the quest to help implement
transit projects currently on the books must not result in a shrinking of the pool of
construction-ready transit projects in future planning cycles. This would be a perverse and
unintended outcome of the regulation.
3.5.2 MPO Structure. Arguably, a more telling and important area to monitor, with
respect to transit's future under financial constraint, is the presence of transit interests at
the table as an equal partner in the planning process. The ability of transit to hold its own
in these negotiations will be key as financial constraint forces a closer examination of
regional priorities and trade-offs. Indeed, in the San Francisco Bay Area, this has been an
issue, since many of the MPO's planning efforts rely upon county Congestion
Management Agencies whose boards may or may not include transit interests. (No transit
operator participates on the MPO's policy board.) The regional rapid transit system,
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BART, must as a result appeal to the three county agencies which represent the BART
district whenever there is a planning issue to resolve.
Congress recognized the importance of the structural representation of transit interests to
the implementation of ISTEA and solicited testimony from the planning community on the
composition of MPO Boards, with special interest in new members added since passage of
ISTEA. The Chair of the Committee conducting the hearing, Rep. Norm Mineta, stated
that the Congress "want[s] to know whether the structure of the MPOs is suited to the
role they must play of fairly representing all the people in a metropolitan area and
developing transportation plans that serve their interests." 14 4 Testimony on this topic
showed that transit representation on MPO policy boards varies signficantly by MPO and
has changed in only a handful of MPOs since passage of ISTEA. Some MPOs include
transit interests as offical voting members (Southeastern Wisconsin MPO, unchanged
since ISTEA), others include transit as non-voting members (Philadelphia MPG, Southeast
Michigan MPO, following ISTEA) and still others exclude transit from their boards
altogether, (MTC). While MPO structure and voting rights can only give one indication
of actual institutional relationships, APTA nonetheless believed that funding flexibility
worked better for transit interests, where transit has a voting seat on the planning board.145
Furthermore, presumably pointing out that some transit properties generate a fair amount
of revenues themselves, one transit offical suggested that federal guidance on MPO voting
membership "promote the idea that sources of non-Federal funding matter in deciding on
voting composition (emaphasis added)."146 ISTEA chose not to be prescriptive in many
areas, including MPO structure. But, like the issue of public involvement, there may
justification to intervene in this area if MPOs and states continue to demonstrate widely
'"Rep. Norm Mineta, House Committee on Public Works and Transportation Subcommittee on
Investigations and Oversight, October 6, 1994.
145APTA, House Committee on Public Works and Transportation Subcommittee on Investigations and
Oversight, October 6, 1994.
'"Alfred H. Harf, New Jersey Transit Assistant Executive Director of Planning, Testimony before the
House Public Works and transportation Committee's Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight,
October 6, 1994.
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divergent processes and products which suggest an imbalance of interests or dominance of
the status quo.
MPO structure can be an important proxy for MPO performance in a number of ISTEA
implementation activities which affect project development. This is because MPOs can
perform important functions to promote true intermodal project planning in the new
environment of financial planning and constraint. First and foremost, MPOs must educate
all stakeholders, including veterans and novices, of the financial requirements and funding
opportunities available to them, especially of the eligibility requirements for the major
ISTEA programs. MPOs wishing to play more pro-active roles in developing projects
which historically suffer from inadequate local match or funding support, can also partner
with operators and project sponsors to remedy this phenomenon. Projects which have
shown some potential include transit and HOV projects which may offer station-area
development or tolling opportunities which can generate "new" and/or "own source"
funding.1 47 Next, a major service the MPO can provide is helping to resolve the technical
issue of how to plan and phase large, regional projects so as to conform them to the time
horizon and year-by-year financial constraints of the TIP. MPOs and their partners must
jointly develop policies and aid project sposors to ensure that these special projects do not
harm and are not harmed by smaller projects seeking funding in the region. In order to
support project development, MPOs can also lead their regions in developing Major
Investment Study policies and guidelines. Regions should create agreements regarding
how need for an MIS is to be determined, and what the proper roles and responsibilities
should be for the various stakeholders in the process, (i.e. regulatory, permitting, MPO
and project sponsor). Finally, MPOs and their regional planning counterparts should
develop a work program which researches system needs and identifies solutions to the
transportation, air quality and development problems which are most pressing in their
regions. The MPOs role in promoting and strengthening project development through
long-range planning efforts therefore begins at the research level and continues through
the MIS and TIP processes.
1
4 7GFOA and FTA workbook: "Flexible and Innovative Funding: Making ISTEA Work for You".
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3.5.3 Federal Responsibilities. The U.S. DOT, through the FTA can also play a
leadership role by reforming transit grant processes and once again promoting long-range
planning in the transit industry. Deputy Administrator of the FTA, Grace Crunican
recently stated that efforts are underway to streamline FTA grant processes which are
currently approximately 90 days as compared to the two-day response period which
sponsors can expect from FHWA.
Even more fundamentally, FTA acknowledges the need to "get transit agencies out of the
scheduling business and into the planning business." 14 In the past, federal transit policy
has shifted from emphasizing long-range planning to short-range planning. With ISTEA,
there is some policy direction to unify and strengthen long-range transportation planning
efforts for all modes. It may not be necessary to view the important activities of
scheduling and planning as mutually exclusive; yet it is very important for federal policies
to once again support transit research and long-range planning efforts in our urban areas.
3.5.4 Operators' Roles. Finally, transit operators have the most challenging task of all.
With one eye on the provision of services, they must participate aggressively in the local
and regional planning arenas. In order to be competitive for flexible funds, the transit
agency must develop an understanding of the institutional environment and planning
process which takes a project from concept to implementation. This will involve activities
as disparate as helping to develop regional consensus on criteria, providing better data to
"justify" projects, building a constituency through marketing and public involvement,
tracking MPO and state obligation activities for opportunities to forward eligible transit
projects, and of course, lobbying for new and increased funding for the operation of their
services. Recall, that for many transit operators, the promise of ISTEA programs depends
in large part upon their own financial condition and capacity to provide the local match for
federal funds.
'
48Grace Crunican in 1994 AASHTO Washington Briefing Summary Report.
3.5.5 Summary
Financial conditions and financial planning requirements affect project development in
fundamental ways. We have seen, through the System Planning, Programming and
Implementation stages of project development, how each successive stage relies upon the
previous stage to generate or forward the "best" projects for implementation. It becomes
increasingly clear, therefore, that there exists a critical "starting point" at which all modes
should enjoy equal opportunities. However, as we have also seen up to this point, in the
past, many factors combined to challenge the equal opportunity of projects to be
considered for development. These included the strong federal interest in highway
building, lack of a clear and powerful constituency for transit, and ignorance of the
environmental impact of single-occupant auto use and highway-led urban sprawl.
ISTEA provides new opportunities for federal, state, regional and local entities to truly
"level the playing field". This includes a range of provisions to support project
development, from flexible funding to MIS directives. The intent is to empower regions
to better plan and manage their transportation systems, at a time when challenges are great
and resources are shrinking.
In chapter 4 we take a look at how regions are approaching these new challenges,
especially with respect to their new financial planning duties. The case studies we present
provide an indication of best practices and common hardspots in implementing the
requirement, and suggest lessons to be learned for federal, state, regional and local
planners in their ongoing efforts.
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Chapter 4.0 Case Studies
Objective "D": Transportation Planning Decision-Making and Funding -
Combine the best features of professional expertise with a proactive citizen and private
sector involvement process to institute a transportation decision-making procedure that
includes all interested groups; and heightens the knowledge of the public as to the
availability of financial resources and the true long- and short-term costs of available
transportation options.
-Dade County MPO, FY 1995 Unified
Planning Work Program for Transportation
The foregoing objective captures the essence of the MPO role in carrying out the financial
planning requirements of ISTEA. MPOs must engage in rigorous financial planning and
strategic decision-making to implement the financial constraint requirement as intended.
They should work cooperatively with State DOTs, transit operators and other interested
parties to develop realistic and constrained estimates of costs and revenues, while keeping
the public informed and involved on the development of the regional vision and investment
plan.
Recall our framework from Chapter 3. This provided a means to view the requirement,
and its influence on the various stages of transportation planning at the metropolitan level.
We presented the fulfillment of the requirement both in terms of processes and strict tests
of the requirement. Arguably, at this early stage of the implementation of the financial
planning requirement, we are more concerned with the former than the latter. This is
because the planning regulations included important built-in flexibility for regions to
develop their own approaches to financial planning. Not only does this requirement make
sense for application to such a diverse group of organizations as MPOs, but it promotes
buy-in of stakeholders and the strengthening of transportation planning as well.
In this chapter, we review three case study regions: the Philadelphia, Salt Lake City and
Seattle metropolitan regions to round out our investigation of the financial planning
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requirement of ISTEA. The primary vehicle for our review are the products of the
planning process, the TIP and the long-range transportation plan. These sources are
complemented by testimony, interviews and other writings where appropriate. For each
case study, we will identify planning issues such as the ones we introduced in Chapters 2
or 3, which are particularly relevant in the region, or for which the region's approach is
particularly strong or weak. We will not attempt to present all planning issues in every
case study profile. We begin with a look at the experience of the Philadelphia MPO and its
partners.
4.1 Delaware Valley Regional Planning Commission, (Philadelphia MPO) 149
The Delaware Valley Regional Planning Commission, (DVRPC), is the federally-
designated MPO for the nine county, bi-state Delaware Valley region. DVRPC is the
MPO for the Philadelphia metropolitan region, which is institutionally notable for its
location within two states, Pennsylvania and New Jersey, and two FTA regions (regions II
and III). The MPO Board consists of 18 voting members representing the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, State of New Jersey, and their respective cities and
counties. Transit operators and numerous state and federal agencies are also designated
members but do not have voting status.
The Transportation Plan and TIP reviewed were adopted in 1993 and 1994 respectively.
At the time of the review, DVRPC was preparing updates to both documents.
Transportation Improvement Program. The TIP lists all transit, highway, bridge,
bicycle, pedestrian and multimodal projects in the Delaware region for which federal
14 9The sources for this case study include:
1. DVRPC, Transportation Improvement Program, FY1995-98, Adopted July 1994.
2. DVRPC, Year 2015 Transportation Plan for the Delaware Valley Region, September, 1993, (Amended
December, 1993).
3. Discussions with Volpe National Transportation Systems Center staff who participated in Philadelphia
Enhanced Planning Review, (June, 1995).
4. U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Public Works and Transportation, Sub-Committee on
Investigations and Oversight, Public Hearing on ISTEA Planning and Flexibility, October 27, 1994.
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funding is expected in the period FY 1995 to 1998 (FY1995-1999 for NJ highway and NJ
Transit projects) as well a financial plan which outlines the sources of funds to implement
the program. The TIP programs approximately $3.5 billion in improvements for the four
years FY 1995-98, with an additional $104.5 million programmed for New Jersey
highways and transit for FY 1999. While, the TIP project selection process is relatively
strong, as will be described below, the actual TIP is overprogrammed by as much as $500
million, and cannot technically be considered financially constrained.
The TIP document articulates the TIP development process, including a description of the
roles of agencies responsible for project planning, scheduling and implementation.
DVRPC believes that the best results are achieved through negotiation among many
interests. For this reason, the planning process in the region exhibits a "bottom-up"
approach. In Pennsylvania, municipal planners and engineers generate project lists that are
reviewed at the county level. Citizens participate in task forces to review these projects.
Though basically similar in NJ, the process there also includes a project solicitation by the
state agencies, authorities and commissions from elected officials, although the TIP states
that this process is being reviewed in the context of ISTEA and is subject to change.
Next, DVRPC's Regional Transportation Committee reviews and prioritizes all project
submissions, and makes recommendations to the DVRPC Board. The programming
process used by the MPO includes a Project Ranking and Selection Process which was
developed by the DVRPC Regional Transportation committee. The process includes
seven steps:
Step 1 Preliminary Screening: projects must meet criteria on sponsorship, ISTEA
requirements, consistency with plans, definition, cost-estimation, deliverability,
and for NJ projects, project readiness (i.e. preliminary engineering and
environmental clearances have been obtained).
Step 2 Initial Project Scoring: Project scoring is performed jointly by sponsors,
DVRPC and state transportation agencies. In NJ, counties then review, revise
and approve the scores. The process incorporates ISTEA and other planning
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requirements, e.g. the use of pavement management and bridge sufficiency
ratings.
Project scoring is based on seven goals with the following weights:
Weight Regional Goal
20 Preserve and Modernize Existing System
15 Improve Safety and Security
15 Mitigate Congestion
10 Protect and Improve the Environment
15 Support Economic Activity
15 Improve Mobility of People and Goods
10 Support Land Use Plans and Goals
Scores are assigned based on the assessment of whether projects exhibit
high, medium or low impacts in the criteria areas.
Step 3 Challenge Round: The RTC conducts a 3-day challenge round in which initial
project scores may be challenged as long as they are seconded by another
member of the RTC. After a score defense, a vote is taken, with a simple
majority needed to carry the vote.
Step 4 Financial Plan: Preparation of the financial plan occurs simultaneously with the
scoring process. Programming targets for federal funds are negotiated with
state and federal agencies and are used to establish financial constraints.
Step 5 Project Selection: Projects to be included in the TIP are selected based on
funding availability, project score, and other selection criteria including federal
mandates, earmarks, contractual obligations, clean air requirements, prior
commitments, regional equity, and modal equity.
Step 6 Funds Flexing: The Pennsylvania Caucus of the Board approved flexing $100
million (80% highway funds) to SEPTA for fiscal year 1995. The TIP
represents use of CMAQ funds for transit as an example of flexing.
Step 7 The DVRPC Board makes the final determination on the form and content of
the TIP.
The TIP Financial Plan is developed by DVRPC with input from member governments,
transit operators, the state DOTs and the federal agencies. On the revenue side, the plan
forecasts the availability of federal funding while assuming that matching funds will be
made available as they have been in the past. The states provide federal matching funds
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and 100 percent financing for selected projects on the state highway systems. Local
counties, municipalities and private developers or toll authorities, as well as transit
operators may also participate in providing matching funds for federal or state aid. For
example, Pennsylvania's Act 26, a dedicated funding source for transit capital needs
requires a 1/30th project cost match from localities. Regional shares of state funds are an
estimate of the region's "fair share", based on the region's contribution to the state in terms
of population, income, taxes generated, and vehicle miles traveled. Since many in the
region believe that the region contributes more to the state than it has received back, this
share exceeds historical trends in the region. Projects are then programmed up to the level
of forecasted revenues.
There were no significant delays in the planned implementation of any "major" projects
listed in the TIP. DVRPC is working with DOTs and transit operators to develop project
tracking and reporting procedures.
Regional Transportation Plan. The Year 2015 Transportation Plan, the current long-
range transportation plan, is the first long-range plan prepared since ISTEA and CAAA,
and provides good background on the requirements of both pieces of legislation. A
disclaimer notes that this version is the first effort toward meeting ISTEA planning
requirements and that it "should not be viewed as the full measure of long range planning
to be conducted by DVRPC within the context of ISTEA language."
The DVRPC has included a comparison of alternative visions in past planning exercises. In
1989, the MPO participated in the National Strategic Transportation Planning Study
(NSTPS) which laid out three alternative investment scenarios: No Build, Minimum
Investment and Moderate Investment strategies. These showed the incremental costs and
benefits of varying levels of transportation investment in the region. The 2015 Plan did not
consider alternative growth and development scenarios, although land use/transportation
considerations underlie the Regional Development Strategy, which guided development of
the Plan. A new and updated long range plan is currently being developed for the year
2020. In the new plan, the regional transportation policy will be re-considered along with
different scenarios for growth and development. In addition, the new effort includes
constrained and unconstrained scenarios, although only the unconstrained scenarios will be
included in the final 2020 Plan.
The Plan reports that the 2015 Plan development methodology was driven by federal rules
on the public participation process, consideration of needs of all modes, determination of
financial limitations and the assessment of air quality benefits. The Year 2010 Regional
Development Strategy (RDS), adopted by DVRPC in 1989, was employed as a guiding
vision for transportation-land use planning. In addition, several long -range documents
were consulted for their applicability to the Year 2015 Plan, including, state plans, Toll
Authority plans, transit operator plans, and county Master plans. The FY 1994-99 TIP
was also a major input into the Program of Projects as were Enhancement projects which
were programmed by the States. Finally, the Plan working group - a subcommittee of the
MPO committee overseeing development of the Plan - developed broad "macro
categories" of investment to give the plan structure and organization. As a result, the Plan
provides general funding guidance for future improvements in terms of preferred funding
levels for general performance categories, and not individual projects. Individual projects
are not recommended beyond the TIP horizon.
Specifically, the Plan consists of goals, performance categories, program of projects and
policy directives. A list of 10 regional goals guided the design of the Performance
Categories - 9 groupings of projects and funding levels to implement stated goals:
- Freight Movement Initiatives;
- Network Reconstruction and Maintenance;
- Non-SOV Capacity Increase;
- Passenger Intermodal Facilities;
- Isolated Safety Improvements;
- SOV Capacity Increase;
- Traffic Flow Improvements;
- Transportation Enhancements and Amenities;
- Travel Demand Management.
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The Program of Projects represents actions toward implementing stated goals and is
comprised of programmed projects in the TIP, Toll Authorities' capital programs and state
rail plans. The Program lists all projects in excess of $10 million and all bicycle and/or
pedestrian Safety projects as well as all Enhancement and Amenities regardless of cost.150
Policy Directives further define actions to implement Plan goals. The first of these is a list
of corridor and subarea studies in excess of $10 million which, together with the
management systems and planning conducted by other agencies for the region, are
intended to generate future projects. Policy direction is also reflected in the planned
increased or decreased shares of funding for each category over the plan timeframe.
Percentages and ranges are used instead of actual dollar amounts to reflect the uncertainty
associated with predicting future levels of funding that will be available. The Plan notes
that over the planning horizon, actual projects may distort these levels at the time of their
implementation. Therefore, the funding levels recommended in the plan should not be
viewed as a funding constraint on the TIP or other planning documents but rather as a
general preferred distribution of future funds. Finally, a Transportation Improvement
Matrix is included to provide guidance for future decision-making relative to DVRPC
adopted Regional Development Strategy preferred growth scenario.
Involvement of stakeholders and interested parties (transportation agencies and local
governments) is facilitated through DVRPC's committee structure. Several committees
had oversight roles in Plan development, including the Regional Transportation
Committee Plans and Programs Task Force (RTC Committee). Periodic meetings and
scheduled briefings with this body were supplemented with a smaller working group
comprised of the state DOTs, city of Philadelphia, Montgomery County, Chester County,
New Jersey's statewide plan development representatives, SEPTA and freight community
reps. In addition, the Public Participation Steering Committee is used to ensure that all
reasonable methods for soliciting and incorporating public input were explored and to
"4Enhancement projects are identified by local officials, but are evaluated and listed at the State levels in
both PA and NJ. Lists are then programmed in the TIP and then categorically included in the Year 2015
Plan's Program of Projects.
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develop public ownership of and support for findings. The primary vehicle for direct
ongoing public participation is the Regional Citizens Committee whose responsibilities are
to review and comment on DVRPC policies and plans. Finally, throughout the
development of the Plan, DVRPC staff met with the Long Range Planning subcommittee
of the region's Goods Movement Task Force to incorporate the needs and views of the
freight community.
Financial Planning and Financial Constraints. The Plan and TIP state that they are
each financially constrained per the conditions outlined in the Transportation Financial
Planning Project. The Transportation Financial Planning Project identifies resources that
could be available to the region from public and private sources to carry out the 2020 Plan
and Transportation Improvement Program. DVRPC negotiates with NJDOT, PADOT,
SEPTA, NJ Transit, DRPA, FTA, and FHWA to define a funding scenario for the next
TIP period and develops a financial plan for the next TIP, and a financial plan for
Transportation Plan.
The financial element of the Plan claims that estimated revenue from known and projected
sources of revenue sufficiently cover the estimated costs of constructing, maintaining and
operating the total transportation system over the 22 years of the plan. However, as the
plan offers no details beyond the TIP horizon, and because it does not document existing
system costs explicitly, this is not demonstrated by the information provided in the
financial element. As was the case with the TIP, therefore, it cannot be said that the
transportation Plan is technically financially constrained.
Funding sources. On the federal level, the same level of NHS funds is assumed to be
available as are available under the remaining Interstate Construction funds. FRA funds
are not accounted for in anticipated revenue sources.
State funds provide much of the 20% match required for most federal programs and
provide capital and operating assistance to both highway and transit projects. New Jersey
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utilizes a provision in ISTEA which allows the state to take certain credits for toll
revenues invested in the system by its toll authorities, thereby offsetting the required 20%
match for federal projects. This is known as the "Soft Match" provision.
In Pennsylvania, Act 26 was passed in 1991 to provide a dedicated funding source, the
Public Transportation Assistance Fund (PTAF) for transit. Act 26 taxes on tires, motor
vehicle leases and rentals and utility companies generate approx. $141 million/year for the
fund. SEPTA receives approx. 70% of these funds, and is allowed to spend up to 30% of
the funds for asset maintenance (operating costs). The Pennsylvania Motor License Fund
provides for highway and bridge improvements, design, maintenance and purchase of
rights-of-way as well as highway patrol operations. The Fund generates approx. $1.5
billion/year.
In New Jersey, the New Jersey Transportation Trust Fund provides state funds for
highway and transit projects. It is funded by the Motor Fuel Tax, Toll Authority Contract
Payments, and Other Vehicle Fees and Taxes. The obligation limit on the Trust Fund was
recently raised by the legislature to $565 million/year. General appropriations provide
operating assistance to transit on an annual basis.
Other - These include a number of toll authorities whose revenues are used to maintain
and operate their respective facilities. In addition local governments maintain their own
road systems, and some governments own transit vehicles or property. These funds derive
from local taxes and are not accounted for in the DVRPC finance plan. Finally,
governments in both states have the right to charge development or impact fees for
transportation improvements. Future sources of private revenues may include:
congestion pricing, parking pricing, toll districts, development of unused rights-of-way
and other strategies.
Projected Revenues. Projections are divided into four 6-year periods. The estimates are
based on the assumption that federal and state funding sources will continue to be
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available, at the authorized levels, adjusted for inflation. DVRPC would like to establish
funding benchmarks for each of the federal funding programs in order to develop its
financial plan and constrain its TIP, but NJDOT has been reluctant to negotiate such
benchmarks to date.m15 The total amount of funding estimated to be available to the region
over the Plan timeframe is $18.5 billion.
Projected Costs. Cost estimates for the Program of Projects (TIP, state rail plans and
toll authority business plans) total $5.2 billion. This leaves $13.4 billion for which
expenditure is unaccounted. Whereas the Plan includes several corridor or area studies to
be conducted, the it does not recommend individual projects or costs associated with any
projects. Instead, the plan articulates target ranges of increases or decreases in spending
for the nine performance categories over the timespan of the long-range plan.
Presumably, this remaining financial capacity will be claimed by existing preservation and
operating costs, and by project development costs as corridor studies and MISs are
completed.
Observations. A first indication of the planning environment in the DVRPC region is
given by the "attitude" of the region as divulged in its planning documents and public
involvement process. In this regard, both the TIP and the Plan are very accessible
documents to the layperson. The Plan provides good background on the spirit and
requirements of ISTEA and the CAAA. In addition, there is evidence of a strong
committee structure (a diagram would be helpful) that provides additional access to the
Plan development process. Together, these indicate commitment to an evolving process
and, it is hoped, increased buy-in from the stakeholders in the region.
Whereas, the MPO is relatively strong on process, it is not as aggressive in developing the
concept of the transportation budget, in terms of an independent assessment of needs,
costs and available resources. While DVRPC has succeeded in developing a project
selection process which reflects ISTEA principles, the TIP remains overprogrammed by
51US House of Representatives, DVRPC testimony.
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approximately half a billion dollars. Some entities such as NJDOT, believe that TIPs
should be allowed to be modestly overprogrammed in order for them to serve as effective
planning tools. It is true that the region has not experienced implementation problems
with TCMs or other projects in past TIPs (two TCMs from the 1982 Pennsylvania SIP
remain to be implemented) and is moving toward developing a project monitoring
capacity. However, the region is a "severe" ozone non-attainment area and a portion of
the region is a "moderate" carbon monoxide non-attainment area. Future TIP updates
might demonstrate more rigorous financial planning as part of its conformity activities.
More troubling than the overprogrammed TIP is the lack of program and financial
definition of the 2015 Transportation Plan. Worse yet, there are no signs that of
improvement evident in the 2020 Plan update. The 2015 Plan is not much more than a
glorified TIP; the TIP accounts for $4.8 million of the total $5.2 million in the Program of
Projects, which itself seems "stapled" from state documents. Since many corridor and
subarea plans are to be conducted, the Plan is not project-specific with respect to the
remaining $13.4 billion in the fund estimate. There are two harms which can result from so
little definition in the Plan: 1) long-term planning is compromised and 2) the existing
system is not well cared for or managed.
With respect to existing long-range planning efforts, theSEPTA has recently committed
itself to long-range planning, especially in the area of improving suburban mobility.
However, SEPTA's new vision does not appear to be addressed by projects in the TIP,
12-Year state capital plan or the long-range plan. Moreover, as a pool from which future
projects will be generated, the majority of projects in 2015 Plan's subarea/corridor studies
is highway capacity increasing. There is no indication of how this pool of potential
projects will eventually fulfill the non-SOV capacity increasing project targets as outlined
in the funding goals - the "vision" for the region. In fact, the plan explicitly denies these
target funding categories as financial constraints on the TIP process.
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This bodes ill for multi-modal planning and growth management initiatives. While SOV-
capacity increasing projects will have to emerge from a CMS process, there is no other
policy guidance in the Plan which will likely address this deficiency. Ostensibly a guide for
future investment based on regional goals, the nine macro-performance categories cover
the entire range of projects so that, in actuality, any project could conceivably be found to
be consistent with Plan. In addition there is no explicit link between the
transportation/land use Transportation Improvement Matrix and any criteria for inclusion
of future projects in the Plan. These realities suggest that it will ultimately fall to the CMS
and MIS process to determine the next generation of projects in the DVRPC region. If
these effort fail, then many of the strategic planning opportunities will have been missed in
this region, and the project selection process for the TIP will again be the engine running
the regional planning process. In order to truly plan for the future, the MPO must
improve its effectiveness in combining a regional vision with the "bottom-up" process that
it has historically overseen.
Furthermore, at a minimum, the MPO must include existing and known system costs in its
long-range plan. Operating costs for transit are included in the Program of Projects but
are not estimated for future years. Neither are highway or transit maintenance or capital
costs forecast as they might be though a PTMS or PMS. In fact, local funds and
expenditures are not accounted for at all in the fund estimate of the Plan. Clearly, these all
suggest a lack of priority given to the existing system. The lack of documentation of
existing system costs is a major oversight of the Plan and directly fails to meet the financial
planning requirements of ISTEA. The consequence of poor financial planning of the
existing system is the continued short-term struggle to scrap together the resources to
maintain and operate an already old and needy transportation system.
The DVRPC has performed poorly in its first attempt at financial planning and
transportation planning under financial constraint. Yet, there is reason to believe that the
region's performance will improve with time. In addition to overseeing a well-functioning
committee system, DVRPC has initiated several new task forces to advance the regional
agenda. New Jersey also formed a Transportation Executive Council for transportation
agencies throughout the state. What the region needs most, now, is time and assistance in
working together. In very candid testimony at Congressional hearings on ISTEA, NJDOT
admitted that shared responsibilities between the State and MPOs are not yet fully
understood nor fully practiced, and that both sides are slowly and often painfully learning
their respective roles. The federal representatives to the region should remain active in the
planning activities of the region; in particular, they have a clear responsibility to enforce
the financial planning provisions of ISTEA.
Although recognition exists among the region's policy makers and planners that financial
planning must become an integral part of the regional transportation planning process, it is
not clear how this recognition is being translated in the long-range planning arena. To do
this, the MPO must 1) identify projects beyond the timeframe of the TIP, 2) estimate the
level of financial need for the existing system and any new additions, and 3) reconcile
regional policies with any shortfalls which may be identified.
Institutional cooperation is being learned by all parties in the region, but progress is slow
and at times, still hampered by structural characteristics of the system. For example, while
DVRPC has strengthened its monitoring role to help locally initiated projects proceed in
the project development stages and as they compete in the TIP process, both NJ Transit
and DVRPC report that reliance on the state matching program has allowed states greater
control of project selection within the DVRPC region , weakening the ISTEA provision
which assigns this responsibility to MPOs. In addition, the bi-state, multi-federal region
status of the DVRPC region creates added complexity in any transportation planning
effort. As noted in testimony, DVRPC complained that FTA Region II denied a request
to use CMAQ funds programmed in the TIP for a full MIS/DEIS and instead limited the
grant to only MIS work on an important Region III transportation initiative in South New
Jersey. A final example of both of these problems is embodied in the flexible fund
allocation process in the DVRPC region.
Based on indications from both states, the Plan assumes flexing of Bridge funds to STP or
NHS projects and highway funds to SEPTA and NJ Transit. DVRPC reports that the two
states in its region approach flexing differently. However, "neither has shown any interest
in flexing funds to transit from the NHS or Bridge programs, though in fact both states
have transferred funds out of Bridge into the statewide STP program." DVRPC states
that flexing decisions are made directly between the transit operator and state, except for
Enhancements and the Urban Allocated share of STP. In addition, it notes that New Jersey
has opted to utilize the soft match provision of ISTEA, making "flexing" easier.
Pennsylvania, on the other hand, has not done so, even though restrictions associated with
the Motor License Fund may be overcome by doing so. Referring to the local match
problem, NJ Transit says that problems in flexing funds occur at the local, rather than
federal level.
Case Summary. The DVRPC region seems to have supplemented "wishlist" planning
with a very conservative articulation of future projects. It is true that the 2015 plan
represents the first ginger steps into a difficult technical and political arena. The 2020
update is an opportunity for the region to build upon its successes and rectify its
shortcomings. The TIP includes innovative consensus-oriented decision-making
processes, and appears to represent fair financial planning, although future versions should
attempt to close the overprogramming gap found in the current document. The 2020 Plan
update must likewise improve upon the weak strategic-planning found in the 2015
document by analyzing what the region needs to and can afford to do, and identifying
projects beyond the TIP time frame. This is especially critical given the need to manage
and recapitalize the existing transportation infrastructure in the region. In short, DVRPC
must continue to show leadership in implementing ISTEA financial planning and other
principles. The challenge is increased due to the dual state interests in the region and the
make-up of the MPO. However, pressing growth and mobility, air quality, safety and
existing infrastructure needs make the effort imperative.
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4.2 Wasatch Front Regional Council, (Salt Lake City MPO)15 2
Whereas the DVRPC planning products did not meet the strict tests of financial constraint,
the Salt Lake and Ogden metropolitan area Transportation Plan and Transportation
Improvement Programs represent a much more sound financial planning process and
product. A comparison of available revenues and costs in current dollars demonstrates
that, with the exception of Phase 2 (the post-TIP phase of the long-range element) of the
Long Range Transportation Plan in Ogden, the areas realize net surpluses throughout the
TIP and post-TIP phases of the planning horizon. With the exception of a few caveats
which can be made regarding certain assumptions in the fund estimate, in general, the
Transportation Plan, TIP and other financial analyses contained within environmental and
other studies affirm the financial condition of the region and identify adequate financial
capacity to carry out proposed plans and programs.
Revenues. For both the Long Range Plan and the TIP, the MPO estimates Federal, State
and local revenues and management system and other costs. A healthy "back and forth"
takes place among the MPO, State and localities with respect to the development of
forecasts of Federal, State and other funds.
The financial plan for the Long Range plan makes several assumptions concerning
available revenues and costs to operate, maintain and expand the transportation systems.
To begin, the plan assumes growth of Federal fund apportionments under ISTEA at 1%
annually for most programs. In addition, the plan assumes that the 2015 state obligation
authority limit will approach this future increased apportionment limit.
The major assumption for highway planning is the availability of additional revenues
equivalent to a five-cent per gallon gasoline and special fuel tax every five years beginning
in 1995. This assumption is based on historical trends. While the legislature has not
152Sources used in this case study include:
1. WFRC staff issue papers, presented at Enhanced Planning Review, March, 1995.
2. WFRC, Salt Lake Area Transportation Plan, Technical Report 30, September, 1993.
3. WFRC, Transportation Improvement Program, 1995-1999, December, 1994.
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actually increased taxes since 1987, it did pass a $60 million general revenue allocation
during this time, which is equivalent to the assumed tax. One possible impact of such an
action may be that localities may not get their "fair share" of surpluses that build up at the
state level. Consequently, local needs such as arterial improvements in fringe areas may be
neglected over time.
Other State and Local revenues were assumed to increase at moderate rates. State
highway fuel tax, user fee and permit revenues were analyzed using existing revenue
source data and assumed to grow at rates consistent with historical as well as recent
consumption rates. Seventy-five percent of State funds are kept by UDOT, while the
remaining twenty-five percent is made available to cities and counties through the Class B
and Class C programs. These funds are allocated to cities and counties based on
population, road mileage and land area. They can be used for maintenance or construction
of highways only. Finally, the financial plan also assumes the availability of $20 million
per year from the state general fund for highway improvements through the year 2015.
This is consistent with historical trends for highway bonding or direct allocation.
The Long Range Plan also makes assumptions about the proportion of State funds that
would come to the region. Although the region is responsible for 51% of the State VMT
and 65% of the State's population and 50% of the State's revenues, the region expects to
receive 60% of the State's revenues over the first 10 years of the plan, and then 40% over
the next 10 years. This is based on the historical under-allocation of State revenues to the
region, (35%) and an agreement with UDOT's Planning Division which recognizes the
great needs of the region over the next 20 years.
Local government agencies have a variety of funding sources available to them, although
the primary source is from the general funds. Cities and Counties also receive Class B and
C funds from the state highway user revenues. Local funding for transit improvements
and services is provided through a quarter percent sales tax in Salt Lake, Davis and Weber
Counties.
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Transit revenue projections were based on financial analyses contained in the
Supplemental DEIS for the 1-15/State Street Corridor, which projected revenues through
2010. These estimates were extended to 2015 by staff.
The Utah Transit Authority, the major transit operator in the region, receives revenues to
support its operations and capital projects from a local 1/4 percent sales tax, FTA Section
9 funds, fare revenue and other sources, such as interest and advertising.
For transit planning, the major revenue assumption was the approval by the electorate of a
quarter percent increase in the local sales tax, doubling the current tax base dedicated to
transit, beginning around the year 2000. This assumption was based on a survey of 10
other MPOs and regions of like size and the size of their sales taxes. This assumption is
carried through to the estimate of Section 9 funds, which are expected to increase as a
result of increased revenue vehicle miles made possible by the additional 1/4 cent sales tax
revenue. Finally, an estimate of "other revenues" is also inflated by this assumption, being
pegged at 1% of total annual operating revenues.
In addition to the sales tax for transit, Federal operating assistance for transit is forecast
to remain at current level over the five-year horizon of the TIP. UTA's federal capital
assistance estimates (Section 9 capital) increase significantly (8.59% annual growth),
however, in 1995 and again in 1997, based on anticipated authorizations under ISTEA.
Section 3 funds are assumed to be available for fixed guideway projects over the next 22
years. UTA also expects to receive additional Section 3 funds for major bus purchases
and other capital facilities.
Costs. Cost estimates for the region's highway improvements over the next 20 years
included estimates for the categories of administration, maintenance, pavement
preservation, safety, bridge replacement, congestion management, intermodal facilities,
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enhancements, and new capacity. In this way, maintenance and preservation costs were
considered in advance of new capacity costs.
To estimate overhead costs, a 15% rate was applied across the board to the total
transportation budgets in each area. Highway maintenance costs were estimated at
$1000/lane mile and preservation costs at $5-12,000/year per lane mile, applied to total
lane miles which are assumed to grow at one percent annually. Local streets and roads
maintenance costs were included in the estimate. MPO staff consulted with local traffic
departments so that cost estimates would be based on needed improvements and not just
upon historical levels of expenditure. This estimate also required the assistance of UDOT,
which made available roadway data by functional class; HPMS lane mile data were also
used to supplement these data.
For the CMS, the MPO estimated costs for a typical 10-year program and doubled these
costs. Various operational and demand management strategies will cost approximately
$5.3 million per year to implement in Salt Lake and Ogden. The BMS needs were funded
fully as were the SMS needs. For projects which can be categorized in a number of
management systems, the MPO states that a single project may have been conservatively
double-counted in the estimation of costs. On the transit side, the TDP provided transit
cost figures for the near-term, serving as an interim PTMS. Intermodal facilities are
"budgeted" approximately $750,000 per year, although the IMS has not yet been
developed. Many of the eligible facilities, however, are identified under the Public Transit
and Congestion Management systems. Finally, Enhancement Program needs are
considered, with estimates based on the limited experience of the region with this
program.
New highway capacity needs are estimated for collector and arterial streets. The cost for
local street construction is not included in the cost estimates; they are assumed to be
incurred by private developers. Transit capacity needs were incorporated from the 1-15
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Corridor Project EIS financial analyses which estimated the costs for the proposed light-
rail transit project.
Finally, in order for forecasted revenues to be compared with estimated costs, all values
were discounted or otherwise stated in 1993 dollars. The discount rate applied to future
revenue streams was four percent, representing the transportation construction inflation
cost over the past few years. The projected amount of available revenue will be sufficient
to meet the safety, bridge, pavement and other needs of the region, as well as to construct
the projects on the current Long Range Plan.
Programming. The MPOs financial planning and programming process does not utilize
prescribed funding formulas or proportions aside from allocations to Salt Lake and Ogden
based on population. Local leaders have expressed a preference to instead determine
these on a "case-by-case" basis, so that flexibility is preserved to accommodate large
"lumpy" projects as appropriate. The Long-Range Plan does note, however, that a
determination was made following the statewide fund estimate as to the proportion that
would be dedicated to "expansion projects" in the Long Range Element as opposed to
other projects. This figure approximates 25% of the total available revenues.
Fund programming activities for the Urban Area STP and CMAQ funds are performed by
the MPO, and are reviewed by the technical committees. The MPO uses cost-benefit
analysis as part of a semi-technical process to evaluate and rank STP projects. For the
CMAQ program, priority is given to TCMs and projects within non-attainment areas.
While some evaluation policies are utilized, the Policy Board prefers not to rely
exclusively on pre-determined criteria.
With respect to the use of flexible funding provisions under ISTEA, significant transfers of
funds to transit have not occurred in the region, nor are they expected to increase in the
future. One exception is the use of CMAQ funds to fund bus/van purchases, park and ride
lots and transit centers. One reason for the low rate of transfer in the region is the
persistence of highway needs in excedance of available resources.
The MPO has encountered difficulty in administering the CMAQ program. It reports that
attempts to take advantage of this program are frustrated by the many restrictions on
eligible uses for these funds, e.g. to fund operating expenses. UTA also expressed
concern about the inconsistent experience of transit properties in being permitted to use
CMAQ funds to underwrite Deep Discounting fare programs, essentially operating
programs. The Enhancement program seems to engender similar complaints about eligible
uses.
Transportation Improvement Program
The MPO prepares a single 5-year TIP for the combined Salt Lake and Ogden
metropolitan area, in cooperation with UDOT and UTA. The document is currently
updated annually. Projects in the TIP are drawn from the long-range element of the
Transportation Plan, management systems, the Transit Development Program, and the
SIP, in the case of Transportation Control Measures.
No new programs were added to the Surface Transportation Programs in either Salt Lake
or Ogden in the current TIP, due to lower appropriations and higher project costs than
were anticipated. The Federal review team encouraged the MPO to consider a more
conservative estimate than the historical trend analysis that is used in light of possible
declines in federal support for transportation programs.
The TIP financial plan includes a schedule of funds throughout the program horizon for
each of the four programming areas: STP, CMAQ, other Highways and Transit. There
are three cases of negative balances in the Ogden Area STP and CMAQ programs.
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Transit Development Program: The TDP development process also includes an
assessment of UTA's financial capacity to realize its proposed service. Forecasts show
that UTA has the financial capacity to support existing service and the planned expansions
included in the TIP. Initiation of an 1-15 corridor light-rail line would require a
"reasonable" amount of bonding. Furthermore, Section 3 funds will be requested to
address the costs of rail transit final design, right-of-way acquisition, construction, and
associated transit and park and ride lots, as well as replacement of 32 regular service
transit vehicles.
The rate of obligation of funds is improving at both the state and MPO levels. The MPO
is currently about a year behind in obligating funds.
Observations. While the approach that the MPO uses to estimate ISTEA federal
program funds is reasonable, future updates to the financial plan should consider the
decline in the rate of federal assistance for transportation. Assumptions such as the 1%
growth rate in the allocations of federal funds, should be reconsidered if slowed trends are
identified. In addition, in light of the experience with the current TIP update (which did
not add projects due to lower-than-expected appropriations) programming principles such
as programming up to authorized levels might be revisited.
Environmental analyses and right-of-way acquisition have been completed for a
controversial 18-mile light rail project. The financial analysis contained in the EIS
confirms local financial capacity to fund the transit project. However, the analysis relies
upon a doubling of the sales tax dedicated to transit on a less-than-reasonable basis ("10
other regions of like size and population have it so why don't we?"). Without passage of
this additional quarter cent sales tax, the UTA will not be able to afford expansion of the
regional bus transit system as proposed in the Transit Development Plan if the light rail
project goes forward. While it is laudable that the MPO has made this trade-off explicit, it
is a poor one. Pitting rail expansion against bus expansion does not consider system-wide
impacts and is not in the best interest of long-run transit planning. Instead, planners
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should design strategies to incrementally improve the entire transit system, as voters seem
to have indicated in their defeat of the sales tax measure earlier this year. 153
The 1-15 highway project, though not included in the current TIP for Conformity reasons,
is a major local priority which will dominate regional decision-making for several years to
come. The typical issues associated with large "lumpy" projects such as this project and
the proposed light-rail project should be addressed on an ongoing basis. The MPO should
focus on monitoring the federal and state funds to support the project, tracking the
implementation of the program to ensure adherence to phasing schedules, and developing
the project evaluation and selection process to balance the interests of the large and
smaller projects in the region in future programming cycles. In this region, despite the
prevalence of several large, high profile projects, the MPO and UDOT should be
commended for their commitment to making maintenance of the existing system a priority.
As in other regions, one issue in the programming of state funds is that these revenues
may only be used as match for highway projects and not transit projects. Multi-modal
planning could be strengthened by removing biases at the local level to better leverage
flexible federal funds. In addition, the MPO is discouraged from pre-determining a
proportion of available funds for programming projects which are capacity-enhancing.
The MPO believes that regulations governing TIP development should be more flexible.
In particular, it objects to having to constrain the three year program by year. It maintains
that project development suffers and there are too many amendments both of which hurt
the credibility of the process. In response to this concern, the federal team suggested that
tracking projects could minimize the need for amendments.
i53In fact, a revenue measure linked to the proposed light-rail system failed when put to the voters
recently. Local mayors faulted the lack of adequate long-range planning for the failure of the measure.
They stated that planners should have done a better job in demonstrating the benefits of an integrated
bus/rail system to voters in each locality.
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Case Summary. The WFRC planning documents represent a good faith first-round effort
on meeting the financial planning requirements of ISTEA. The revenue forecast was
comprehensive and generally utilized reasonable assumptions. In addition, the cost
estimation process was laudable for its "teletic" approach of basing estimates on needed
rather than historical costs.
The overall transportation planning process in the region needs improvement, however. Due
to conformity issues and lower than anticipated revenues, the TIP update did not add any
new projects to the program. Moreover, the 1993 Transportation Plan update in the region
was not considered as fully responding to ISTEA and the new regulations. Due to this and
conformity problems in Salt Lake and the southern portion of Ogden, the plans were jointly
accepted by FHWA and FTA as only interim plans. Clearly the region's planning capacity is
hindered by air quality problems and the classic resource problems associated with planning
for a major, lumpy transportation project in the region, the 1-15 highway project. This has
made it difficult for the region to be visionary in its planning.
There are several indications that the future holds promise for the region, however. First,
among these is the "attitude" of the MPO. MPO officials stated that they found the financial
constraint requirement to be useful and to have improved the transportation planning
process. In particular, the requirement was beneficial in focusing attention on planning
realities. A secondary benefit of this requirement was to promote the integration and
coordination of planning activities, e.g. management systems. Indeed, the region should be
commended for its adoption of the metropolitan Management Systems as a structure for its
long-range plan.
Finally, the Salt Lake region provides another observation point for the limits of technical
capacity. While the financial plan contains some optimistic revenue assumptions, it is
generally a technically acceptable planning document. However, its effectiveness is limited
by the absence of mutually-developed and consensus-oriented decision-making institutions to
support the project selection activities in the region. Federal support in the region should
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focus on developing the institutional capacity of the region. While the major planning
institutions, (the MPO, state and transit operator) seem to be working well together, it seems
that air quality issues continue to be a point of frustration, especially with the state
department of air quality. One issue which could be a focus for improvement is the
coordination of planning cycles and data analysis methods in the region.
In addition, the region acknowledges needing help in the area of initiating dialogue with the
public. The MPO long ago abandoned the idea of having a citizen's advisory committee,
citing the non-representative nature of such entities. Fortunately, other groups have taken
the initiative in the region to hold regional forums on planning issues, and the MPO has taken
part in these.
4.3 Puget Sound Regional Council, (Seattle MPO)1 4
The Puget Sound Regional Council is the MPO for the Seattle, Washington metropolitan
area. The organization of the Regional Council is based upon a General Assembly and
Executive Board. The GA is composed of all elected officials from the executive and
legislative branches of member cities plus representatives from the member ports and state
agencies. Members of the Executive Board are appointed by their GA constituents. Two
policy boards - the Transportation Policy Board and the Growth Management Policy
Board - advise the Executive Board.
Transportation Improvement Program
'
54Sources for this case study include:
1. PSRC, Policy Framework for 1993 ISTEA TIP Process and Criteria, April 1993.
2. PSRC, Policy Framework for 1995 ISTEA TIP Process, January 26, 1995.
3. PSRC, 1994-1996 Regional Transportation Improvement Program, October 28, 1993 as revised to
include the 1994 Major Amendment, and as corrected and amended through October 19, 1994.
4. PSRC, Final Draft Metropolitan Transportation Plan, Transportation Element of Vision 2020, March
9, 1995.
5. Comments of King Cushman, Executive Director, PSRC, at Transportation Research Board, Annual
Meeting, Session 175: Congestion Pricing and Other Market-Based Transportation Control
Measures,"State of Washington Efforts to Advance the Pricing Concept", January 26, 1995.
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The development of the 1993 TIP was preceded by the development and adoption of a
Policy Framework in April 1993. The Policy Framework was developed to improve the
TIP project-selection process. It provides guidance through an the expression of policy
intent and project evaluation criteria which employ a point system that rates projects
through both technical and policy perspectives. The policy emphasis areas in the
Framework are:
-Non-SOV Emphasis
-Support for Transportation Enhancement Projects in excess of the State set-aside (10%)
-Comparable Review for All Projects
-Air Quality Scoring Emphasis (25% of total possible points)
-Encourage Innovative Projects
-Flexibility in Developing the Three-Year TIP in order to incorporate new directions in local growth
management or state priorities.
Project scoring criteria evolved from the policy areas. These were divided into two
categories: technical criteria and policy criteria, including:
- Enhancement objectives
- Regional and county-wide growth and transportation policies
- Air quality
- Beneficial environmental, social and energy impacts
- Support adopted regional economic strategies
-Assess cost-effectiveness
While the point system lends some objectivity to the project selection process, the TIP
states that projects in the region are ultimately selected with a degree of pragmatic
technical and political judgment.
The total request for ISTEA funds for the 1993 TIP cycle was over $680 million while
only $290 million were available. The task of prioritizing the region's transportation
investments fell to the PSRC's Regional Project Evaluation Committee. The Committee
consisted of staff from planning and public works departments, transit agencies, WSDOT,
the ports and a representative of the Regional Council's Transportation Enhancement
Committee. Volunteers totaled 55 and were divided among 13 teams. Countywide
technical committees were then asked to prioritize high-scoring projects. After one month
of review, prioritized project lists were finalized.
147
Planners in the region believe that a broader project mix was achieved using ISTEA
flexible funds and the regional policy objectives as guidelines. Over 15% of the regional
STP/CMAQ funds were recommended for transit projects, 27% for non-motorized
projects, 9% for intermodal projects, 9% for innovative/other (mostly TDM) projects and
under 40% for roadway projects. By purpose, the 1993 program can be broken down as:
1/4 to preservation needs, 1/4 to expansion, and 1/2 to improvement. An interesting result
is that only 6.6% of new Regional lane miles are for SOV use and 10.2% are HOV lane
miles, with the remainder composed of bikeways, trails, and sidewalks. However, this
scenario is counter-balanced with the state program which is 25% SOV, 73% HOV and
1.2% non-motorized. Recall our discussion about the proportion of funding which the
MPO controls versus that which is controlled by the states. In the Puget Sound Region,
ISTEA funding typically accounts for less than 10% of most city/county capital funds.
State revenues account for approximately 20-30% of capital funds. Local and other
revenue sources make up the remaining 60-70%. In contrast, federal ISTEA funding for
WSDOTs projects typically accounts for more than 50% of the state's transportation
program funding.
In January, of 1995, PSRC planners revised the 1993 Policy Framework to be used in the
1995 ISTEA TIP Process. The purpose of this effort was again to provide regional
guidelines and policy intent for how the Regional Council would manage, administer and
approve projects to be programmed and selected under the three regionally managed
federal funding programs (STP, CMAQ, and FTA Programs). The 1993 process was
considered in need of improvement for three reasons. First, planners wished to streamline
and simplify the overall process. In addition, there was a desire to alter selection criteria
to better allow funding of a few larger scale projects and innovative smaller projects in
addition to the traditional medium-sized projects which fared best in the previous TIP
cycle. Finally, there was a need to refine the process for the Regional Council to delegate
a portion of its regionally managed funding to countywide organizations in recognition of
local needs.
Here we explore PSRCs strategies for dealing with the chronic transportation planning
problem of planning for large, lumpy transportation projects in greater detail. Recall that
in the San Francisco metropolitan region, planners at the MTC would phase or segment
projects so that they were competitive against smaller projects in the regional scoring
system. In Seattle, planners observed that the TIP development process yielded a variety
of smaller scale multimodal projects from $300-$500 thousand in project cost, but that
larger projects did not compete very well. One reason for this was that the region had
difficulty defining what was a regional project, and how to account for regional benefits in
the scoring system.
For the 1995 cycle, the strategy adopted by the region was to create separate categories of
funding for regional versus local projects. Four broad categories were created for
solicitation and consideration of these larger projects. These categories were designed
with both multimodal and preservation goals in mind:
1) Projects that Optimize or Manage use of Existing Facilities, i.e. Major rehabilitation or seismic
projects.
2) Travel Demand Management/System Management Projects, i.e. planning studies for congestion
pricing or freight/goods movement access studies.
3) Projects that focus on transportation on investments that support transit and pedestrian oriented
land use patterns, i.e. a major regional center or urban corridor development study.
4) Transportation Capacity Expansion projects: i.e. major regional multimodal terminals or centers,
or missing links in the arterial system, land acquisition or HOV projects.
PSRC used the regional criteria in conjunction with a countywide (locally initiated) project
development process, resulting in an independent but coordinated process for TIP project
applications. Regional and countywide projects then undergo separate scoring processes,
which were developed by the PSRC and countywide organizations respectively. In terms
of programming, the Framework further recommended "funding targets" for the regional
and countywide projects. The target for projects in the "regional" competition is 39% to
47.5% of total CMAQ and STP funds. The recommended range for programming
projects through the countywide process is from 52.5% to 61%. Once the regional
application process is complete (i.e. an "adequate number of high priority projects is
approved), any remaining CMAQ and STP funds are then allocated to the countywide
149
process. Countywide organizations are responsible for developing criteria, processes and
finally, project lists to the Regional Council for approval. The final project lists are
submitted in June, 1995, with a finding that submitted projects do not exceed approved
funding target allocations.
Financial Constraint. The investments in the 1993 TIP totaled $1.7 billion. The TIP
reports an affirmative finding of financial constraint. To do so however, the region relies
upon full authorizations of Section 3 fixed guideway and Section 9 funds, or Section 3
Discretionary funds sufficient to cover the cost of several regional transit projects. These
figures are in excess of historical trends for the Section 3 and 9 revenue sources.
Transportation Plan. The PSRCs Final Draft Metropolitan Transportation Plan was
adopted on March 9, 1995. The MTP builds upon local plans, adopted multi-county and
countywide planning policies, and the Washington State Department of Transportation
(WSDOT) Multimodal and System Plans. The one-and-a-half year technical Plan
development process included participation by the Growth Management and
Transportation Policy Boards, as well as other PSRC committees. In addition a
questionnaire was administered to over 7000 individuals, agencies and businesses, as well
as 600 randomly selected households in the region to solicit data and gauge the public's
views. Meetings with member jurisdictions, workshops and open houses were also held in
all four counties of the region in the fall of 1994.
In the opening pages of the MTP, the region's planners candidly discuss the problems
facing the region, and the resources available to tackle these. Citing VMT growth which
has outpaced population and employment growth over the past two decades, the MTP
states that congestion and auto-dependency cannot be eliminated but can be better
managed in the region. This is necessary because the region lacks the financial resources
to build its way out of congestion trends. In addition, there exist geographic constraints
to expansion and public unwillingness in the region to building more highways. Finally,
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planners note that transit's effectiveness too is limited by existing dispersed regional land
use problems and limited control of development trends.
Planners were frank with respect to the "Significant Issues [they experienced] in
Developing the MTP". The dilemma posed by limited resources, opposition to highway
building, and the viability of transit services challenged planners in Seattle. This situation
and other realities which make transportation planning difficult are not unique to Seattle.
Among the problems facing planners are:
- Failure to charge for the true cost of auto use;
- Insufficient investment in alternatives to SOV travel;
-Need to focus on minimizing and redistributing all trips not just HBW trips;
-Need to address both short- and long- range tripmaking since 82% of current trips are less than 10
miles in length;
-Tendency of investments to inadequately address needs of the young, elderly, disabled and low-
income populations;
-Need to balance access, mobility and congestion management with economic growth and
environmental quality;
- Lack of regional access and mobility performance indicators to compare multi-modal projects;
- Decentralization of jobs resulting in suburb-to-suburb travel and poor reverse commute access to
suburban sites;
- Lack of pedestrian and bicycle-friendly environments;
-Historic inability to address the objective of reducing SOV travel while improving conditions for
freight and goods movement over same roadways;
-Need to establish relationship between transportation investments and land-use development;
As a strategy in response to these dilemmas, the MTP elects to make changes to the
"operating environment" in which travel choices are made, instead of constructing new
facilities. Examples of these operating environment changes include controlling land use
and development patterns, accessibility to various forms of transportation, price and
availability of fuel, and fiscal and tax policies. Seattle is able to propose these relatively
controversial strategies because the state has passed enabling legislation in a variety of
areas, including growth management legislation, enabling legislation for regional pricing
schemes, and local option parking, motor fuel and other taxes or fees.
Vision 2020, adopted in 1990, is the long-range growth management, economic and
transportation strategy for the central Puget Sound region. Along with input from the
public, planners used Vision 2020 to guide the development of the MTP, which is
organized into several components. These include: Maintenance and Preservation,
Transportation System Management, Transportation Demand Management (including
road pricing), Nonmotorized Transportation, Ferry Infrastructure and Service, Freight and
Goods Mobility, Aviation Program, and Infrastructure Investments and Service
Improvements.
Two components, TDM and Infrastructure Investments are noteworthy for their
innovative approaches. In the TDM component, the MTP commits the region to pursuing
transportation pricing initiatives. A major study undertaken in 1994 identified the
effectiveness of over 20 pricing strategies in reducing travel demand and emissions.
Hypothetical pricing levels were modeled, with the results showing high potential for
VMT and trip-reduction benefits. In 1993, the state legislature established a new
program, The New Partners: Public/Private Initiatives in Transportation, which was
received with interest by the private sector. The six New Partners Projects involve:
decking over park and rides and charging for parking; two Automatic Vehicle
Identification HOV toll bridge projects; two SOV inter-regional corridor pricing projects;
and one ambitious area-wide tolling and congestion pricing project covering several
hundred miles of roadway. In order to work on these projects and incorporate them into
the regional long-range strategy, the PSRC's Regional Council's Transportation Policy
Board created an Ad Hoc Task Force on Transportation Pricing in 1995. The influence of
pricing initiatives is evident in the MTPs financial plan for delivering the next generation of
projects in the region.
The Infrastructure component provides major capacity expansions in public transit
services, pedestrian and bicycle facilities. In addition, the region will provide foundation
segments of major system additions to which the region is currently committed: i.e. Phase
1 of the Regional Transit Authority's rail/bus system plans, WSDOT's core HOV system,
and completion of essential portions of "missing links" in the regional highway network. In
the long-term, these projects will be completed, and a regional nonmotorized network and
freight facilities will be added as they are identified. Finally, additional and restructured
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local transit services are also included in this component. This component assumes
increases in conventional transportation financing sources in the first 10 years of the 25
year planning horizon. In the last 15 years, additional system expansion is assumed
through either of two approaches: 1) continuation of moderate increases of conventional
financing sources (local ballot and legislatively authorized revenue increases) or by
implementation of previously described transportation pricing strategies.
Specifically, the Action Element divides the region's initiatives into capital and noncapital
projects and programs. Capital projects and programs are further divided between
Candidate and Approved projects and programs. Candidate Projects are those which are
proposed to meet an identified transportation deficiency, where the status of formal
planning and review remains incomplete. These projects are eligible only for planning,
environmental or preliminary engineering approval in the TIP. Approved Projects meet
screening and other criteria such as public and environmental review requirements, MIS
procedures if applicable, air quality conformity determinations, and identification of
proposed funding source(s).
Financial Constraint. A financial capacity assessment for the region indicates that
current revenue sources are reasonably adequate to maintain and preserve all modes of the
existing local and regional transportation systems. The Regional Financial Strategy
Analysis of current law revenues (projections of existing tax and operating revenues)
indicates that they are reasonably sufficient to meet maintenance and preservation needs
over the 25-year planning horizon. However, they can support very little overall system
capacity expansion. In addition, long-term maintenance and preservation on highways and
roadways are dependent upon a source which does not keep pace with inflation (motor
fuel tax). Transit and ferries are able to expand services slightly because their tax bases
are more closely tied to inflation and regional economic growth.
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Costs. The region identified approximately $36.9 billion in baseline maintenance and
operating costs, ($1.5 billion/year) over the 25 years of the Plan. Planned expansion
projects totaled an additional $23.5 billion, for a total future cost of $60 billion.
Revenues. Projections for the growth of current-law operating revenues are based on
historical growth trends for transit and ferry services and the revenue effects of
implementing new services. For example, post 2005-2010 fare projections assume
substantial transit ridership (and fare revenue) with rail build-out. Growth projections for
other revenues are based not on changes in tax rates, but rather more on changes in tax
bases, i.e. regional population, employment and growth. Total revenues are estimated at
$36.9 billion between 1996 and 2020. The MTP reports that over 80% of this revenue
base is dedicated to specific programs either by law or by practice.
Shortfall. The MTP's financial assessment identifies a $23.6 billion shortfall, or one third
of the total need identified. Available revenues ($36.9 billion) appears to just cover the
Baseline total of maintenance and preservation costs ($36.9 billion). In actuality,
however, the shortfall is distributed over the entire planning horizon, if financial
assumptions hold. The MTP financial strategy structures the shortfall such that
approximately 25% of the shortfall is realized in the first decade, with the remainder
occurring between 2006 and 2020. Planners state that this strategy allows time to develop
and incrementally implement new strategies for dealing with the shortfall.
The MTP identifies three options to address the resource shortfall. These are reducing
costs, postponing improvements, or increasing revenues. The option to increase revenues
has four parts:
- Refine Local Option Taxes to be Regionwide in Scope;
- Adjust Formulas for Regionally Derived Income: to raise the region's share of statewide revenues to
the level that it generates.
- Index the State Motor Fuels Tax to Inflation;
-Consider Transportation Pricing Measures
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Financial Strategy. The MTP adopts an incremental financial strategy for its
implementation. The shortfall in the first 10 years would be supported by increases in
traditional taxes, including the sales tax for transit and motor fuel tax increases. In the
longer term, the next 15 years of the program, the MTP assumes a combination of either
increases in traditional revenue sources or implementation of one or more of the demand
management/pricing options. The MTP assumes that $7.9 billion could be raised through
transportation pricing strategies during the 2006 to 2020 period. The equivalent gas tax
during the same period would be 40 cents/gallon. Under either option, the MTP also
supports reconsideration of postponing some projects to post 2020 periods.
Modally, the region's financial plan adopts a "shared pain" approach to distributing the
shortfall in resources. Public transit projects account for about half of the $23 billion
shortfall, while highway projects total approximately 40%. The balance is representated
by foregone improvements in the ferry, freight and non-motorized systems.
In comments delivered at the Annual Meeting of the Transportation Research Board in
January of 1995, PSRC Executive Director King Cushman reported upon the results of
the MTP effort. The 2020 financially constrained plan showed a 63% increase in VMT
without the aggressive congestion pricing strategies found in the MTP. However with the
institution of market-based and regulatory strategies which target road, vehicle and/or
owner and which are projected to generate over $400 million per year, King reports that
VMT increased a reduced 43% over the same period. In addition, the pricing strategies
resulted in a 4% mode choice shift to transit, and a substantial savings in total regional
delay. King also noted that the region was engaged in public policy discussions on equity,
access, and the diversion and uses of the pricing revenues. King concluded that these
important and controversial issues result in the need for long lead times for congestion
pricing programs to be implemented.
Other Areas of Leadership. In order to track the region's implementation of the MTP,
the PSRC is developing a monitoring system in two parts. Implementation monitoring will
track and summarize how expeditiously regional and state agencies, as well as local
jurisdictions, are applying Vision 2020 policies. Performance monitoring examines the
effectiveness of implementation efforts through data collection and performance
indicators. On the other end of the planning spectrum, PSRC is also initiating an MIS
process for project development. Consistent with a state mandate emphasizing least-cost
planning and cost-effective facilities, services and programs, future MISs will consider
TDM strategies among the alternatives considered. The HOV MIS process will consider
both lane conversion and new lane construction. In addition, the process will consider
freight interests as HOV lane development occurs.
Observations. The PSRC and its partners have devoted considerable time and resources
toward the evolution of sound processes for both TIP and Plan development. The PSRC
processes enjoy a high level of regional consensus and yield plans and TIPs which
generally meet the financial planning requirements of ISTEA. A singular recommendation
which might be made to the region in the area of financial constraint is to revisit overly
optimistic revenue assumptions in future TIP and MTP financial plans. This finding is
validated somewhat by the defeat of a local sales and motor vehicle excise tax financing
package for the regional rail and bus transit system earlier this year.
The PSRC's long range transportation plan employs the teletic view by outlining the
region's needed and desired levels of investments, showing the region's capacity for
meeting those needs, and engaging in innovative strategies to meet expected shortfalls. In
addition, in the event that shortfalls are not met, the region structures its projected
financial deficit in a way which appears to ensure that no mode suffers disproportionately.
Although some of the MPO's revenue and implementation assumptions are optimistic -
especially those involving congestion pricing initiatives - the region should be commended
for its approach to long-range planning. In addition, the region exhibits leadership in
promoting public education and awareness on transportation planning issues, tackling the
problem of planning for "large and lumpy" transportation projects in its project selectin
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process, and developing both project development and implementation processes to
support continuing effective transportation planning practices in the region.
Case Summary. The PSRC is an example of pro-active and comprehensive metropolitan
transportation planning. Despite aggressive public campaigns and supportive state
enabling legislation however, it appears that many of the innovative strategies which the
region has developed will require long-lead times to implement. The Seattle MPO's
experience illustrates the difficulty of fashioning solutions to complex transportation
planning problems. Despite this, planners there are committed to seeking long-term
solutions to the financial and other planning realities which they face, and which are faced
by most U.S. metropolitan areas. Their efforts should be commended and supported by
their federal, state, local and public counterparts.
4.4 Summary
In this chapter we examined three MPOs of varying size, institutional make-up and history.
Though uneven in their achievement of ISTEA financial planning dictates, each MPO has
acknowledged the importance of financial planning in the short- and long- range
transportation planning process. Even where planners demonstrated a facility for long-range
financial planning, it is important to note that they were no less frustrated by the outcome -
limited public resources and an unwillingness on the part of the electorate to authorize new
revenue measures.
This is an important point to note. Financial planning does not promise to solve metropolitan
fiscal problems. In fact, the financial planning exercise may portend a period of major
confusion, frustration and discord within a region. What planning with financial realities does
yield, however, is an opportunity to ensure the preservation of the existing transportation
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system, and an informed debate over the affordability of future investment alternatives and
the need for associated financing options. This benefit is a tenuous one, admittedly. It
requires continued commitment on the part of all parties to see the exercise through in order
to result in a set of short- and long- term strategies which is acceptable to all. In this sense,
the processes of financial planning can be considered more important than the technical fine
points of the exercise.
Far from being insurmountable, financial planning was carried out successfully in two of the
three metropolitan areas reviewed. Where financial planning was carried out successfully,
e.g. Salt Lake City and Seattle, the technical difficulties of the exercise were overcome either
through the MPO's resident expertise or the use of consensus-oriented development
strategies. In addition, both documents were stronger planning frameworks for their explicit
analyses of the financial condition and capacity of the respective regions. For example, in
Salt Lake City, the assumption of a speculative new revenue source was tied to an explicit
(though unfortunately modal) trade-off. Similarly, Seattle planners were explicit about the
consequences of not realizing the assumptions included in the long-range plan, adopting a
"shared pain" approach among the modes. In contrast, where financial planning was not
undertaken, e.g. Philadelphia, the result is a weak long-range planning process, which does
little to ensure the continued maintenance and preservation of an aging transportation
network and even less to guide transportation policies and investments (or cuts) over the
next twenty years.
There are several conclusions which can be drawn at this time. The primary lesson for all
observers is to acknowledge the request of all three MPOs reviewed: allow MPOs and their
partners more time to refine their first efforts in the difficult area of financial planning. MPOs
are diverse in the problems they face and in their institutional capacity for solving them, but
they are generally supportive of the requirement. For example, it is not surprising that the
Seattle MPO, which enjoys favorable state enabling legislation and a more recent
transportation history, has achieved greater success in the area of financial planning than the
Philadelphia MPO, where institutional make-up is complex and infrastructure preservation
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needs are great. Despite these differences, however, all three MPOs acknowledged the
benefits of planning with financial constraint and pledge to continually refine and improve
their processes in the future.
While it is promising to note the positive attitude MPOs display toward financial planning, it
is discouraging, to note how this attitude is being rewarded. For example, even where
financial planning was performed teletically, e.g. Seattle, the success of San Diego in turning
the exercise into new local revenue sources for transit could not be replicated. Likewise in
San Francisco, voter sentiment toward new taxes is so negative that no state legislator from
the area would carry a bill to implement a Congestion Pricing demonstration project on the
Bay Bridge in the last legislative session. These realities underline the gravity of the
transportation finance problem. Federal and local support for transportation is shrinking just
at a time when nascent transportation planning reforms are being implemented. Needless to
say, this unfortunate situation jeopardizes the promise of ISTEA signficantly.
What can or should be done to address this situation? Again, there are no easy solutions to
this dilemma. However, in Chapter 5 we offer some preliminary thoughts on the
recommended next steps for Congress, the D.O.T., and MPOs and their partners in the area
of financial planning.
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Chapter 5.0 Conclusions
In the preceding chapters, we have presented the salient issues surrounding the ISTEA
requirement for financial constraint in transportation planning. This historic requirement
represents a significant challenge to transportation professionals. As one report notes:
ISTEA challenges the transportation community, within existing budgetary
constraints, to meet our growing transportation needs and sustain our
aging transportation infrastructure. It asks that we not only maintain and
improve existing highway and transit facilities but also manage these
facilities more effectively so as to increase their capacity and efficiency. 155
Fulfilling this challenge will not be easy, and Congress must acknowledge the learning
curve on both the technical aspects and the more difficult institutional reforms that
financial planning requires. In Chapter 2 we presented an historical perspective on the
central debate regarding the net benefit or harm of the requirement. We hypothesized then
that attention to process, defensible analysis and the teletic approach to financial constraint
could together overcome the barriers to implementing the requirement. This result should
not be expected immediately, however. Recall that it took over 20 years just for financial
planning requirements to be instituted evenly in U.S. transportation policies. At this early
stage of implementation, the efforts have only just begun and should be closely monitored
and nurtured rather than rushed.
With respect to the constructive (teletic) versus potentially destructive view of the
financial planning requirement, we conclude that ISTEA may have been remiss in not
requiring long-range unconstrained (vision) plans to accompany the constrained versions.
If performed teletically, financial planning results in a comprehensive view of the costs of
recapitalizing, operating and expanding the metropolitan transportation system, and a
documentation of a region's capacity to deliver its vision. Collectively, these plans could
155GAO, Transportation Infrastructure: Major Program Revisions Present Challenges, p.2.
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form the "cost-to-complete" the new national transportation strategy to follow the
construction of the Interstate: System Management.
Chapter 3 conceived a framework for measuring the effectiveness of the financial
constraint requirement, and identified factors which may erode the effectiveness of aids to
MPOs included in ISTEA by Congress. In addition, techniques for analyses of varying
detail and complexity and for strengthening institutional capacity were suggested. Special
roles and responsibilities of MPOs, States, Transit Operators and the federal agencies in
implementing the requirement were highlighted.
In Chapter 4, we examined the experience of three MPOs of different circumstances,
history and institutional make-up. Initial findings show that practitioners find
transportation planning under financial constraint difficult, but worthy of their efforts.
What regions need most now is time, local education and leadership, and federal financial
and technical assistance. The future of ISTEA implementation is at a crossroads today.
Each member of the transportation community must do its part so that the benefits of
implementing the requirement are achieved. In particular:
5.1 MPOs. As the "stars" of the regulation, MPOs must exhibit leadership in
implementing financial constraint. MPO responsibilities span the Project Development,
Systems Planning, Programming and Implementation phases of the 3-C process. These
responsibilities include developing MIS and CMS procedures to ensure true multi-modal
planning, educating and engaging the public vis a vis a regional "vision" to guide long-
term investment, creating project selection processes which are fair and tractable, and
monitoring implementation activities such that costly delays are minimized and
opportunities for last-minute funding are not missed.
5.2 States. As key MPO partners States must learn to re-orient their missions to support
greater planning autonomy at the regional level. States must forge new relationships with
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MPOs and transit operators in a spirit of cooperation and intermodal partnership. This
includes leveling the "local match" , "flexible funding" and "obligations" playing fields as
well as simply providing timely estimates of funding which MPOs can rely upon to
perform their financial analyses. States must also re-think the financial implications of their
own transportation planning activities, given the sizable amounts of transportation funding
they continue to control.
5.3 Transit Operators. To benefit from financial constraint, (or even to avoid being
harmed in some states) transit operators must insist on being given a "seat" at the
transportation funding table. Although much of the legislation was conceived in the spirit
of helping transit interests, the ability of transit to take advantage of financial opportunities
in ISTEA depends upon the financial condition of the operator. Unfortunately, most
operators struggle just to maintain and sustain their existing systems, when in fact, it is just
as important to engage in long-range planning in order to be able to generate a backlog of
projects to compete in the regional process. Conversely, transit must fight for operating
dollars, but also must secure local matching dollars in order to take advantage of flexible
funds.
5.4 Federal Agencies. Federal agencies can do much to support the intermodal planning
process at the regional level. First, inequities in the modal planning processes still exist
today, and must be eradicated. Next, federal representatives at the regional and local
levels must be active in the MIS, CMS, and financial constraint processes in their regions.
In addition, at this early stage of implementation, the DOT should take the strategic view
of enforcement. DOT should canvass initial efforts and identify problem regions; they
should target common problems and develop guidelines based on the best-practices of
successful MPOs. While generally there is a greater need for guidance and assistance than
enforcement, federal representatives must be willing to enforce the most basic and
fundamental tenet of financial constraint, the priority consideration of existing system
needs. Sanctions should be used against regions which refuse to engage in responsible
financial planning and asset management. Appropriate federal roles also include analyzing
162
long-range plans across the nation. Collectively, these documents are useful in
operationalizing the teletic approach at the national level by serving as an estimate of the
"cost-to-complete" the current federal mandate, and assessing regions' ability to meet
those costs given current funding realities.
5.5 Congress. The requirement of financial constraint must not be judged on the
products of this, the first phase of implementation efforts. Congress must take a long-term
view of the financial planning experiment, and of ISTEA in general. In order to best assist
regions in meeting their responsibilities, Congress should first and foremost fully fund
ISTEA. MPO planning funds should keep pace with planning responsibilities. Program
funds should be appropriated at their fully authorized levels, and transit operating
assistance should be re-instated. In addition, oversight committees should continue to
solicit testimony from a wide range of interests, and transportation research should
continue to be funded. If, over time, states continue to exhibit divergent levels of success
in implementing financial constraint, there may be a need to link program funds to
proportional obligation rates, directly pass through a greater share of program funds to
MPOs, and/or require more comprehensive long-range financial planning requirements at
the state level. MPO structure and public involvement requirements may also need to be
revisited in "Next-Tea" if highway projects continue to dominate the planning landscape.
5.6 Conclusion. It is time for the transportation community to be serious about financial
planning. As one STPP document states, "We must begin now to ask the right questions,
and trust them to lead us to the right answers."156 At stake are the safety, efficiency and
effectiveness of investments past, and the ability of the next generation of projects to
deliver solutions to pressing regional transportation and air quality problems and provide a
superior quality of life. Sound financial planning, if conducted in the spirit intended in
ISTEA, confers educational benefits to practitioners, decision-makers and the public, so
that a realistic dialogue of values, priorities, and future strategies can be initiated in our
precious urban areas.
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Appendix A
Flexible Funding Transfers to FTA and Obligations
Draft FTA Estimates
Millions Of Dollars
1400 1,383
1200 1,146
1000
800 711
600 529
729
400 304 2?44 237
200 I100
60
1992 1993 1994 Cumulative Transfers
and Obligations
Total Available
Cumu. Transfers
Obligated by FTA
Cumu. Obligations
I Pending Obligation
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Appendix B
ISTEA Federal Aid-Highway Program Authorizations
from: FHWA, Financing Federal Aid Highways
PROGRAM 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 TOTAL
Title 1-Surface Transportation
nterstate Construction Program .800.00 300.00 800.00 300.00 0.00 0.00 7200.00
Interstate Substitute Proaram 240.00 240.00 240.00 240.00 .00 0.00 960.00
'nterstate Maintenance Proaram 2.43100 2.91300 2.914.00 2.91400 2914.00 2914.00 17000.00
National Highway System 3.003.00 0599.00 3,59900 3.59900 3600.00 3.60000 21.00000
Surface Transportation Program 3.418.00 -1-096.00 .096.00 -1,096.00 4 097.00 -. 097.00 23.90000
Conaestion Mitigation ana Air Quality
imorovement Program 858.00 028.00 1,028.00 .028.00 ,.029.00 1.029.00 6000.00
Bridge Program 2.28800 2,76200 2.76200 2.76200 2763.00 2,76300 16,100.00
Federai Lanas Highway Programs: 371.00 -145.00 -45.00 -15.00 -47.00 -147.00 2.600.00
naian Reservation Roaas 159.00) 191.00) 191.00) '91.00) 191.00) 191.00) (111400)
Public Lanas Highway 143.00) 71.00) 171.00) 100) 172.00) 172.00) (1,000.00)
Parkwavs ano Park Highways 69.00) 83.00) 83.00) 84.00) 84.00) 486.00)
Donor State Bonus Amounts 429.00 514.00 514.00 14.00 514.00 515.00 3000.00
Reimbursement for non-federailv aidea
Interstate Segments 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2000.00 2000.00 4.000.00
Hold Harmless' 606.60 606.60 606.60 606.60 606.60 606.60 3.63960
90% of Payment Adjustments' 0.00 83.00 83.00 3.00 83.009 83.00 415.00
Additional Allocation-Wisconsin 40.00 47.80 47.80 -17.80 -780 47.80 279.00
Highway Use Tax Evasion Projects 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 30.00
Highway Use Tax Evasion Projects-GF 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 15.00
Scenic Byways Program 1.00 3.00 4.00 14.00 1400 14.00 50.00
Interim Scenic Byways Program 10.00 10.00 10.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 30.00
Ferry Boat ana Facilities Construction 14.00 1700 17.00 '7.00 17.00 18.00 100.00
Emergency Relief 100.00 '00.00 '00.00 0 0000 100.00 600.00
Arkansas Traffic Control Device 1.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.20
Minimum Allocation' 1,160.00 803.40 503.40 503.40 803.40 803.40 5.17700
Projects: 542.62 1,225.46 1,15885 110052 1,100.52 1.100.52 6.228.49
High Cost Bridge Projects 122.82) 152.48) 52.48) 5 52.48) (52.48) (285.20)
Congestion Relief Projects (39.20) .90.17) 90.17) 90.17) (90.17) (90.17) (490.04)
High Priority NHS Corridors (94.65) 270.99) 204.38) 204.38) (204.38) 204.38) (1,183.16)
Rural Access Projects (73.65) 169.40) 169.40) 169.40) 169.40) (169.40) (920.63)
Urban Access and Mobility Projects (44.49) 102.32) 102.32) 102.32) 102.32) 102.32) (556.10)
Innovative Projects (232.85) 459.71) 459.71) 401.38) 401.38) 401.38) (2,365.41)
Priority intermodal Proiects 34.96) 80.401 80.40) 80.40) 80.401 80.40) (436.95)
High Priority NHS Corriaor Studies 8.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 3.00 8.00 48.00
High Priority NHS Corridor Revolving Funo 0.00 40.00 0.00 20-00 40.00 40.00 200.00
Infrastructure Awareness Education Proaram 2.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.00
Safety Belts and Motorcycle Helmets 17.00 Continues as $24 million orawaown from sec. 402 for 93-94 17.00
Trauma Study 5.00) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 (.00
FHWA Hiahway 402) Safety Program 17.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 117.00
=stimatea amounts.
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Appendix B (continued)
HWA Hianway R&D Safety (403) Program
National Maanetic Levitation Devt--
-ihan-soeeo Grouna Transportation Devt-7F
Nationai Magnetic Levitation DevIt-GF
-iah-soeea Grouna Transportation Dev t -GF
-High-soeea Ground Transponation Dev t
R&D-GF
Railroao Relocation Demonstration
Proaram- TF
Railroaa Relocation Demonstration
Program-GF
Zrivate Sector involvement Program GF
'lisceilaneous Highway Prolects
4 ecreationa Trails'
Title 1 Total
Highway Trust Fund-Highway Account
General Fund
10.00
5.00
3.00
225.00
25.00
'0.00
-5.00
5 00
00
300
0.00
-00.00
5.00
0.00
0.00
'0.00
-00.00
5.00
0.00
0.00
25.00 0 00 0.00 0 00
10.00 1000 .00 .00
5.00 5.00 5.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 15.00
5.00
987.20
30.00
'8.692.12
'7.419.92
1.272.20
5.00
100
3 0.00
20.478.76
20.468.76
*0.00
5.00
3.00
30.00
20.469.15
20.469.15
10.00
5.00
0.00
30.00
20.395.82
20.390.82
5.00
Title l-Highway Safety
NHTSA Hignway Safety (402) Program 126.00 171.00 171.00 171.00 !71.00 171.00 981.00
,NHTSA Highway R&D Safety (403) Program 44.00 44.00 14.00 44.00 _i4 00 44.00 264.00
Drug Recognition Expert Training Program 4 00 1 00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 24.00
National Driver Register Act Authorizations 4.00 Continues as S4 million arawdown from sec. 402 for 93 and 94 4.00
Alcohol Traffic Safety Incentive Grants 25.00 Continues as $25 miilion arawdown from sec. 402 for 93-97 25.00
Traffic ano Motor Vehicle Safetv 68.72 71 33 74.04 76.86 0.00 0.00 290.95
1otor Vehicle information ano Cost Savings
Proarams 6.49 6.73 6.99 7.25 0.00 0.00 27.46
Title i Total 278.21 .97.06 300.03 303.11 219.00 219.00 1,616.40
Highway Trust Fund-Highway Account 199.00 219.00 219.00 219.00 219.00 219.00 1.294.00
General Fund 79.21 78.06 81.03 84.11 0.00 0.00 322.40
Title IIl-Mass Transit
Section 3 Discretionary ana Formula 1,342.17 2.030.00 2,050.00 2.050.00 2.050.00 2.900.00 12.422.17
New Starts (536.87) 812.00) (820.00) 820.00) (820.00) (1,160.00) (4,968.87)
Rail Modernization Formula (536.87) '812.00) (820.00) (820.00) (820.00) (1.160.00) (4,968.87)
Bus (268.43) (406.00) .410.00) (410.00) (410.00) (580.00) (2,484.43)
Section 9 Formuia Caoital ana Operating 1,822.76 2.604.14 2.642.57 2.642.57 2.642.57 3.741.02 16,095.64
Section 18 Rural 106.09 '51.56 153.80 '53.80 153.80 217.73 936.78
:nterstate Transter-Transit 160.00 '64.84 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 324.84
Section 16(b)(2) 54.88 -0.15 68.68 68.68 68.68 97.15 428.21
T
ransit Plannina and Researcn 109.12 157.05 '53.75 153.75 153.75 217.50 944.92
National (39.51) 45.62) 44.62) 44.62) 44.62) (63.75) (282.75)
State (8.96) 14.96) 14.62) 14.62) 114.62) 21.00) (88.79)
Coooerative (8.96) 496) 4621 14.62) 14.62) (21.00) (88.79)
Sec. 8 MPO Planning (43.69) 70.67) 69.19) 69.19) 69.19) (97.88) .419.80)
-Estmatea amounts
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-. 00
S25.00
1.00q 
3.00
0.00
0.00
'0.00
'25.00
5.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
60.00
500.00
25.00
225.00
25.00
25.00
30.00
.00
0.00
30.00
20.386.82
20.381.82
5.00
5.00
0.00
30.00
20.388.82
20.383.82
5.00
30.00
987.20
180.00
120.811.49
119.504.29
1.307.20
Appendix B (continued)
Rural Transit Assistance Program 5.00) 7.85) 7 69) 7 69) .69) 10.87) 46.79)
National Transit Institute 2.99) 3.00) 3.00) 3.00) 3.00) 3.00) 17.99)
Universitv Transportation Centers 6.99 7 00 - 00 - 30 00 7.00 41.99
Program Administration 37.00 50.26 49.20 -9.20 -9.20 69.60 304.46
Title III Total 3.639.01 5235.00 5.125.00 5.125.00 5.125.00 -250.00 31.499.01
Highway Trust Fund-Transit Account 896.01 2.875.00 2.975.00 2.875.00 2.775.00 _ 800.00 18.196.01
General Fund 1.743.00 2.360.00 2.150.00 2.250.00 2.350.00 2.450.00 13.303.00
Title IV-Motor Carrier Safety
Motor Carrier Safety Grants Programs 65.00 76.00 80.00 33.00 85.00 90.00 479.00
Motor Carrier Safety Functions 49.32 0.00 0.00 3.00 0.00 0.00 49.32
Longer Comoination Vehicles 1.00 1.00 )00 . 0 0.00 0.00 3.00
Uniformitv 6.00 Continues as S6 million arawoown Trom MCS Grants tor 93-97 6.00
Title IV Total 121.32 77.00 31.00 33.00 35.00 90.00 537.32
Highway Trust Fund-Highway Account 72.00 77 00 31.00 33.00 65.00 90.00 488.00
General Fund 49.32 0.00 0.00 3.00 0.00 0.00 49.32
Title VI-Research
Bureau of Transportation Statistics 5.00 10.00 15.00 15.00 20.00 25.00 90.00
Bus Testing 3.99 0.00 3.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.99
Howara Transportation Information Center 2.24 0.00 0.00 3.00 0.00 0.00 2.24
Nat'l Center for Advanceo Transportation
Technology 2.50 3.00 2.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 8.00
University Transportation Centers 5.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 35.00
University Researcn Institutes 6.25 6.25 6.25 6.25 6.25 6.25 37.50
Intelligent Vehicle Highway Systems 94.00 113.00 113.00 '13.00 113.00 113.00 659.00
Title VI Total 118.98 '38.25 '42.75 i40.25 145.25 150.25 835.73
Highway Trust Fund-Highway Account 114 99 '38.25 142.75 140.25 145.25 150.25 831.74
Highway Trust Fund-Transit Account 3.99 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.99
General Fund 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
TOTAL 22.849.63 26,226.07 26,177.93 26.047.18 25.961.07 28.098.07 155.299.96
HIGHWAY TRUST FUND-HIGHWAY
ACCOUNT 17.805.91 20.903.01 20.901.90 20.833.07 20,831.07 20.843.07 122.118.03
HIGHWAY TRUST FUND-TRANSIT
ACCOUNT 1.900.00 2.875.00 2.975.00 2.875.00 2.775.00 4.800.00 18.200.00
GENERAL FUNDS 3.143.72 2.448.06 2.241.03 2.339.11 2.355.00 2.455.00 14.981.92
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Appendix C
Survey and Assessment of Alternative Revenue Projection Methods
from: David Murray, "Financial Constraint of the Transportation Improvement
Program", Surface Transportation Policy Project ISTEA Planner's Workbook, 1994.
Strategy Advantages Disadvantages Appropriateness
OLS Regression: Simplicity, Requires careful Best method for
Ordinary Least flexibility, analysis of cause- funds that have a
Squres regressions availability, effect relationships; direct relationship to
characterize the familiarity. OLS Requires data for economic trends, i.e.
relationship of one regression options trend analysis and gas or sales tax
variable to other exist on most working knowledge receipts. Also used
variables, which can spreadsheet of statistical to predict fare
then be used in programs. User methods and revenues for
projections. should be wary of properties. proposed fare
presence of lagged structures.
and/or seasonal
variables.
Time Series Simplicity. User Requires special Best method for
Regression: should be wary of software. Current variables that have a
projects variables presence of lagged packages are a bit of constant pattern
based on past values and/or seasonal a black box method. over time, (certain
of that variable variables, business cycles), and
alone. no discemnable
relationship to any
other economic or
political factors.
Input-Output Some Input-Output Complicated for Good for analyzing
Model: characterizes models can calculate projecting fund direct and indirect
an economic system fund revenues or the sources. Requires impacts of a toll or
and the direct and variables that drive updated model, and tax structure, or the
indirect linkages projections of working knowledge effects of other
within it. funding resources of some advanced shocks to a regional
with some degree of statistical methods. economy.
accuracy.___________ 
_______ ____
Geometric or Simplicity. Analysis No sensitivity to Geometric formulas
Exponential Growth an be performed on political or can be used for
Rates: uses a trend a calculator. economic forces. funds increasing at a
curve to characterize decreasing rate.
the behavior of a Exponential
fund sources and to forumals may be
project future used to project
values, funds tied to
exponential growth
vari .rates.
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Constant Growth Simplicity. Can be No sensitivity to Appropriate for
Rates: uses a linear performed on a political or funds that have
trend line to project calculator or by economic forces. experienced little
future values. hand. variation of growth
over time.
Institutional Accuracy. Only true for limited Appropriate only to
Formula: some fund set of fund sources. funds that are so
sources are easy to Even ones that are determined.
predict because they legislatively-dictated
are based on can be changed by
legislatively the body that
determined devised them.
formulae.
Algebraic: some Simplicity. Only true for some Appropriate only to
fund sources have fund sources. those funds that
strict algebraic have this direct
relationships to relationship.
other variables, i.e.
average General
Fund contribution to
transportation.
Political Judgment: Some funds just Difficult to reach Most fund sources
some fund sources work like this and consensus. Relies benefit from this
are subject to annual the judgment of heavily on open method as a
budget battles or are experience may be forum for reasonableness
private dedications more appropriate for reasonableness check on other
subject to these fund types. check. methods.
negotiations. I
Appendix D
FDOT Cash Flow Analysis Program
from: Hillard, "Financial Dynamics: A Model for Forecasting Transportation Program
Cash Flow", Transportation Research Record 1305, 1991
FABLE 1 PROGRAM AND RESOURCE PLAN SUMMARY
TENT91F
Mw ~
)2:18 VP
TENTATIVE WORK P1
FISCAL YEARS 1990/91 TH
PROGRAM AREAS
1. PRODUCT
A. Express. Const
8. Arterial Heys.
C. Right Of Wav
0. Aviation
E. Transit
F. Rail
6. Safety
H. Resurface/Rehab
1. Bridge
II. PRODUCT SUPPORT
A. Prel. Eng.
3. Const Eng Insp.
C. R/W Support
I. Material & Res.
E. Planning
F. Pub. Trans Oper.
Il1. OPERAT. MAINT.
A. Routine faint.
B. Traffic Eng.
C. Toll Oper.
D.Motor Carrier Cop.
IV. ADMINISTRATION
A. Adein.
8. Fixed Capital
TOTAL PROSRAM
V. OTHER
A. Dep.Data Ctr.
8. CME
C. Non-Oper. Trnfs.
0. Offset-Pay Pack
TOTAL BUDGET
FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
1990 PROGRAM AND RESOURCE PLAN SUMIMARY
OGRAM FISCAL YEARS 1990/91 TO 1998/99
ROUSH 1998/99 (MILLIONS OF S)
COM. CURRENTIS I!III i!!!!!!:1t1! 1 I t!!!! 1!!! 5 YR i!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 4-YEAR
88/89 89/90 90/91 91/92
738.0 1136.7 1187.2 1371.2
345.4
115.6
26.4
34.5
24.7
50.6
13.9
34.7
92.2
229.0
157.8
422.0
44.9
22.8
45.2
10.7
55.0
149.4
195.2
208.6
408.5
43.5
40.0
40.6
19.6
154.7
76.5
548.2
196.8
314.5
44.8
33.8
39.5
11.0
115.4
67.2
316.9 271.2 386.4 323.8
147.1
74.0
41.1
28.2
21.4
5.1
103.0
72.5
46.7
24.4
18.8
5.8
139.3
63.8
130.0
25.9
20.5
6.9
111.8
91.3
64.8
27.3
21.4
7.2
263.4 241.5 273.0 288.6
170.4 159.4 176.5 189.2
10.9 10.8 10.1 9.7
73.6 61.9 75.7 78.5
8.5 9.4 10.7 11.2
51.4 58.7 65.8 69.3
92/93
DEC .39
10- YEAR
93/94 94/95 TOTAL 95/96 96/97 97/98 98/99 SUB-TOT TOTAL
896.1 839.1 928.2 5221.8 943.1 1032.2 1050.1 1073.1 4098.5 10457.0
195.2
192.3
129.5
45.2
23.8
54.5
12.5
130.8
112.3
175.1
175.8
92.8
46.1
25.1
56.1
10.8
169.6
87.7
181.3
193.8
112.0
47.9
25.7
57.6
14.0
226.3
69.6
1295.0
967.3
1057.3
227.5
148.4
248.3
67.9
796.8
413.3
270.2 287.1 298.9 1566.4
114.0
58.9
39.2
28.6
22.0
7.6
120.4
67.7
37.9
30.0
23.1
8.0
123.2
73.2
35.1
32.3
26.7
8.4
608.7
354.8
307.0
144.1
113.7
38.1
303.0 318.7 334.6 1517.9
264.0
126.1
151.1
50.7
38.0
45.1
17.0
164.1
87.0
272.0
124.9
148.5
52.3
38.0
45.0
17.0
244.8
89.7
281.0
138.2
151.7
53.9
38.0
6.7
17.0
259.4
104.2
290.0
138.2
155.7
55.6
38.0
5.0
17.0
259.4
114.2
1107.0
527.4
607.0
212.5
152.0
101.8
68.0
927.7
395.1
2631.0
1652.5
2086.3
484.8
323.2
395.3
146.6
1779.5
957.8
300.6 311.8 323.0 337.1 1272.5 3110.1
98.6
78.6
51.5
35.0
28.1
8.8
103.0
81.1
52.4
36.6
29.5
9.2
108.6
82.7
53.0
38.2
30.8
9.7
114.0
86.7
55.4
39.9
30.9
10.2
424.2
329.1
212.3
149.7
119.3
37.9
1135.9
756.4
566.0
318.2
251.8
81.8
353.0 370.4 388.9 408.4 1520.7 3280.1
198.7 208.7 219.2 992.3 231.2 242.7 254.9 267.6 996.4 2148.1
10.2 10.5 10.9 51.4 12.2 12.8 13.4 14.1 52.5 114.7
82.3 87.1 91.5 415.1 95.9 100.6 105.6 110.9 413.0 890.0
11.8 12.4 13.0 59.1 13.7 14.3 15.0 15.8 58.8 127.3
72.3 75.4 84.4 367.2 89.5 93.6 95.2 99.5 377.8 803.7
44.0 53.9 61.2 64.3 67.3 70.4 79.4 342.6 84.5 88.6 90.2 94.5 357.8 754.3
7.4 4.8 4.6 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 24.6 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 20.0 49.4
1369.7 1708.1 1912.4 2052.9 1541.6 1520.3 1646.1 8673.3 1686.2 1808.0 1857.2 1918.1 7269.5 17650.9
----------------------------------- a=2. = =====a= ==22 -=Zz == a -::2:z=== :: zz~ z
94.1 107.1 108.0
13.1 12.2 14.2
52.2 45.9 50.8
28.8 55.0 55.0
0.0 -6.0 -12.0
127.5
14.9
57.6
55.0
0.0
1463.8 1815.2 2020.4 2180.4
%cams UZ:222 :::z3:X=ZZ
131.2 135.0 139.1 640.8 143.9 148.4
15.7 16.5 17.3 78.6 18.3 19.2
60.5 63.5 66.8 299.2 70.6 74.2
55.0 55.0 55.0 275.0 55.0 55.0
0.0 0.0 0.0 -12.0 0.0 0.0
1672.9 1655.3 1785.2 9314.1 1830.1 1956.4
====3a === 2222 czzz z2~ U~2Z2 was====
153.0
20.1
77.9
55.0
0.0
2010.2
157.9
21.1
81.8
55.0
0.0
2076.0
Z=X333U
603.2
78.7
304.5
220.0
0.0
7872.7
1351.1
169.5
649.6
550.0
-18.0
19002.0
::::azzs
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TABLE 2 PROGRAM. FUND. AND CASH FLOW CATEGORIES
PROGRAM CATEGORIES AND SUBCATEGORIES:
PRODUCT:
CNST Construction
TOPS Traffic Operations
PREV Preservation (Resurfacing)
BRDG Bridge
ROW Right-of-Way
PTO Public Transportation Operations
TRTF Toll Facilities Revolving Trust Fund
2080 Special Local Gov't program
EDEV State Economic Development Program
SUPPORT:
PET Preliminary Engineering (In-house)
PEC Preliminary Engineering (Consultant)
CEII Construction Engineering and Inspecuon (In-house)
CEIC Construction Engineering and Inspecton (Consultant)
RWUI Right-of-Way Support (in-house)
RWO Right-of-Way Support (Consultant)
M&R Materials and Research
PLAN Planning
PTOO Public Transportation Operations Support
MAINTENANCE AND OPERATIONS:
RMNT Routine Maintenance
TE Traffic Engineering
TOLO Toll Operations
MCC Motor Carrier Compliance
ADMINISTRATION:
ADMN Administration
FCO Fixed Capital Outlay
PROGRAM CATEGORIES AND SUBCATEGORIES:
PRODUCT:
CNST Construction -
TOPS Traffic Operations
PREV Preservation (Resurfacing)
BRDG Bridge
ROW Right-of-Way
PTO Public Transportation Operations
TRTF Toll Facilities Revolving Trust Fund
2080 Special Local Gov't program
EDEV State Economic Development Program
SUPPORT:
PEI Preliminary Engineenng (In-house)
PEC Preliminary Engineering (Consultant)
CEII Construction Engineering and Inspection (In-house)
CEIC Construction Engineenng and Inspection (Consultant)
RWII Right-of-Way Support (In-house)
RWO Right-of-Way Support (Consultant)
M&R Materials and Research
PLAN Planning
PTOO Public Transportation Operations Support
MAINTENANCE AND OPERATIONS:
RMNT Routine Maintenance
TE Traffic Engineenng
TOLO Toll Operations
MCC Motor Carrier Compliance
ADMINISTRATION:
ADMN Administration
FCO Fixed Capital Outlay
FUNDS:
I,ACI
IR.ACIR
O.F.A.
100% FED
100% STATE
TURNPIKE
TOLL.LOC.OTHER
BOND
above with"/ROW"
CSX
Interstate. Advanced Const Int
Interstate Rehab. AC Int Rehab
Other Federal Aid
100% Federal Financing
100% State Financing
Financed with Turnpike Bonds
Toll. Local. or other financing
Bond Financea (not Turnpike)
Indicates funds for Right-of-way
CSX Railroad Corridor Purchase
CASH FLOW CATEGORIES:
Federal Aid Interstate Construction
Other Federal Aid Construction
Federal Aid Preservation ana Traffic Operations
Federal Aid Bridge Construction
Federal Aid Rights-of-Way
Consultants
State Construction
State Preservation and Traffic Operations
State Bridge Construction
Other Construction
State Rights-of Way
Public Transportation Operations
Budget - Flow in Year of Commitment
Other - Special Cash Flow Situations
FUNDS:
I,ACI
IRACIR
O.F.A.
100% FED
100% STATE
TURNPIKE
TOLL.LOC,OTHER
BOND
above with"/ROW"
CSX
Interstate. Advanced Const Int
Interstate Rehab, AC Int Rehab
Other Federal Aid
100% Federal Financing
100% State Financing
Financed with Turnpike Bonds
Toll, Local, or other financing
Bond Financed (not Turnpike)
Indicates funds for Right-of-way
CSX Railroad Corridor Purchase
CASH FLOW CATEGORIES:
Federal Aid Interstate Construcuon
Other Federal Aid Construction
Federal Aid Preservation and Traffic Operations
Federal Aid Bridge Construction
Federal Aid Rights-of-Way
Consultants
State Construction
State Preservation and Traffic Operations
State Bridge Construction
Other Construction
State Rights-of Way
Public Transportation Operations
Budget - Flow in Year of Commitment
Other - Special Cash Flow Situations
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PROARAM PLAN PR06RESS REPORT
1I = Variance + or - 101)
PLANi ADOPT90F
PROGRAM YEAR 1989-90 iPr
COMMIT
ior Yr
Actual
TTMENTS : ----------------------- OGRESS AS OF JUNE 30,1990 -------------------- l
Currentirl(----COMMITTMENTS----kl--CASH FLOWS (ALL FUNDS-->I(--CASH FLOWS (STTF ONLY--)I
Plannea I Plannea Actual Var I I Planned Actual Var I : Planned Actual Var 1
1. PRODUCT
Expessway Const.
Arterial Highways
Right Of Wav
Aviation
Transit
Rail
Safety
Resurtace/Rehab
Bridge
II. PRODUCT SUPPORT
Prelininary Eng.
Const.Enq.Inspect.
R/ Support
Material & Research
Planning
Public Transit Oper
1II.OPERAT.t MAINT.
Routine Maintenance
Traffic Engineering
Toll Operations
Motor Carrier Coto.
IV. ADMINISTRATION
A. Administration
B. Fired Capital
V. LOCAL 60V'T REIMBURSE
TOTAL PROGRAM
VI. OTHER
A. Dept. Data Center
8. Mobile Equip.(CME)
C. Non-Oper.fransfers
D. Offset-Pay Package
TOTAL BUDGET
738.0 1136.7 1
345.4 229.0 1
115.6 157.8 I
26.4 422.0 I
34.5 44.8 I
24.7 22.8 1
50.6 45.2 1
13.9 10.7 1
34.7 55.0 1
92.2 149.4 I
216.9 271.2 I
147.1 103.0 1
74.0 72.5 I
41.1 46.7 I
28.2 24.4 i
21.4 18.9 1
5.1 5.8 I
263.4 241.5 1
170.4 159.4 1
10.9 10.9 1
73.6 01.9 1
8.5 4
51.4 52.7 1
44.0 53.9 1
7.4 4.8 I
0.0 3.0 1
1369.7 1708.1 1
94.1 107.1 
13.1 12.2 1
52.2 45.9 1
28.8 55.0 1
0.0 -6.0 1
---- ----- I
1463.8 1815.2 I
1136.7 176.0 -141 t 1 334.6
:29.0 240.0 51 I 292.3
57.8 152.0 -41 4 159.2
422.0 200.0 -29%1 1 162.0
44.8 42.0 -.1 1 40,0
22.8 20.0 -121 1 1 18.0
45.2 30.0 -34% : I 50.0
10.7 10.0 -l I 10.5
55.0 52.0 -51 1 18.5
149.4 130.0 -131 1 1 34.1
271.2 275.0 :: 1 256.2
103.0 120.0 171 1 1 150.2
72.5 72.0 -1 I 40.0
46.7 78.0 -19j1 1 25.0
24.4 24.0 -21 1 22.0
18.9 17.0 -101 t I 15.0
5.8 4.0 -311 t I 4.0
241.5 239.0 -11 1 231.0
159.4 160.0 )1 1 155.0
10.8 8.0 -261 I 1 8.0
61.9 62.0 3 1 60.0
9.4 Q.0 -41 1 8.0
58.7 55.0 -61 1 55.5
53.9 52.0 -41 1 50.0
4.8 2.0 -381 1 5.5
3.0 0.0 1 5.0
1708.1 1545.0 -101 1 1 1382.3
z===z= ==== === 1 ===== z
107.1
12.2
45.9
55.0
6.0
1815.2
92.0
12.0
46.0
40.0
-6.0
1637.0
-141 1
-21%
01
-271 1
01
-10%1 8
100.0
11.0
29.0
50.0
6.0
1482.3
~26.0 -131 I1
225.0 -301 1 1
.70.0 ~. I
136.0 -!61 1 1
:3.0 -51 1
.7.0 -61 1
48.0 -41 1
5.0 -521 I
.9.0 :I 1
38.0 5% I
:20.0 1 I
175.0 171 1 I
50.0 251 t I
20.0 -201 t I
20.0 -91 1
12.0 -201 1 I
3.0 -25% 1 1
223.5 -31 1
50.0 -3% I
-.0 -131 1
58.0 -31 1
3.5 61 1
52.0 -tl I
48.0 -41 1
4.0 -271 I
5.0 0%1 I
1286.5 -71 1
====z ==== I
q9.0
10.0
29.0
55.0
4.0
1385.5
-11
-41%
-31%
101
-331
-7%
410.8 418.0 2% I
.00.0 9.o -1 I
150.0 140.0 -71 1
t3.0 '5.0 191 1 1
12.0 1.0 -81 I
5.0 6.0 201 1 1
35.0 28.0 91 1
4.0 4.0 01 1
12.0 15.0 25% 1
29.8 :0.0 11 I
172.0 174.0 1 I
112.0 110.0 -2% 1
2.0 28.0 121 1 1
12.0 12.0 01 1
10.0 12.0 201 8 1
:0.0 11.0 101 1 1
3.0 1.0 -671 3 1
220.0 219.0 01 1
150.0 :49.0 -1% I
4.0 5.0 25% 3 I
58.0 58.0 01 1
8.0 7.0 -131 3 1
51.0 52.0 21 1
47.0 48.0 21 1
4.0 4.0 01 1
5.0 5.0 01 1
858.8 869.0 11 1
===2=== ==2 ZZ=
100.0 99.0 -11 I
11.0 10.0 -91 1
29.0 28.0 -31 1
50.0 55.0 10%1 1
6.0 4.0 -331 t 1
95M.8 167.0 1 1
I :2222 2 2:::: I =2:22222 z==zazs:: =z2
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Appendix E
MTC Scoring Criteria for STP and CMAQ Programs
30 points MAINTAIN/SUSTAIN THE METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION
SYSTEM (MTS)
Rehabilitations and repiacements based on Management Systems are eligible for up
to the full 30 points. depending upon the portion of the project that will rehabilitate
the system, and the optimization of the proposed improvement with current
condition.
Rehabilitations not based on a management system. or for support infrastructure
like drainage, can oniv receive a maximum of 20 points.
30 vonts IMPROVE THE EFFICIENCY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE MTS
Safety and security, congestion relief, cost effectiveness, and freight movement are
the three subcategories where points can be assigned, up to a combined maximum of
30 points.
For both the safety and congestion relief criteria, the magnitude of the (safety or
congestion) problem addressed by the project is multiplied by the impact that the
project will have in eliminating or alleviating the problem. Guidelines for setting the
multipliers are included. and impact scores are based on shared empirical
experience (e.g. Class 1 bike paths are safer than Class 3).
Cost-effectiveness points measure the ratio of annual benefits in terms of total travel
time savings and operating cost savings for the project to annualized total project
costs. Cost-effectiveness scores are adjusted to reflect the median of all submitted
proiects.
Freight movement points are assigned based on the facility type and nature of the
proposed project.
15 pomits - SYSTEM EXPANSION
System expansion projects are first evaluated as to whether or not the meet current
demand through the use of a multiplier based on average daily traffic and existing
level-of-service. Again, the impact that the project will have in meeting demand is
set based on shared empirical experience (e.g. the addition of HOV lanes has more
impact than ramp metering).
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(Continued)
Summary of MTC Scoring Criteria for STP and CMAQ Programs
25 voints - EXTERNAL IIMPACTS
Air cualitv improvement, land use poiicv support, energy conservation, and
imviementation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) are the four
subcategonies where points can be assigned. up to a combined maximum of 25
points.
Projects with positive air quality impacts are awarded up to the full 25 points if thev
implement MTC-adopted Transportation Control Measures (TCMs). Projects which
are oniv partially TCMS are awarded proportionately smailer point values, and
TCMS are grouped according to their effectiveness in cleaning the air.
A project can also be awarded up to 8 points if it supports land use policies that
foster a mode shift away from single occupant vehicle trips on regional facilities. Up
to 10 points can be awarded for projects with demonstrable energy conservation or
modal shift benefits. Up to 20 points can be awarded for implementation of ADA
enhancements.
100 TOTA L POINTS POSSIBLE
Planning projects are prorated according to the nearness and necssity of the planning.
project to direct and immediate transportation improvements.
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